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ABSTRACT
In comparing a considerable amount of the reportage, analysis and candor 
preceding this study, there is one conclusion that virtually all evaluations on United States 
public diplomacy after September 2001 would agree on: the consolidated efforts of the 
U.S. government to inform, influence and engage with foreign publics in pursuit of its 
national interest are deeply flawed. This gloomy outlook is borne out by identified 
deficiencies in strategy, coordination and organization, which have furthermore attracted 
intense scrutiny in response to opinion polls showing consistently low favorability 
towards the United States by foreign populations. A wide range of observers has drawn 
attention to various aspects of the overall diagnosis, and consequently formed an active 
segment of the general scholarship on public diplomacy.
What enriches the discussion on the U.S. case is when the focus turns to positing 
solutions, as the ensuing debate invokes historical, theoretical and futuristic perspectives 
on the processes, roles, and activities considered within public diplomacy’s scope. This 
study isolates two broad explanations for the failure of post-9/11 U.S. public diplomacy. 
The advocacy model represents the American public diplomacy ‘tradition’ of campaign 
style, one-way information flows, while the advisory model represents a two-way, 
‘dialogic’ mode that has been championed by proponents of the ‘new’ public diplomacy. 
This study views American public diplomacy as situated at a crossroads as it solves the 
riddles of its failures -  to further embrace tradition or adopt a new path.
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For Emi
INTRODUCTION
“To be successful in its foreign and domestic policies alike...[a 
government] must recognize that the conflict between the requirements o f  
good foreign policy and the preferences o f  public opinion is in the nature 
o f things and hence, unavoidable... ”
- Hans J. Morgenthau, P olitics Am ong N ations1
One of the central issues that has preoccupied both scholars of international 
history as well as students of International Relations (IR) are the deeper reasons that lead 
great powers to rise, mature and ultimately decline. Empires such as those of Rome and 
Britain have been the subject of many well-known studies, and aside from the explicit 
reasons they offer for how great powers become vulnerable, often there is also implicit 
guidance for rising and current powers to heed. Around the time of the fall of 
communism in the late 1980’s, this attention turned to the United States. Historian Paul 
Kennedy’s The Rise and Fall o f  the Great Powers (1987) presented both a detailed 
chronicle of fallen empires as well as a tacit warning to contemporary powers to
'y
understand the errors that led to their forebears’ demise. Kennedy predicted the United 
States, beset by its own immense but imperfect might, would overextend its resources and 
give way to the would-be successors to global primacy. Soon thereafter, IR scholar 
Joseph Nye would issue his dissent in the form of Bound to Lead (1990), a strong
1 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle fo r  Power and Peace, Brief ed. (Boston, MA: 
McGraw Hill, 1993), 164.
2 See for example Edward Gibbon, The History o f  the Decline and Fall o f the Roman Empire, ed. David 
Womersley, 3 vols (London: Allen Lane, 1994); Lawrence James, The Rise and Fall o f  the British Empire 
(London: Little, Brown, 1994).
3 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall o f  the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from  
1500-2000 (New York: Random House, 1987).
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affirmation that the pre-eminent position of the United States was indeed secure, 
assuming it could transition its military power and what Nye termed ‘co-optive’ or ‘soft’ 
power so that it could respond to future challenges.4
In the years since the United States sustained attacks by terrorists on 11 
September 2001 (hereafter referred to as ‘9/11’), there is no doubt which nation retains 
the world’s most formidable military, which has been showcased in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
However, America’s powers of attraction, its allure and credibility -  all those aspects that 
would determine its image and reputation in the world -  have declined considerably. In 
2003, the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) took notice of the increasingly antagonistic 
relationship between the United States and the rest of the world. In its report the CFR 
found that “there is a growing cultural gulf between the United States and much of the 
world. These two groups view the world through vastly different cultural lenses that 
impose conflicting sets of values.”5 Respondents to a series of foreign public opinion 
surveys taken after 2001 have expressed rising distrust of America’s role in the world, 
increasing dismay over its post-9/11 assertiveness in the global war on terror and other 
theatres, and accumulating disapproval of American foreign policy.
While some dismiss outright the importance of foreign populations understanding, 
if not approving, America’s international intentions, there has been broad concern across 
the political spectrum in the United States and elsewhere about its fractured relations 
overseas. Some are mainly concerned with leveraging these relations to gain foreign 
acquiescence as a means to achieve policy ends. Others are troubled by the damage done
4 Joseph S. Nye, Jr, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature o f  American Power (New York: Basic Books, 
1990).
5 Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force on Public Diplomacy, Finding America's Voice: A 
Strategy fo r Reinvigorating U.S. Public Diplomacy (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2003), 24. 
(hereafter ‘CFR Report’)
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to America’s image and reputation, and lament the improbable belief of some populations 
that the United States may be unleashing more harm upon the world than good.
At the epicenter of these concerns lies a catalyst of change in the form of public 
diplomacy. A scholar or practitioner of public diplomacy would doubtlessly agree with 
the above prescription by Morgenthau, since his premise conceives public opinion as an 
essential factor in the setting and execution of policies be they foreign or domestic. 
Because this study presumes public diplomacy to be an act of political communication 
occurring between a government or non-governmental organization and members of a 
foreign rather than domestic public, problems with public diplomacy often surround 
conflicts over foreign policy. More to the point of this study, in the post-9/11 era the 
United States has been engulfed in Morgenthau’s dilemma with its foreign policy on one 
side and the opposing preferences of many foreign populations on the other. 
Consequently, the American practice during this time has become the most observed and 
studied example of public diplomacy in the world not for being a model of success, but 
because it has done so little to assist with the many conflicts the United States is dealing 
with.
For this study, there are four main observations from developments in 
international affairs noted for their connections to these conflicts. They are: (1) an acute 
proliferation of anti-Americanism shown to be positively correlated with post-9/11 U.S. 
foreign policy, (2) the inability of U.S. public diplomacy to control anti-American 
sentiment and international criticisms of American foreign policy, (3) changes in the 
global communications dynamic that are leading to well informed and more empowered 
citizens worldwide as they challenge the international agenda of the United States, and (4) 
a dearth of scholarship and relevant literature that would otherwise be useful for learning 
more about the nuances of public diplomacy, and how -  if at all -  it may illuminate ways
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in which the American practice can be reconsidered to function effectively in this new 
era. Exploring all of these themes, it is hoped, will provide more information about why 
U.S. public diplomacy since 9/11 is widely recognized as having failed in its objectives, a 
point on which nearly all observers agree to be a fact that must be redressed.
Further enriching the discussion on the U.S. case is when the focus turns to 
positing solutions. Ideas for solutions often invoke historical, theoretical and futuristic 
perspectives on the definition, process, roles and activities considered to be within the 
scope of public diplomacy. Joseph Nye has attempted this by portraying the debate on 
public diplomacy as a soft power discourse and weaving together a theory on state 
behavior with the globalization of international communications technologies (ICT’s).6 
Diplomatic, foreign policy analysis and international communications scholars also point 
out that the increasing relevance of non-state actors in international relations is changing 
traditional uni-directional information flows from states to non-states into one that 
resembles a ‘dialogic’ mode, which has been captured under the rubric of the ‘new’ 
public diplomacy. Whatever the utility of these arguments, they have helped to compel a 
steady inquiry into the contemporary and future state of public diplomacy in the United 
States, and stimulated new thinking on the study and practice of public diplomacy 
globally. Therefore, the majority of analysis in this study will survey the solutions 
discourses, preceded by these main questions: Why has American public diplomacy on 
the post-9/11 era failed? How might it be transformed to respond to the demands of the 
era, in which America is a superpower in an increasingly anti-American atmosphere? 
What strategic and organizational factors are inhibiting the public diplomacy process in 
the United States from maximizing its effectiveness? How might the behaviors of
6 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).
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American public diplomats and their policymaking superiors be altered to make this 
possible?
In 1968, James Rosenau issued the bold observation that “politics everywhere” 
were becoming “related to politics everywhere else.” One way of reading this statement 
may underscore the frequency with which powerful nations insert themselves into the 
internal political debates of another country when those debates are seen to hold 
ramifications extending beyond that country’s borders. A more recent view of Rosenau’s 
observation may devolve such linkages beyond the role of mere nation-states down to the 
general public, thus rephrasing the original statement to read “politics everywhere matter 
to publics everywhere else.” This poses a radical new way to view the connection 
between foreign policy and public opinion since most prior studies in this area presume 
foreign policy discourses to be a domestic negotiation between decisionmakers and the
O
domestic public. The theory put forth in this study contends that the foreign policy 
discourses of one nation are more penetrable by foreign publics who are not merely 
interested in outcomes, but also are becoming more capable of influencing foreign policy 
debates occurring internally.
American public diplomacy lies at a crossroads at present since it has not yet 
committed to a course that acknowledges the enhanced communicative powers held by 
foreign publics. In the ensuing analysis, the roots of failure for post-9/11 U.S. public 
diplomacy and the continued debate over solutions shall be portrayed as a product of two
7 James N. Rosenau, “Introduction: Political Science in a Shrinking World,” in Linkage Politics, ed. James 
N. Rosenau (New York: Free Press, 1969), 2.
8 Ole R. Holsti, Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy (Ann Arbor, MI: University o f  Michigan 
Press, 2004); Robert Y. Shapiro and Lawrence R. Jacobs, “Who Leads and Who Follows? U.S. Presidents, 
Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy,” in Decisionmaking in a Glass House: Mass Media, Public Opinion, 
and American and European Foreign Policy in the 21s' Century, ed. Brigitte L. Nacos, Robert Y. Shapiro 
and Pierangelo Isemia (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), 223-245; Benjamin I. Page and 
Robert Y. Shapiro, “Effect of Public Opinion on Policy,” The American Political Science Review 77, no. 1 
(March 1983): 175-190.
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competing models -  ‘advocacy’ and ‘advisory’ -  and their three related approaches -  
‘information’ and ‘influence’ for the former, and ‘engagement’ for the latter. As should 
be expected of a rigorous analysis of an isolated period, this study frequently 
contextualizes U.S. public diplomacy’s contemporary problems as a product of preceding 
events. That the advisory and advocacy models remain to be reconciled is a precedent 
that first came to light in American Cold War-era public diplomacy. The most extensive 
historical analyses to take place here date from the end of the Cold War and after a 
lengthy period of advocacy model, information- and influence-driven public diplomacy. 
This will help the reader not only to understand conditions of the post-9/11 era as strongly 
influenced by events of the prior decade, but also to note a trend in which certain 
conditions suggest the advisory model, engagement-driven approach may be on the rise. 
In truth, determinations are inconclusive as to which model the United States may adopt 
for the future. A case study on the advocacy model strategy of the Cold War revisits its 
legacy as a success, but notes the challenges of adopting that model for the present and 
future. At the same time, there is an emerging undercurrent of scholarship extolling the 
advisory model, which also faces significant barriers at organizational and coordinating 
levels to dominate at this time. Conclusions shall elaborate on the critical questions to be 
answered in order for a clear and effective strategy to be realized and speculate on how 
the future of this problem may unfold.
Research Structure
This study consists of eight chapters divided across four generally assigned 
purposes: definition, historical background (with some analysis), concepts and analysis, 
and conclusions. Chapter One sets out the research problematic in detail and begins 
dealing with main questions giving rise to this study. It will be useful here to find public
15
diplomacy’s practical evolution paralleling a theoretical evolution as well. 
Communications scholars have worked over many years to prove a correlation between 
foreign policymaking and public opinion. Their works dealt almost exclusively with 
policymaking in the domestic arena, but by the 1990’s Joseph Nye’s ‘soft power’ thesis 
would probe new territory in speculating a correlation between foreign policymaking and 
foreign public opinion. The first chapter shall frame the American public diplomacy 
problem in the evolution of a potentially new way of interpreting the impact of foreign 
public opinion on states and organizations, and the nature of their communications. 
Before proceeding further into the American case, Chapter Two will attempt to establish a 
basis of understanding for terms and concepts that will appear throughout the forthcoming 
pages. The meaning and nuance of public diplomacy are the subjects of regular debate 
amongst the scholar and practitioner communities. It is not the intention of the chapter to 
articulate a concise, all-encompassing definition, but rather to explore the range of how 
public diplomacy has appeared in practice. The following two chapters comprise the 
historical section that will focus on recent periods of transformation in the American 
pursuit of international affairs, and the resulting impact on American approaches to public 
diplomacy. Starting with the fall of communism, Chapter Three traces the present-day 
structural and organizational weaknesses of U.S. public diplomacy by way of shifts in the 
global power dynamic occurring between the end of the Cold War and leading up to the 
events of 9/11. Certain seminal events of that period along with their repercussions 
determined to a large extent American domestic regard for public diplomacy and, as it 
turns out, facilitated its decade-long decline. This chapter sets out three objectives: to 
provide a backdrop for interpreting this decline as a result of shifts in the post-Cold War 
power dynamic and subsequent reshuffling of U.S. foreign policy priorities; to give an 
account of events directly related to the dispersal and debilitation of U.S. public
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diplomacy; and linking the combination of these effects to the weakened public 
diplomacy apparatus in place at the outset of the post-9/11 era. Because these effects are 
produced by sources both endogenous and exogenous to the United States, considerations 
of foreign public opinion and its ability to influence U.S. foreign policy start to form.
Chapter Four extends the historical survey through the next transformational 
period, the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. The declared global 
war on terror heralded a bold projection of American power, complete with a provocative 
security doctrine and ambitious grand strategy. After a prolonged period of decline, U.S. 
public diplomacy assumed a central role in bolstering the new American agenda and 
persuading world publics, particularly those of the Arab-Muslim world, of its necessity. 
Yet in the process of its reawakening, it was discovered that public diplomacy offered 
virtually no resistance to the swelling tide of resentment towards the United States from 
the wider world. Upon viewing this failure, American political figures and public 
intellectuals called into question the readiness of public diplomacy and its apparent 
ineffectiveness in changing foreign public opinion. A host of investigative reports, many 
issued by the U.S. Government Accountability Office revealed vast deficiencies in 
operations of public diplomacy and the lack of an integrated strategy.
While it is not surprising that the revival of interest in U.S. public diplomacy 
comes at a time of its greatest need, most intriguing are the many vigorous debates about 
expanding on the unsatisfactory state of the U.S. public diplomacy apparatus since 9/11 
and what should be done about it. These debates have proved stimulating for scholarship, 
if not immediate useful for practice, since they shed new light on how to define public 
diplomacy, what exists within its scope, and how its roles apply to the predicament faced 
by the United States. But the U.S. case has also caused a ripple effect of igniting new 
interest in public diplomacy from IR scholars, diplomatic historians, and communications
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specialists. For the first time, public diplomacy is being construed in the empirical sense 
as possessing an orderly range of activities. This has helped to create a context for what 
is happening to American public diplomacy at present and raises the possibility that it 
may be poised for a transformation into what has become known as the ‘new’ public 
diplomacy. Chapters Five and Six are studies in the contrast between the American 
public diplomacy ‘tradition’, represented by the advocacy model, and a possible future 
represented by the advisory model. Chapter Five examines the period regarded as the 
golden era of U.S. public diplomacy - the Cold War. It probes into a thread of logic that 
yearns for the restoration of public diplomacy’s Cold War-era standing. This logic holds 
that the spread of liberal democracy behind the Berlin Wall owes a debt to the Voice of 
America and Radio Free Europe; that cultural exchanges with influential members of 
Soviet society helped create the groundswell that undermined the Communist regime; and 
that public diplomats made these outcomes possible by being equipped with the necessary 
tools and support. The fall of the Soviet Union is used to promote to their notion that 
public diplomacy of this period was a success, and furthermore, that the problems of 
today would be remedied by adopting lessons from the past.
The historical memory and lessons of Cold War-era public diplomacy both loom 
large in the defense of the advocacy model. This chapter tests such a defense by filtering 
claims of success in how public diplomacy approaches of information, influence and 
engagement were performed. By subdividing public diplomacy activities in these ways, 
determining the merits of public diplomacy during this time become more precise..
Chapter Six introduces the concept of the ‘new’ public diplomacy and its own 
claim to a sounder model and approach for communicating and policymaking within an 
ever-changing international system. The point of departure here will be to first establish 
its self-ascribed strengths, most notably in managing the proliferation in ICT’s; blurring
18
divisions between citizen and diplomat; and making policy with awareness of the interests 
of target populations. A recurring theme within new public diplomacy logic is the idea of 
‘listening’ and the contention that, just as two people perform a dialogue, states have it 
within their means to ‘listen’ and in so doing somehow confer a sense of 
acknowledgement to the ‘speaking’ party. The notion lies at the heart of a distinction 
drawn between the ‘self-help’ system professed by the realist school of thought and the 
‘complex interdependence’ ideal set forth by liberal internationalists, since it suggests that 
states will readily sacrifice of their own self-interest to satisfy the demands of external 
parties. Nye’s ‘soft power’ thesis will be seen to capture well the idealistic nature of new 
public diplomacy thinking and work to disavow ‘self-help’ inclinations that have 
historically justified advocacy public diplomacy. However, it will also be seen that Nye’s 
conception of public diplomacy as a form of power does not resonate completely with the 
collaborative emphasis to be found in new public diplomacy thinking.
Chapter Seven draws the vision laid out by ‘new public diplomacy’ theorists in 
the previous chapter back into the case of the United States, where it is seen that a number 
of constraints obstruct the potential for advisory model public diplomacy from assuming 
the dominant position above the advocacy model in its the overall strategic direction. The 
argument outlaying the obstacles in place is ordered on the past and current relationship 
between the US public diplomacy organization and strategy. From a structural point of 
view, the case will first be made that dysfunction in US public diplomacy organizations in 
the post 9/11 era rests on a long legacy of unsettled issues. Chief among them is the as 
yet resolved matter of how close public diplomacy practitioners should be to the 
policymaking process. The behavior of successive administrations will show that 
marginalization from the process represented the normal approach to this question. The 
second structural weakness deals with inconsistent coordination efforts, an indirect
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consequence of instability in organization but also reflective of sporadic interest exhibited 
by the chief executive. As a consequence of these structural inadequacies, public 
diplomacy strategy remains ineffective as well as an anachronism in light of 
contemporary challenges.
The study moves to conclusion in Chapter Eight by first summarizing the chief 
points made in the previous chapters. It follows on the themes of Chapter Seven that 
discussed practical obstacles standing in the way of organizational and strategic change. 
It will elaborate on reasons to believe that regardless of whatever organizational and 
strategic perfections may come, there will remain limits on what public diplomacy can 
achieve on its own. This is caused by two factors: the notion that American foreign 
policy undercuts its own public diplomacy efforts, and that American political culture is 
given to underutilizing public diplomacy. A differentiation is made between limits and 
limitations since public diplomacy seems to inherently possess the latter in ways its 
effects can be measured and that they often require patience to materialize. Ultimately, 
this study will submit that change to post-9/11 U.S. public diplomacy will not occur from 
within because the limits of foreign policy and culture are too intractable. They will 
instead come from outside, and certain catalysts of change will be mentioned to support 
this point. The study then closes with some thoughts on future directions for public 
diplomacy research building on the findings described here.
It is with the key insights on the American case fully clarified that the study’s 
concluding ideas illuminate directions for the future study of public diplomacy. Points 
for consideration shall revolve around the International Relations-Intemational 
Communications relationship in seeking further elaboration on eroding barriers between 
domestic and foreign interests with respect to foreign policy, a re-evaluation of the state’s 
role in the ‘information society’, and future prospect of non-state diplomats.
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CHAPTER 1 : A NEW ERA FOR U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
This chapter opens the study by placing the post-9/11 state of U.S. public 
diplomacy within what is being viewed as a major shift in the way governments and the 
public communicate with each other. The shift is amplified at this time not only by the 
deteriorating relations the United States shares with the foreign public, but also by the 
increased assertiveness with which non-governmental organizations and individuals are 
impacting political processes on an international scale. The combination of these forces 
lends weight to the argument of many experts knowledgeable in diplomatic affairs along 
with a concerned group of communications scholars that the problems of America’s 
standing in the post-9/11 world can be traced in some way to the poor planning and 
ineffective execution of its public diplomacy. An introduction of this argument and the 
wide-ranging search for solutions shall appear in the forthcoming pages. It must be made 
clear first and foremost that the changing dynamics in which public diplomacy is pursued 
is not limited to the American problem to be discussed at length here, but the case of the 
United States does present a timely opportunity of exploring how even the world’s most 
powerful country is coming to grips with this complex international communications 
environment. Such a claim raises the prospect of a new theory about the linkages 
between policymaking and the public interest, a theory which may be poised to expand 
current research on such linkages from the exclusively domestic realm to the foreign.
It was not always the case that a powerful country had to contend with the 
intervention of foreign publics in its internal affairs. There was a time when the division 
of labor in maintaining a sovereign state appeared relatively straightforward. A portrait
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by Clausewitz described a neatly divided dynamic shared by the state, its armed forces, 
and its general public.9 It might have appeared as follows: A state establishes its 
legitimacy by holding a monopoly on the use of force over a defined territory. The 
monopoly on force is abetted by the state’s armed forces, and these two bodies protect 
and rely on each other in that the army safeguards the interests of the state at home and 
abroad while the state devotes its treasure to financing it. Both the army and the state 
depend on a third party in the network, the public, to consent to their activities while the 
public enjoys the protective power of the army and welfare provided by the state. Foreign 
affairs were conducted- by a close-knit and exclusive group which assumed sole 
responsibility for all negotiations dealing with such matters as the waging of wars and 
other projections of military power, the establishment of treaties, covenants and other 
regimes, and agreements governing international commerce and the flow of goods.10
If the general public really retained such limited bargaining power over the actions 
of the state and the army domestically, no such power existed for the public at the 
negotiating table in matters of diplomacy. According to Nicolson, in the modem 
diplomatic system prior to the First World War participation in the diplomatic process 
amounted to the dealings of public servants anointed by sovereign states to conduct 
negotiations under secretive conditions.
9 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, translated and edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1976).
10 Stephen D. Krasner, “International Political Economy: Abiding Discord,” Review o f International 
Political Economy 1: 13-19; Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1999).
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1.1 Foreign Policy and the Public
A turning point arrived when Wilsonian liberal internationalism established itself 
during and after the war as a new means for managing the international system. The 
notions of “open covenants openly arrived at” and governance conducted transparently 
for public view came into consideration. Emerging from this sense of openness the 
practice of publishing treaties became widespread for the purpose of share products of 
negotiations with members of the public. Polities could watch their leaders commiserate 
with other leaders at summits. But the more impressive changes during this time of 
openness derive from the polities themselves. For instance, public participation in the
thpursuit of international affairs has increased dramatically during the 20 century. One 
explanation for this may be the astounding proliferation throughout the twentieth century 
of universal suffrage, which Freedom House contends rose from zero percent of all 
nations in 1900 to 62 percent by the 1990’s.11 Polities could express their opinions on 
domestic and foreign interests with unprecedented vigor via the ballot box. But how has 
it come about that the expressed views of such group have come to impinge on the affairs 
of another country or shape events occurring far away? At the start of the new century, it 
has become evident that foreign publics, spearheaded by sectors of civil society, 
businesses and non-official elites, are seeking to (and often do) influence political 
activities within other states more frequently than ever before. Conversely, states are 
placing a higher premium on the opinions of foreign populations in addition to their own 
to advance national interests.
11 Freedom House, “End o f the Century Survey Finds Dramatic Gains for Democracy,” Freedom House (7 
December 1999), http://www.ffeedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=70&release=74 (accessed on 2 August 
2006).
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Much could be said to explain the causes of these changes and indeed already has. 
A burgeoning catalogue of literature on globalization includes numerous investigations on 
the continuing transformation of public participation in international politics, and thereby 
validating Rosenau’s early notion on the interrelated nature of international politics. Two 
leading causes for this blurring of borders stand apart, and it is not coincidental that they 
are interconnected. One lies in patterns of social activity that have gradually escalated 
issues of human concern from a state-centric to transnational level, a theory supported by 
an expanding number of transnational issues that supersede the responsibility of any one 
state. The growing legions of stakeholders concerned with state of global ecology, 
international trade and finance, population migrations, organized crime and proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction are all prime examples of such issues.
1.2 The Information Catalyst
Enabling the flows of ideas, money, goods and people is a robust infrastructure of
information communication technologies (ICT’s), and it is arguably this aspect above all
1 ^
that is reshaping societies and allowing transnational social activity to thrive. By 
unleashing a new opportunity for populations to profoundly impact the world at large, 
information technology is to international political participation as suffrage was to the 
proliferation of democracies -  a conduit between public expression and political change. 
No nation understands the power of this transformation better than the United States, 
which boasts the greatest number of internet users of any single country, the world’s 
richest companies, active segments of civil society in development and humanitarian
12 Manuel Castells, The Rise o f  the Network Society, vol. 1 of The Information Age: Economy, Society and 
Culture, 2nd ed. (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2000), 500-509.
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causes, and influential media and entertainment industries exporting messages and images 
from the United States across the globe.
In the political arena, the dynamism of information resources has forever altered 
the way publics participate in elections, policy debates, lobbying campaigns and decisions 
involving military interventions. The internet unleashed new avenues for campaign 
fundraising and other forms of political action. From the first broadcast battles in 
Vietnam to the 4CNN effect’, television has narrowed the proximity between audiences 
and events in faraway places, with images so. stark that they have impacted the public 
mood time and again to astonishing effect. Public displays of political expression are in 
themselves newsworthy and happen to influence publics elsewhere.
Due to the fact that information technologies have aided in elevating social 
activity to the transnational level and conferred broader powers of political participation 
to the general public, it has therefore become apparent that governments in general and 
particularly the United States must not only engage with a complex domestic 
constituency, but an increasingly potent foreign constituency as well.
1.3 Conversations with the World
To do this, states employ a set of political communications tools broadly known as 
“public diplomacy.” According to the Edward R. Murrow Center for Public Diplomacy, 
it “deals with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign 
policies.”
“It encompasses dimensions o f  international relations beyond traditional 
diplomacy; the cultivation by governments o f  public opinion in other 
countries; the interaction o f  private groups and interests in one country 
with those o f  another; the reporting o f foreign affairs and its impact on 
policy; communication between those whose job is communication, as 
between diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the processes o f  inter-
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cultural communications...Central to public diplomacy is the1 ^transnational flow o f information and ideas."
Officially, the United States has been practicing public diplomacy since before World 
War Two, although it was during that war that public diplomacy truly assumed an 
important role in communicating with foreign audiences through radio, starting in 1942 
with the first overseas transmissions of Voice of America. The ensuing Cold War 
heralded the golden years of American public diplomacy. Driven by the United States 
Information Agency (USIA), Presidents from Eisenhower to Reagan relied on public 
diplomacy officials to inform citizens of the Communist bloc countries about world 
events, to embed the influences of democracy and capitalism into the popular discourse, 
and to conduct a multitude of exchanges between Americans and foreign counterparts. 
With the capacity to project image-enhancing content and influence populations in a 
variety of ways, the United States could afford to think of public diplomacy as a 
monologue directed at publics abroad. ‘Soft power’ thinking resembled more of a 
prolonged election campaign in the imagination of policymakers, and the attraction of 
America, distinguished by the Soviet alternative, could almost be relied upon to sell itself.
However, changes in the international system since the end of the Cold War and 
more significantly since 9/11 have cast increased relevance upon the dynamic relationship 
between the United States, a vast and dynamic foreign constituency, and the complex 
channels that bridge their communications. Rather than making public diplomacy easier, 
the information catalyst has made it much harder for the United States to employ its 
traditional practices, and this has created an uncertain future for the ways it projects its
13 Edward R Murrow Center for Public Diplomacy, brochure, http://fletcher.tufts.edu/murrow/public- 
diplomacy.html (accessed 20 February 2005).
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image and maintains its credibility with world populations. Also unclear is how much 
merit remains in monologue-style communication, and whether expanding 
communications towards a dialogic format may assume a larger role. The merits and 
prospects of both shall be discussed in the pages ahead.
For the moment, this chapter shall attempt to explain why the time has arrived to 
deal with questions facing U.S. public diplomacy. The events surrounding 9/11 happened 
to converge with an initiative by the incoming administration of George W. Bush to 
invigorate its public diplomacy apparatus to aid in the pursuit of a new American foreign 
policy agenda. Chapter Three describes some of the initiative s and their impact, but it is 
important to first understand the connection between American foreign policy, its public 
diplomacy, and foreign public opinion. Within IR discourses, this connection served as a 
timely platform for the advancement of the ‘soft power’ thesis, and this study with further 
introduce new lines of thought inspired by the U.S. case.
1.4 A New Era for U.S. Public Diplomacy
On March 15, 2001 Secretary of State Colin Powell, barely two months into his 
post with the new administration of President George W. Bush, appeared before the 
House Budget Committee of the United States Congress to present his department’s 
budget for the coming fiscal year. To a question about the Department of State’s 
weakened diplomatic infrastructure, Powell responded with an enthusiastic and ambitious 
vision. “I am going to be bringing people into the public diplomacy function of the 
Department who are going to change from just selling us in the old USIA way to really 
branding foreign policy,” Powel announced. “Branding the Department, marketing the
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Department, marketing American values to the world.”14 At this time, no one could have 
foreseen how crucial public diplomacy would soon become, but it would be remembered 
as signaling the beginning of new era for U.S. public diplomacy. Progress on Powell’s 
vision was slow. His nomination of former advertising executive Charlotte Beers for 
Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs languished in Congress for over 
five months. But the decimating decline of public diplomacy in the post-Cold War years 
contrasted sharply with the frenzied wartime atmosphere to emerge after 9/11. The new 
mood accompanied sudden changes in the prioritization of America foreign policy and 
injected a sense of immediacy about improving public diplomacy. It took less than three 
weeks to complete Beers’ confirmation. She would subsequently enter into unparalleled 
trials facing the American image abroad. The immediate period following the attacks 
found worldwide sentiment strongly behind the United States. Almost without exception, 
world leaders publicly condemned the act and offered condolences. Even detractors of 
the United States, including Moammar al-Qaddafi of Libya, responded with sympathies 
and pledges of assistance. In Iran, President Mohammed Khatami expressed deep sorrow 
for all Americans and issued a strong condemnation: "Terrorism is denounced," he said, 
"and the international community must identify it and take fundamental steps for rooting 
it out."15 The headline of 12 September 2001 issue of Le Monde, the Parisian daily often 
critical of the United States read, “Nous sommes tous Americains” (“We are all 
Americans”).
What was undoubtedly one of the darkest hours in the history of the United States 
consequently shaped up to be a vivid moment of solidarity for the international
14 House Committee on the Budget, State Department Budget Priorities, 107th Cong., 1st sess., 15 March 
2001 .
15 Neil MacFarquhar, “A Day of Terror: The Arabs: Condemnations from Arab Governments, but Widely 
Different Attitudes on the Street,” New York Times, 12 September 2001.
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community. Rarely had one event elicited such an outpouring of unified feeling, at once 
an expression of sympathy toward the United States and a willful international 
denouncement of terrorism. The member nations of NATO, for instance, invoked the 
mutual defense clause of its founding treaty the first time in its 49-year history, affirming 
that an attack against the United States warranted a response from all members. In an 
article to the New York Times, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan called for building “a 
universal coalition [to] ensure global legitimacy for the long-term response to 
terrorism.”16 Up to this point, answering the question of how to confront a landless and 
faceless enemy (the case against al-Qaeda was still gathering momentum) remained 
unclear, but the objective of eradicating the world of terrorism forged an impressive, if 
fleeting, coalition based on principle.
But it would not last. Starting within mere weeks after the attacks, concerns rose
1 7over plummeting levels of favorability around the globe toward the United States. 
These premonitions later materialized in the widely-circulated findings of the Pew Global 
Attitudes Project released in June of 2003, when tensions were at a fever pitch over the 
waging of the Iraq War. The survey confirmed most speculations of deepening 
disapproval amongst Arab-Muslim nations toward the United States. The percentage of 
those who viewed the United States favorably in Jordan, Pakistan, Turkey, and Lebanon 
scored no higher than 15 percent of those surveyed in all cases. From 2000 onward, 
Turkish favor towards the U.S. had fallen by 37 percent; in Morocco, by 50 percent.
16 Kofi A. Annan, “Fighting Terrorism on a Global Front,” New York Times, 21 September 2001.
17 Nancy Snow, “We’re Caught in a Trap,” CommonDreams.org, entry posted 19 June 2003, 
http://www.commondreams.org/views03/0619-05.htm (accessed 3 August 2005); Stanley Hoffman, 
“America Alone in the World,” The American Prospect 13, no. 17, 23 September 2002, 
http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=america_alone_in_the_world (accessed on 26 July 2006); Josef 
Joffe, “Gulliver Unbound: Can America Rule the World?” (lecture, Centre for Independent Studies, 
Sydney, Australia, 5 August 2003).
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News of this kind, though troubling for some, was less of a surprise for those who had
# ,  1 Cbeen studying such trends over a long period of time. Results for other areas of the 
world raised concerns to a higher level. The same Pew report documented how South 
Korea’s approval of the United States dipped from 58 to 46 percent between 2000 and 
2003, Brazil’s figure tumbled from 56 to 34 percent, and Indonesia’s from 75 to 15 
percent. Meanwhile France and Germany, two of the most vocal opponents of the Iraq 
War, exhibited huge drops in their favorability ratings by 19 and 33 percentage points 
respectively. Even Great Britain showed a decline of 13 percentage points towards its 
“closest ally in the war on terror”.19 Clearly, the results of the Pew study revealed a 
downward trend in attitudes on a wider basis than those of one region alone.
In addition to the widespread nature of this sentiment, the low figures also have 
proven resilient over time, underscoring the depth and prolonged concern for U.S. actions 
and intentions. A BBC World Service Poll released in January of 2005, two and a half 
years after the Pew report, found that majorities polled in Great Britain, France, Germany,
s
Canada, Turkey, Chile, Brazil, Australia, Russia, Mexico, Indonesia and Argentina all
•j(\
characterized the United States’ influence in the world as ‘mainly negative’
There are important insights to be gained from these figures. The most prominent 
of those would be the extent to which the repercussions of American foreign policy 
affected the level of foreign favorability toward the United States. Reinforcing an 
assertion about American power made by Joseph Nye, the Pew data depicted evidence of
181 am referring mostly to American-based area experts on the Middle East, the so-called “Arabists” such 
as Fouad Ajami, who once quipped at a Washington Institute symposium, “I know that it's fashionable these 
days to quote the Pew Survey, that the bottom has fallen out o f support for America in the Muslim world. 
That's news to me — I always thought it was bottomless to begin with!”
19 Pew Global Attitudes Project, Views o f A Changing World (Washington, DC: The Pew Research Center 
for the People and the Press, June 2003), 19.
20 BBC World Service, “In 18 o f 21 Countries Polled, Most See Bush’s Reelection as Negative for World 
Security,” 19 January 2005, http://www.pipa.org/OnlineReportsWiews_US/BushReelect_Jan05/ 
BushReelect_Jan05_rpt.pdf (accessed 20 January 2005).
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an inverse relationship between the two variables, whereas the greater levels of
91aggression in foreign policy stimulate stronger negative reactions from abroad. The 
implications of low favorability could therefore be construed as threatening to the
99realization of foreign policy goals.
1.5 Post 9-11 Criticisms of U.S. Public Diplomacy
Another insight is that as these numbers became harder to ignore, U.S. public 
diplomacy became the object of more intense scrutiny since it had been incumbent upon 
public diplomats to counter foreign resentment with acts of persuasion and goodwill. 
Since 9/11 well over thirty research efforts have been undertaken to address the complex 
questions of what is wrong with U.S. public diplomacy and what can be done to repair it. 
From within the U.S. government, a series of scathing reports from the Government 
Accounting Office (GAO) bore down on the Department of State, which currently houses 
most official public diplomacy activities, for lacking an integrated strategy, failing to lead 
interagency efforts, misallocating human and financial resources to programs, 
undermining international broadcasting in mission-critical regions, and being deficient in
9^
measurable objectives for success. In a 2004 report, the Defense Science Board went so 
far to conclude that current U.S. public diplomacy in is a state of crisis.24 A widely- 
circulated report from The Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and
21 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Paradox o f  American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower 
Can't Go It Alone (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).
22 See for example Newt Gingrich, “Rogue State Department” Foreign Policy 137 (July/August 2003): 42- 
48.
23 These reports evaluate the activities within the Department o f State as well as the quasi-independent and 
closely affiliated Broadcasting Board of Governors. See Bibliography for a complete list o f these reports.
24 United States Department o f Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication, Report o f  
the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication, September 2004, 2 (hereafter Defense 
Science Board Report, 2004).
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Muslim World in 2003, headed by former ambassador Edward P. Djerejian, echoed some 
of these arguments to prompt new thinking for public diplomacy activities in regions of 
the world where post-9/11 U.S. foreign policy encounters the greatest resistance. With 
a mandate to steer clear of local reactions to U.S. foreign policies, however, the 
Commission limited its attention to organizational restructuring and new modes for 
disseminating messages.
Observers from outside the government spared little in the way of criticism, which 
is captured in the substantial offerings of the Heritage Foundation, Center for the Study of 
the Presidency, RAND Corporation, Aspen Institute, Brookings Institution, and the 
Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). And whilst there are variances in the conclusions 
they reach to address the matters at hand, most embody a noteworthy formula of firstly 
lamenting the state of public diplomacy at the time of research, and secondly laying out 
propositions aiming towards a sort of revival, which suggests the existence of a 
benchmark against which all subsequent initiatives are appraised. A 2003 Heritage 
Foundation brief, among others, points to the pivotal decision in 1999 to abolish the 
USIA and fold it into the Department of State, the effects of which had yet to stabilize by
sy/T
the occurrence of the 9/11 attacks. Whereas this report stresses organizational lapses 
(eight of its ten recommendations deal explicitly with structural issues), a notable 2003 
CFR report levels its criticisms on strategic flaws: the isolation of public diplomats from 
policymakers, the previously cited “push-down” style of communicating foreign policy to
25 Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, “Changing Minds, Winning 
Peace: A New Strategic Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World,” Report o f  the 
Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy fo r the Arab and Muslim World (Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, 2003), 32 (hereafter Djerejian Report).
26 Stephen Johnson and Helle Dale, “How to Reinvigorate Public Diplomacy,” The Heritage Foundation 
Backgrounder 1645 (23 April 2003), http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/bgl645.cfm 
(accessed 18 July 2005).
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audiences abroad, ignoring the voices of moderate elites and journalists in target societies, 
disabling cultural exchange programs and undervaluing outreach efforts by local U.S.
97Embassy officers.
A common denominator that often appears in the many diagnoses of U.S. public 
diplomacy ailments can best be classified as “political will” -  the support of members of 
Congress expressed by budget allocations, and the support of the White House indicated 
by level of interest in coordination and proximity to pursuing foreign policy initiatives. A 
2005 CRS review of recommendations from 29 reports dating between 1999 and 2005
9ftrevealed that 15 proposed increasing human and/or financial resources. Joseph Nye has 
emerged as a strong advocate of raising the public diplomacy budget, pointing out the 
wide disparity in comparison to the U.S. defense budget (under one-third of one percent) 
and that this disparity far outweighs the comparative investments of other leading power 
such as France, the United Kingdom and Germany.29 With respect to structure, the same 
CRS report showed that 10 studies favored reorganization of public diplomacy directed 
from the White House and 11 encouraged better coordination. The 2003 Djerejian Report 
argued that there could be “no success without the seriousness of purpose and interagency 
coordination provided at the direction of the President of the United States.”
The perception that political will has been consistently weak in these aspects 
raises a valid question worth asking: why is public diplomacy so important? One answer 
came in the passages of the 2003 CFR report. “Why should the United States care if it is 
well liked or not?” they asked. “Because at this moment of our greatest strength, we are
27 CFR Report.
28 U.S. Congress, Public Diplomacy: A Review o f  Past Recommendations, by Susan B. Epstein and Lisa 
Mages, Congressional Research Service (2 September 2005).
29 Joseph Nye, “Power in the Global Information Age” (lecture, Chatham House, London, 5 February 
2007); Nye, Soft Power, 123-4.
30 Djerejian Report, 59.
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uniquely vulnerable. Anti-Americanism is endangering our national security and
 ^t
compromising the effectiveness of our diplomacy.”
Provided one is convinced by the near unanimity of these reports, it seems clear 
that public diplomacy as it is practiced by the United States is currently primed for a 
period of significant change. However, as the beginning of this chapter points out the 
forces of the international system have not always been receptive to the will of the 
general population. The linkage between national reputation and national security has 
evolved into being far more consequential than it might have been prior to 1914 and the 
advent of liberal internationalism. It was after that time and starting with Walter 
Lippmann in the 1920’s that scholars began to seriously observe the behavior of the 
general public and how it influenced that of political leaders. The gradual development of 
this interest over the 20th century into a full-fledged academic niche has led to theories 
that will elucidate how public diplomacy came to be valued by the United States and 
other countries, and why it has increased in importance since 2001.
1.6 Foreign Policy and Public Opinion
Public diplomacy, at the heart of its practice, is a transnational form of 
communication occurring between international actors. It is ‘public’ insofar as the 
populations in question are solely comprised of non-official representatives usually but 
not always from a state, and it is ‘diplomacy’ in that its agency involves representational, 
envoy-like activities that are internationally focused. To draw an adaptation from 
Watson, diplomacy itself is an act of negotiation between independent political entities.
31 CFR Report, 3.
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Diplomacy becomes ‘public’ when one of those entities is not sovereign, but influential 
enough to be dealt with directly and apart from the sovereign power under which it may 
reside. But why should it matter to policymakers what the public thinks about foreign 
policy? One view holds that the general public is largely “uninformed about either the 
specific foreign policy issues or foreign affairs in general,” and that when the public is 
momentarily gripped by a foreign policy issue its mood can be characterized as volatile 
and superficial. In a testament to the traditional wisdom that “all politics are local,” 
policymakers have operated under the assumption that in addition to its volatile mood, 
publics possess relatively little knowledge about foreign policy and security issues, and 
attach low salience to these issues in comparison with more pressing domestic concerns. 
This argument is not without its merits. Polls taken by Gallup in the United States during 
presidential elections years between 1972 and 2004 found that the salience of economic 
issues loomed over foreign and security concerns by sometimes significant ratios, peaking 
in 1992 during a time of economic recession at a staggering 18 to l.34 The low salience 
of foreign policy concerns suggests that public opinion can be easily manipulated to 
support policy initiatives, which in turn provides influential policy elites the power to 
lead, rather than take cues from their publics.35
Another view finds publics to wield more checking power on policymakers than 
the first view implies. Contrary to a generally permissive attitude, publics can exert
32 Adam Watson, Diplomacy (Philadelphia, PA: ISHI Publications, 1986), 33.
33 Gabriel Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1950); Walter 
Lippmann, Essays in the Public Philosophy (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1955); James N. 
Rosenau, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: An Operational Formulation (New York: Random House, 
1961), 35.
34 The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, Foreign Policy Attitudes Now Driven by 9/11 and 
Iraq, 18 August 2004, http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=222 (accessed on 10 
December 2006).
35 Richard Sobel, The Impact o f  Public Opinion on US Policy Since Vietnam: Constraining the Colossus 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 12-13.
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constraints either through domestic structures, such as the electoral process, or through 
more ‘substantive’ democratic means, such as interest groups or coalitions, who are well- 
informed and maintain constant pressure on policymakers to adhere to the public will. 
For a number of reasons, it is challenging to ascertain the causal and moreover the 
directional link between public will and policy outcomes. Identifying and measuring 
something as intangible as influence (a problem that will recur throughout this study) is 
an inexact science. But it remains fair to say that most scholars probing the veracity of 
this link agree that the public impact on foreign policy and decision-making processes can 
be significant. Not long after Morgenthau advised governments to heed national as well
'J O
as international public opinion in the building of sound policies , V.O. Key developed 
the standard metaphor illustrating how states shape public preferences to build support for 
policy initiatives. Key viewed public opinion as a system of dikes controlling the flow of 
public policy and moving it towards desired directions. He defined public opinion as 
“those opinions held by private persons which governments find it prudent to heed.” In 
democratic societies, the largest and most direct expression of public opinion comes in 
the form of elections where the public can use the vote to express, retrospectively, their 
support or displeasure with foreign policy.40 The public is generally limited in its ability
36 Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal 
Democracies,” World Politics 43, no. 4 (July 1991): 479-512; Robert Y. Shapiro and Lawrence R. Jacobs, 
“Who Leads and Who Follows? U.S. Presidents, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy,” in Decisionmaking 
in a Glass House: Mass Media, Public Opinion, and American and European Foreign Policy in the 21st 
Century, ed. Brigitte L. Nacos, Robert Y. Shapiro and Pierangelo Isemia (Lanham, MD: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 2000), 223-245.
37 Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy in the United States (London: Allen and Unwin, 
1952); Rosenau, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, “Effects of  
Public Opinion on Policy,” The American Political Science Review 77, no. 1 (March 1983): 175-190; Ole 
R. Holsti, Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy (Ann Arbor, MI: University o f Michigan Press,
2004).
38 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 164.
39 V.O. Key, Jr., Public Opinion and American Democracy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), 14.
40 Sobel, The Impact o f  Public Opinion on U.S. Policy Since Vietnam, 24.
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to set or even steer policy in a direct manner. What some have found is that the public is 
more disposed to exerting indirect control of policymaking behavior, as Key’s metaphor 
depicts.41
The truest testament to the claim that public opinion sets limits on foreign policy 
choices is most evident in the policy decision-making process. Opinion researchers use 
the objective criteria of ‘congruence’ to determine the degree to which policy decisions 
correspond with public opinion.42 One can try, as Page and Shapiro have done, to work 
around this potentially complicated task by comparing shifts in public opinion regarding a 
policy to the policy outcomes themselves, and identifying how frequently opinion 
matches the policy decision 43 It would be a simple test if not for the fact that foreign 
policy grows out of a highly complex and usually hidden deliberation phase. It is a 
process where making decisions occurs last in a sequence of phases after which decision­
makers accumulated as much information on the subject as they could in order to reach 
their conclusions. How those decisions are reached resembles a kind of ‘black box’ 
approach because information arrives from a multiplicity of sources and naturally 
represents conflicting views.44 It is difficult to tell based solely on outcomes if it was the 
informed policy advisor, the antagonistic media, the will of the people, or none of the 
above that figured into the final decision. One former Department of State official wrote 
how observers of the decision-making process “assume that what we call ‘decisions’ are 
in fact decisions -  discrete acts, with recognizable beginnings, and sharp, decisive
41 Ibid., 25; Risse-Kappen, ““Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal 
Democracies,” 510.
42 Shapiro and Jacobs, “Who Leads and Who Follows?” 225.
43 Page and Shapiro, “Effects o f Public Opinion on Policy”.
44 Richard C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin, eds., Foreign Policy Decision-Making: An Approach 
to the Study o f International Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1962).
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endings...The reality, of course, is quite different.”45 The difficulty of pinpointing the 
precise causal relationship between public opinion and foreign policy outcomes results in 
frequent debates on how much public opinion matters, and on the perpetual conundrum of 
who is actually leading opinion and who is following.
Virtually all scholarship of this kind is concentrated on the domestic relationship 
between publics and policymakers. Public diplomacy adds a twist to the prevailing 
research paradigm because the public and policymakers in this instance are not confined 
to the domestic sphere -  they are, in fact, foreign counterparts. This relationship casts the 
usual determining factors in a whole new light. Compared to the multi-dimensional 
frame of reference developed by Shiraev to deal with domestic public opinion-policy 
linkages, the international version of this relationship precludes policymakers and the 
public from sharing in the same political system.46 This means that chances are greater 
that the social values and norms of each group would relate to each other less well than if 
cohabitated in the same cultural setting. Pressure on policymakers from international 
media and interest groups raises the likelihood that foreign populations will become more 
engaged in the surrounding debate. The low of information becomes more diffuse and 
harder to manage. So to address the initial question of why foreign public opinion 
should matter to the makers of foreign policy, one response might point to the 
increasingly\blurred distinction between domestic and international issues, and the
45 Roger Hilsman, “Policy-Making is Politics,” in International Politics and Foreign Policy, ed. James 
Rosenau (New York: The Free Press, 1969), 233.
46 Eric Shiraev, “Toward a Comparative Analysis o f the Public Opinion-Foreign Policy Connection,” ,” in 
Decisionmaking in a Glass House: Mass Media, Public Opinion, and American and European Foreign 
Policy in the 21st Century, ed. Brigitte L. Nacos, Robert Y. Shapiro and Pierangelo Isemia (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), 297-304.
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formation of “shared constituencies” across borders to deal with them.47 Etzioni, for 
instance, has written of a “communitarian” response to transnational threats on safety and 
security—global epidemics, poverty, control and protection of environmental resources, 
disaster management, organized crime, weapons of mass destruction and the privatization 
of war enumerate the most pressing of these threats. A more practicable suggestion to 
be drawn from the case of flagging foreign favorability towards the United States in the 
post-9/11 era is that foreign public opinion may obstruct a state’s foreign policy and 
therefore undermine its security agenda. It is by neglecting its own cache of soft power 
that the CFR believes the United States has made itself more vulnerable.
1.7 Theory of Soft Power: Attraction over Coercion
By elevating the public opinion-policy relationship to the international realm, the 
theory of “soft power” reflects how political communication and the participation of 
publics globally is becoming more important in the international system of the 21st 
century. Although it had been first introduced by the prominent IR theoretician Joseph 
Nye in the early 1980’s, soft power did not become part of the established discourse on 
power until at least 1990, when Nye published his book Bound to Lead: The Changing 
Nature o f  American Power. As the subtitle suggests, the impetus for his argument 
stemmed from forces impinging on American power during the time of writing — the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, the economic threat posed by Japan, and the prospect of 
European unification. Nye’s thesis expanded over the following years as new challenges
47 Christopher Hill, The Changing Politics o f  Foreign Policy (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 
279.
48 Amitai Etzioni, From Empire to Community: A New Approach to International Relations 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).
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to U.S. preponderance arose. Soft power later enveloped how information technologies 
were proliferating to create a new class of international actors, the rapidly growing 
responsibilities of the United States in global governance, and the impact of globalization 
on the distribution of global power. What Nye attempted to do was construct a new 
notion of power by taking account of traditionally underestimated factors, such as the 
spread of multinational firms, the appeal of culture and the inherent powers of 
information.49 However, even with soft power’s expansion the basic message Nye 
developed remained unchanged: American power cannot subsist on ‘hard power’— 
military and economic inducements and threats — alone, and therefore it must transform 
itself, to better shape and influence the preferences of other states through the power of 
attraction. In Nye’s words, soft power is:
“the ability to achieve desired outcomes in international affairs through 
attraction rather than coercion. It works by convincing others to follow, or 
getting them to agree to, norms and institutions that produce the desired 
behavior. Soft power can rest on the appeal o f one's ideas or the ability to 
set the agenda through standards and institutions that shape the 
preferences o f others. ”5
To be clear, it is not Nye’s position that soft power should replace hard power as 
the premier method of choice for the United States to advance its international agenda, as 
some critics have suggested.51 Instead, Nye has prescribed a prudent synthesis of 
military, economic and soft power in the image of a ‘three dimensional chess game’ to 
respond to his belief that United States will need an effective strategy in each contest to
49 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature o f  American Power (New York: Basic Books, 
1990), 188-201.
50 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, 3rd ed. (New York: Addison Wesley 
Longman, 2001), 220.
51 See for example Niall Ferguson, “Power,” Foreign Policy 134 (January/February 2003): 21.
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maintain its preponderance in the years ahead.52 All of this led to Nye’s conclusion that 
the United States would be better served by appealing to its international counterparts for 
cooperation in some circumstances rather than coercing them into compliance. And the 
realization of this goal means incorporating the cooperative involvement of large states, 
small states and non-state actors. One common response is that relying too much on soft 
power would be akin to basing foreign policy decisions on popularity with other world 
leaders. This notion is essentially antithetical to the realist school and more recently the 
‘unilateralist’ groundswell articulated best by Charles Krauthammer and other American 
neoconservative thinkers.53 From the opposite end of the spectrum, there are those who 
have challenged the basic interpretation of public diplomacy as a form of power. This 
view belongs to some proponents of the ‘new’ public diplomacy, and will be explored at 
greater length in Chapter Six.
The rise of the soft power research program to greater prominence may not have 
proved so stimulating amongst IR thinkers and American policy planners had it not been 
for its timeliness. At its core, the concept injects a relevant and viable approach for the 
preservation of American power during a turbulent time in its history. In the wake of 
9/11, for instance, Nye tapped into a vein of concern for the future path of the American 
foreign relations by warning against “a foreign policy that combines unilateralism, 
arrogance and parochialism.”54 Prior to this, Nye co-authored a Foreign Affairs article in 
1996 titled, “America’s Information Edge”, in which he warned against American 
unilateral military action to secure the peace, and drew attention to the democratizing
52 Nye, Soft Power.
53 Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment Revisited,” The National Interest, (Winter 2002/2003): 5- 
17.
54 Joseph S. Nye, The Paradox o f  American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower
Can't Go It Alone (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), xii.
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(and by extension, peace-inducing) power of information.55 From his perspective, the 
genesis and subsequent development of the soft power concept represented both an ideal 
and a prescription for action in the real world. Having been built upon idealist IR thought 
soft power is idealistic in its encouragement of interdependence among diverse 
international actors, and it also provides a realistic portrait of an increasingly 
interconnected world. Nye’s enduring challenge to the predominant powers is that they 
must decide what the quality of those connections shall be and how they plan to engage in 
the emerging network.
Gradually over the last two decades, Nye has turned his attention to public 
diplomacy, which slowly migrated from the periphery of his treatment of soft power 
towards the center. Although he would later draw a clear relationship between aspects of 
a complex interdependent world and the capabilities of public diplomacy, Nye’s early 
forays into the persuasive powers of states mainly dealt with soft power resources of 
culture, leadership in international regimes, or science and technology, and less with 
mediums for projecting the power of those resources.56 By 1996 Nye had redirected his 
focus to exploring resources for the channeling of American soft power. He lobbied for 
an expanded role for the USIA in democracy promotion, international broadcasting and 
exploitation of new information technologies.57 In the post-9/11 era, Nye openly 
criticized the abolition of USIA by saying it had “reduced the effectiveness of one of our 
government’s important instruments of soft power.”58 Such a statement would presage 
the incorporation of public diplomacy as a cornerstone of 2004’s Soft Power. By this
55 Joseph S. Nye and William A. Owens, “America’s Information Edge,” Foreign Affairs (March/April 
1996): 20-36.
56 Nye, Bound to Lead.
57 Nye and Owens, “America’s Information Edge,” 36.
58 Nye, The Paradox o f  American Power, 143.
42
time, the act of ‘wielding’ soft power would become intertwined with public diplomacy, 
which became renowned for its association with a widely recognizable IR concept.59 The 
combination of falling foreign favorability towards the United States with its noticeable 
weak public diplomacy apparatus strengthened Nye’s claims to the costs of ignoring soft 
power, which he has argued to be threatening the international standing and national 
security of the United States.
1,8 Between the Tradition and the Future of U.S. Public Diplomacy
As theories applying to public diplomacy have evolved to account for changes in 
the international system, practice is also susceptible to change. For example, an active 
segment of the overall discourse on diplomacy’s evolving role in international affairs has 
witnessed periodic interest in what some have called the ‘new diplomacy’.60 However, 
the ease with which change permeates the practice of public diplomacy requires the 
consent of practitioners and policy elites who may or may not be prepared to embrace 
change. In this isolated moment where changes for public diplomacy may lurk on the 
horizon, this study finds there to be a contest between two competing models of public 
diplomacy. The argument that American public diplomacy should adjust to new 
conditions in the international system draws its inspiration from evidence of a multitude
59 See for example Carnes Lord, Losing Hearts and Minds (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 
2006); Antony J. Blinken, “From Preemption to Engagement,” Survival 45, no. 4 (Winter 2003-04): 47.
60 This represents a step beyond proclamations o f the ‘new diplomacy’ in opposition to the pre-Wilsonian 
‘old diplomacy’ o f closed-door negotiations and secret treaties, discussed at length in Amo Mayer’s 
influential Political Origins o f  the New Diplomacy (1959). Literature that has dealt with the “new 
diplomacy” in its various forms includes Arthur S. Hoffman, ed., International Communication and the 
New Diplomacy (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1968); U.S. Advisory Commission on Public 
Diplomacy, The New Diplomacy: Utilizing Innovative Communication that Recognize Resource 
Constraints: Report o f  the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy (Washington, DC, July 2003); 
David Bollier, The Rise o f  Netpolitik: How the Internet is Changing International Politics and Diplomacy: 
Report o f  the Eleventh Annual Aspen Institute Roundtable on Information Technology (Aspen Institute,
2003).
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of ICT’s at the disposal of a growing number of international actors. Proponents of 
change include not only scholars such as Nye, but some practitioner advocates such as 
Daryl Copeland of Foreign Affairs Canada, and Shaun Riordan, formerly of H.M. 
Diplomatic Service in the United Kingdom, both of whom speak of the importance of 
“two-way” or “dialogue-based” public diplomacy.61 Such proponents posit these new 
conditions behoove the states to embrace the advisory model of public diplomacy -  to 
communicate transparently with other actors to preserve its credibility, to concentrate on 
building relationships for the long-term, and to engage public diplomacy specialists and 
foreign population in policy-related discussions
On the other side of the argument, there is a strong and established lobby in favor 
of curing the ills of U.S. public diplomacy with more aggressive approaches information 
dissemination and management. These approaches are representative of the advocacy 
model of public diplomacy. Proponents of this view point to the case of public diplomacy 
during Cold War-era, usually with an eye towards the USIA of the 1980’s, as a model of 
success worth emulating. In one well-known example, 9/11 Commission Chairman 
Thomas Kean invoked the legacy of that period when he remarked, “just as we did in the 
Cold War, we need to defend our ideals abroad and we've got to defend them 
vigorously.” Such a statement thrives on the assumption of a positive correlation 
between the outcome of the Cold War and the public diplomacy strategy of that time.
61 Daryl Copeland, (panel discussion, Silver Jubilee International Symposium, University of Westminster, 
London, 10 May 2006; Shaun Riordan, “Dialogue-based Public Diplomacy: A New Foreign Policy 
Paradigm?”, in The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations, ed. Jan Melissen 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillian, 2005).
62 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9-11 Commission Report: Final 
Report o f  the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Official Government ed. 
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2004), 364; National Security, Emerging Threats and 
International Relations Subcommittee o f the House Government Reform Committee, The 9/11 Commission 
Recommendations on Public Diplomacy: Defending Ideals and Defining The Message, 108th Cong., 2nd 
sess., 23 August 2004..
44
The spirit of Cold War public diplomacy materialized in the form of a massive campaign 
to embolden repressed societies with the tools they needed to defeat communism. Much 
of the same is being said in the post-9/11 era with respect to tyranny and terrorism, and it 
is on this ground that “battle for hearts and minds” is being waged.
Beneath this overarching struggle between the tradition and the future of U.S. 
public diplomacy, there is a parallel debate ongoing with respect to roles and 
responsibilities of its practitioners. Edward R, Murrow, the legendary broadcaster and 
one-time lead figure for American public diplomacy as the director of the USIA, 
famously illustrated the distinction between ‘advisors’, those who were present at the 
‘take offs’ or genesis of policy, and ‘advocates’, who sometimes performed damage 
control when policies failed, or at moments of ‘crash landings’. In the post-9/11 era, the 
American practitioner is overwhelmingly assigned the duties of the advocate -  mixture of 
’’telling America’s story to the world” and building support for policy overseas -  while 
advisory functions have been traditionally shunned. One of the pressure points in the 
overarching debate between traditional and ‘new’ public diplomacy thinking is whether to 
rearrange the two roles to give ‘advisors’ greater influence.64
Other aspects of the debate on the future of U.S. public diplomacy exist as well, 
and they shed new light on such long-standing issues as the American regard for 
government-sponsored communications and exchange programs. All proponents for a 
more effective public diplomacy apparatus lament the lack of domestic public support for 
increasing human and financial resources, and this is directly related to the fact that no 
domestic constituency for public diplomacy exists in the United States. The reason for
63 Joshua Muravchik, “Hearts, Minds, and the War against Terror,” AEI Online (1 June 2002), 
http://www.aei.org/include/pub_print.asp?pubID= 14896 (accessed 28 February 2006).
64 Blinken, “From Preemption to Engagement,” 47-48.
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this is a piece of legislation known as Smith-Mundt Act o f  1948, which bans all forms of 
public diplomacy domestically.65 This prohibits, for example, domestic radio broadcasts 
of Voice of America, and also explains the organizational and functional divides that 
persist within U.S. public diplomacy institutions. Some have argued that the Act to be 
obsolete with the advent of the internet, thus rendering the Act an anachronism dating 
back to a period when American lawmakers were stridently protecting the public from 
government propaganda. But the technological landscape and its associated norms have 
changed, and the abolishment of the Act is seen as an acknowledgement of the new 
information environment as well as removing a barrier to increasing domestic support for 
U.S. public diplomacy.
However, there is also reason to doubt that stability and longevity of domestic 
support may materialize due to Americans’ mercurial relationship with public diplomacy 
and foreign policy. Gregory has said it is commonplace for nations to “discover” public 
diplomacy during wartime, and it is not a coincidence that strategists take greater stock of 
programs with the capacity to influence in order to win the psychological dimension of 
wars, helped along, ostensibly, by a more consenting domestic constituency galvanized 
by nationalism.66 One need only look to the highly orchestrated, but short-lived activities 
of the Ministry for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda in Nazi Germany, or the 
extensive psychological contretemps between the United States and Soviet Union during 
the Cold War to prove this point. But the 1990’s demonstrated when a polity decides to 
withdraw from foreign affairs, and American public diplomacy flagged once the strategic 
imperatives of the Cold War had faded behind the triumph of liberalism. The wartime
65 United States Code Title 22, Chapter 18, Subchapter V, § 1461.
66 Bruce Gregory, “Public Diplomacy as Strategic Communication”, in Countering Terrorism in the 21st 
Century, ed. James J. Forrest (New York: Praeger, forthcoming).
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atmosphere engulfing the United States after 9/11 provoked a “rediscovery” of public 
diplomacy in particular and foreign affairs in general.
1.9 Toward a Theory of Public Diplomacy and Foreign Policy
For the benefit of public diplomacy scholarship, the case of the United States after 
9/11 captures the frustrations of a system widely regarded as deeply flawed, and this 
leaves many choices to consider for it to succeed in the international systems of the 
present and future. Despite considerable restructuring, the process and overarching 
strategic approach of American public diplomacy remain largely unchanged from the 
Cold War era, a system that relied heavily on the advocacy model to control and 
disseminate information to populations that were information poor. The extent to which 
foreign populations were believed to participate in the public diplomacy process has been 
restricted to compliant recipients of foreign policy guidance that has been prepared for 
mass public consumption. In the American tradition of public diplomacy, practitioners 
have served as image and message bearers — the advocates of foreign policy.
Theories of public opinion and foreign policy apply mainly to dynamics in the 
domestic realm. They suppose that decision-makers and the foreign policymaking 
process in general are most responsive to domestic public opinion. But changes in the 
international system that challenge established notions of sovereignty -  the 
multiplication of transnational issues, expansion of democracies, the proliferation of 
international norms, and the availability of information technologies to once deprived 
populations -  warrant enlarging the scope of potential influences on domestic discourses
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dealing with foreign policy to include external factors.67 Joseph Nye astutely noted that 
prior to the most recent generation of information technologies, a state’s underlying 
assumption about using information was that its target otherwise lacked access to that 
information. New information technologies have undermined this belief, and new
r o
challenge for states is to overcome not their targets’ scarcity of access, but of attention.
Castells has written of the infinite potential of non-state actors to build 
information networks that need not rely on state sponsorship to shape opinion or grant 
access to political participation in other states.69 By this estimate, the line between 
domestic and international political constituencies is increasingly blurry. Public 
diplomacy provides a means to accessing these networks by acting as an intermediary 
between external interests and policymakers. RAND analysts Arquilla and Ronfeldt 
propose that public diplomacy serves as a conduit linking global civil society with states 
so that they can better assess foreign opinion with respect to particular foreign policies. 
When global civil society is sufficiently opposed to a certain policy, Arquilla and 
Ronfeldt recommend that states reconsider them so as to bring them closer in line with
70the preferences of civil society. There are limitations to this logic; the wisdom of states 
crafting foreign policy out of avoidance of being disliked is questionable indeed. But 
many feel it is nevertheless important to show consideration of foreign public opinion in 
the policymaking process. "We are not in the business of getting the world to love us, but 
to understand us," said Harold C. Pachios, chairman of the U.S. Advisory Commission on
67 Gene M. Lyons and Michael Mastanduno, eds., Beyond Westphalia? State Sovereignty and International 
Intervention (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995); Susan Strange, “The Westfailure 
System,” Review o f  International Studies 25 (1999): 345-54; Daniel Philpott, “Usurping the Sovereignty of 
Sovereignty,” World Politics 53, no. 2, (January 2001): 297-324.
68 Nye, Soft Power, 105-107.
69 Manuel Castells, End o f  Millennium, vol. 3 o f The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, 2nd 
ed. (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2000).
70 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt. The Emergence o f  Noopolitik: Toward and American Information 
Strategy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1999), 65-66.
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Public Diplomacy. "Prior to 9/11, the public diplomacy apparatus of the U.S. government 
was essentially dismantled because no one believed it was necessary, no one believed we 
had to worry about the opinion of foreign publics."71 One of the purposes of this research 
will be to elaborate on the strain of recent research pointing to a revised relationship 
between public diplomacy and foreign policy. In an about-face from the Cold War 
system, the new relationship opens up the prospect of foreign publics using their own 
forms of public diplomacy to influence the policymaking process.
The theories of foreign policy and public opinion and soft power provide the 
observer with a foundation for understanding why public diplomacy has become relevant 
in the contemporary international environment. Yet in the course of its evolution as a tool 
of American statecraft the question is often revisited as to what are the constituent 
features and activities of public diplomacy, and it is vital to this study that a working 
definition be established at this time.
71 Ira Teinowitz, “Beers draws mixed review after one year; Some question nature o f the job,” Advertising 
Age, 23 September 2002.
CHAPTER 2 : UNDERSTANDING PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
To find a disciplinary home for public diplomacy is a difficult task. For instance, 
with International Relation (IR) public diplomacy is seen to cross over several sub-fields, 
including diplomatic studies, international peace studies, conflict resolution, foreign 
policy analysis, and ongoing discourses on power, specifically ‘soft power’. 
Alternatively, public diplomacy also presents itself as an act of international 
communications (IC) insofar as it is preoccupied with the management of images and 
messages, and maximizing the utility they may provide for influencing public opinion. 
Complementary to the substance of communications there is also the issue of mode — the 
technologies that enable the transmission of images and messages. It shall be seen how 
the spread of these ICT’s has streamlined and accelerated the way in which 
communications reach their targets, and, in coming full circle to IR, shifted a source of 
power away from state-sponsored information providers to non-state information 
consumers.
Public diplomacy scholarship has rarely attempted to view its subject from a 
universal perspective. Most literature chooses to do so from a case perspective, although 
some notable exceptions do exist.1 With recent offerings emerging from diplomatic 
studies, international history, international relations and international communications, 
this demonstrates public diplomacy’s interdisciplinary appeal, and yields the benefits
1 Jarol B. Manheim, Strategic Public Diplomacy and American Foreign Policy: The Evolution o f  Influence 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); .Mark Leonard, Public Diplomacy (London: The Foreign 
Policy Centre, 2002).
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more detail about what the act of public diplomacy truly entails. Rather than attempt an 
abstract definition here, this chapter draws from the many fields with an interest in public 
diplomacy practices and practitioners and builds its meaning from an amalgamation of 
instances. Using them for purposes of comparison, the instances to be presented reveal 
patterns to public diplomacy that lend themselves to distinguishing the practices of one 
actor from another. Looking closely at these activities also presents an opportunity, one 
that has seldom been seized, to classify them in a particular order. It is therefore the 
purpose of this chapter to first embark on a detailed description of public diplomacy 
models and approaches that are seen to be representative of current theory and practice. 
A further examination of public diplomacy sub-traits attaches cases to several 
international actors, but there will be a noticeable emphasis on informing the practice of 
the United States from regularly delving into history. After discussing these generally 
applicable features at some length, the chapter gradually reduces its focus exclusively to 
the United States. The aim of elaborating on the previously established models and 
approaches provides a backdrop on the specific interpretation and direction the United 
States has chosen in the execution of its public diplomacy. The reader may wish to 
consider the latter part of this chapter a character study on how the United States has 
traditionally conducted it.
2 Raymond Cohen, “Reflections on the New Global Diplomacy: Statecraft 2500 B.C.-2000 A.D.” in 
Innovation in Diplomatic Practice, edited by Jan Melissen (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1999), 1-18; Giles. 
Scott-Smith, “Searching for the Successor Generation: Public Diplomacy, the US Embassy’s International 
Visitor Program and the Labour Party in the 1980’s,” The British Journal o f  Politics and International 
Relations 8, no. 2 (2006): 214-237; Eytan Gilboa, “Diplomacy in the media age: Three models of uses and 
effects,” in Diplomacy, Vol. I ll  edited by Christer Jonsson and Richard Langhome (London: Sage 
Publications, 2004): 96-119.
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2,1 Models and Approaches
A good place to begin drawing out the primary features of public diplomacy is in 
distinguishing them by what they are not. For example, it is regarded as distinct from the 
kind of diplomacy which, in its modem form, follows Nicolson’s criteria of managing 
“the relations between independent states by process of negotiation,” customarily 
performed by accredited representatives of a sovereign state in a setting usually hidden 
from the public eye. Contrary to this practice known by comparison as ‘traditional’ 
diplomacy, public diplomacy occurs when one such representative interacts with civilians 
or non-governmental groups from another part of the world, especially when the opinions 
of these individuals or groups become instrumental to fulfilling policy.4 Strictly 
speaking, the distinction between the two is not really an issue of which practice is 
current or outdated, or which is effective or ineffective, but it is instead, as U.S. 
Ambassador Christopher Ross explains, a matter of using different forms of diplomacy 
for targeting the right audience in order to support the national interest.5 Although the 
development of public diplomacy as a field of scholarship and as a practice is not 
intended to obviate the more traditional purposes of diplomacy, it cannot be denied that 
its evolution has been spurred by inadequacies realized in traditional diplomacy. Two 
interrelated reasons may vouch for this. The first concerns global trends of openness and 
transparency in political processes, or the “open covenants openly arrived at.”6 The 
proliferation of summitry in the postwar period and the new practice of publishing
3 Harold Nicolson, Diplomacy (London: Thornton Butterworth, 1939), 80.
4 Ibid., 41-54. An early distinction between the two (although preceding these labels) is captured well by 
Nicolson in his chapter on “democratic diplomacy”, where he faults the crafters o f the Treaty o f Versailles 
for neglecting ‘open diplomacy’ and in turn ‘the will o f the sovereign people.’
5 Christopher Ross, “Public Diplomacy Comes o f Age,” The Washington Quarterly 25 (Spring 2002): 75.
6 Lincoln P. Bloomfield, The Foreign Policy Process: A Modern Primer (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice- 
Hall, 1982), 149.
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treaties, for example, effectively brought diplomatic negotiations and their outcomes into 
public view with greater regularity than ever before. In truth, the movement toward 
transparency in diplomatic practice, and the resultant rise of public diplomacy may be 
seen as a direct result of enhanced information systems and communication technologies. 
As far back as 1939, Nicolson, in discussing the changing nature of diplomacy at the 
time, acknowledged that the increasing importance of print media had prompted 
embassies to create a new position, the press attache, to manage and direct publicity. 
Therefore, the growing ease by which information was transmitted through various media 
resulted both in polities being more informed and able to hold their leaders to 
unprecedented accountability, and contrariwise, in enabling leaders to steer public 
opinion to serve their own purposes.
Alternatively, one could develop an understanding of public diplomacy by its 
looking at its constituent activities, thereby concentrating not on what it is or is not, but 
rather on the question of what it is that practitioners do. The term ‘public diplomacy’ 
traces back to Edmund Gullion of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, who was 
said to have coined it in 1965 to divorce a transparent set of communication and exchange 
activities from propaganda. Prior iterations of the term have been convincingly argued, 
but the Gullion coinage is nevertheless commonly cited as the origin. Some would have 
it that public diplomacy is actually a sanitized substitute for propaganda because 
information and influence approaches common to both suggest manipulation and control 
of foreign audiences is done more aggressively in the case of the latter.9 This line of
7 Nicolson, Diplomacy, 167.
8 Nicholas J. Cull, ‘Public Diplomacy’ Before Gullion: The Evolution o f a Phrase (Los Angeles, CA: USC 
Center for Public Diplomacy, 2006).
9 Kim Andrew Elliott, “Is There an Audience for Public Diplomacy?” New York Times, 16 November 2002, 
The article begins: “Public Diplomacy the current and gentler term for international propaganda...”
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thinking traces back to the Second World War, when the American government
sanctioned propaganda (for both information and disinformation), influenced the
production of Hollywood films, and co-opted advertising executives to aid in the war
effort. Acceptable for the parlance of the period, propaganda now invokes a sense of
unease and distrust from which public diplomacy is not immune. The former Under
Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Charlotte Beers captured this
sentiment in 2004 when she remarked: “I think public diplomacy has kind of had a
diminishing in terms of the people's perception of what it means, not only in our own
press but in our government and maybe in our country. It has a connotation of propaganda
which in this country sometimes is very negative.”10 Nowadays, those close to
managing and observing American public diplomacy try to steer clear of such a
connotation, trying instead to use it strictly for deriding “enemy” information sources.11
In addition, much care has been taken in the United States to separate acknowledged
propaganda techniques, such as psychological operations or “psyops”, which are a tactical
1")form of information warfare used in military operations, from public diplomacy. 
Defenders of public diplomacy have tried to portray their area of expertise as the 
embodiment of trust and credibility, and conducted in the spirit of a free and transparent 
press.13
10 Hearing o f the National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations Subcommittee o f the 
House Government Reform Committee Subject: The 9/11 Commission Recommendations on Public 
Diplomacy: Defending Ideals and Defining The Message, 24 August 2004.
11 R.S. Zahama, “From Propaganda to Public Diplomacy in the Information Age,” in War, Media, and 
Propaganda, ed. Yahya R. Kamalipour and Nancy Snow ( Lanham, MD : Rowman & Littlefield, 2004).
12 United States Department of Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication, Report o f  
the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication, September 2004 (hereafter Defense 
Science Board Report, 2004).
131 shall be referring regularly to the many enduring statements made by the legendary American newsman 
and former USIA director under President Kennedy Edward R. Murrow. One o f these enduring statements 
dates back to 28 March 1963, when Murrow remarked before the House Subcommittee on International 
Organization and Movements, “American traditions and the American ethic require us to be truthful, but the
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Scholars have long grappled with a concise definition of public diplomacy. Much 
debate could have been averted had the majority accepted the Fletcher School of Law and 
Diplomacy’s early definition of the term some believe to have been coined in 1965 by its 
dean, Edmund Gullion.14 But the Fletcher definition proved to be only the first of a litany 
of attempts, and even reaching consensus on a clear definition has beguiled both scholars 
and practitioners for so long that a recent Wilton Park conference concluded that “public 
diplomacy has entered the lexicon of 21st century diplomacy without clear definition of 
what it is or how the tools it offers might best be used.”15 For example, no one can 
dispute the fact that the conduct of public diplomacy includes at its core a 
communications component, but there remains some confusion over whether this 
communication takes place in a purely domestic or foreign sphere. While some interpret 
the former to be the case16, others such as Melissen assert that public diplomacy is: 
“aimed at foreign publics, and strategies for dealing with such publics should be 
distinguished from the domestic socialization of diplomacy.”17 Another point of 
contention exists in the role public diplomacy should play within governments; this 
centers on the question of whether it is purely distinct from, or simply a support
most important reason is that truth is the best propaganda and lies are the worst. To be persuasive we must 
be believable; to be believable we must be credible; to be credible we must be truthful. It is as simple as 
that.” (Edward R. Murrow, Testimony before the House Subcommittee on International Organization and 
Movements, 28 March 1963.)
14 According to the Fletcher definition, public diplomacy “deals with the influence o f public attitudes on the 
formation and execution o f foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions o f international relations beyond 
traditional diplomacy; the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of 
private groups and interests in one country with those o f another; the reporting of foreign affairs and its 
impact on policy; communication between those whose job is communication, as between diplomats and 
foreign correspondents; and the processes o f inter-cultural communications... Central to public diplomacy is 
the transnational flow o f information and ideas. Edward R Murrow Center for Public Diplomacy, brochure, 
http://fletcher.tufts.edu/murrow/public-diplomacy.html (accessed 20 February 2005).
15 Ann Lane, “Public Diplomacy: Key Challenges and Priorities,” Report on Wilton Park Conference 
WPS06/21 (April 2006), 2.
16 Siobhan McEvoy Levy, American Exceptionalism and US Foreign Policy: Public Diplomacy at the End 
o f  the Cold War (New York: Palgrave, 2000).
17 Jan Melissen, ed., The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 13.
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mechanism beneath more traditional forms of diplomacy. In the United Kingdom, public 
diplomacy is regarded as “part of a wider strategy to break down communication barriers
1 ftboth at home and abroad.” Other countries, such as Norway and Canada, have been 
seen to regard public diplomacy as highly as other diplomatic activities.19 And these 
representations refer only to state-level actors. Information communications technologies 
have helped endow private citizens more diplomat-like powers, thus eroding the 
distinction between members of the public and diplomats. Non-state actors are 
challenging the pre-existing monopoly of governments on public diplomacy institutions 
and activities.20
In the context of such debates, it remains evident that prevailing 
conceptualizations laid out by both scholars and practitioners, if not perfect reflections of 
one another, do share considerable common ground. For instance, refer to the following 
interpretations. In the first, Nye divides the purposes of public diplomacy into three 
distinct dimensions “ ...[requiring] different relative proportions of direct government 
information and long-term cultural relationships.
“The first and most immediate dimension is daily communications, which 
involves explaining the context o f  domestic and foreign policy 
decisions...The day-to-day dimension must also involve preparation for  
dealing with crises and countering attacks...The second dimension is 
strategic communication, in which a set o f  simple themes is developed, 
much like what occurs in a public campaign...The third dimension o f  
public diplomacy is the development o f  having relationships with key 
individuals over many years through scholarships, exchanges, training,
18 Lane, Report on Wilton Park Conference, 2.
19 Alan Henriksen, “Niche Diplomacy in the Public Arena: Canada and Norway,” in The New Public 
Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations, ed. Jan Melissen (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan,
2005), 67-87. For example, Foreign Affairs Canada terms public diplomacy its ‘third pillar’ in pursuing 
Canadian foreign policy, the other two being “the promotion of prosperity and employment?’ and “the 
protection o f [Canadian] security, within a stable global framework.”
20 See for example David Bollier, “The Rise o f Netpolitik: How the Internet is Changing International 
Politics and Diplomacy,” A Report o f  the Eleventh Annual Aspen Institute Roundtable on Information 
Technology, 2003.
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seminars, conferences, and access to media channels ...Each o f  these three 
dimensions o f public diplomacy plays an important role in helping to 
create an attractive image o f a country and this can improve its prospects 
for obtaining its desired outcomes. ”21
Ambassador Christopher Ross, a career diplomat in the American foreign service, 
draws a very similar picture to the one described by Nye, distinguished mainly by a 
reduction from three dimensions to two by virtue of the consolidation of communication 
activities:
“The first is the communication o f  policy. Whereas the task is ongoing, 
intensive, and fraught with difficulties, public diplomacy is basically a 
short-term effort with a simple goal: to articulate U.S. policy clearly in as 
many media and languages as are necessary to ensure that the message is 
received...As demanding as articulating U.S. policy to foreign publics is, it 
is only half o f  public diplomacy’s responsibility. The other half is a 
longer-term effort to develop an overseas understanding and appreciation 
o f U.S. society -  the people and values o f  the United States... Success on 
the information front can be measured. In contrast, gauging the success o f  
exchange programs is more intangible and requires time and 
patience ...Throughout the Cold War, public diplomacy efforts ran 
essentially one way. Programs and activities were pushed out to target 
audiences. In today’s world, the United States is more likely to meet with 
success i f  it structures activities in ways that encourage dialogue.22
While it is true that Ross operates from his American frame of reference, British 
scholar Mark Leonard offers a more generalized definition, done in such a way that 
strongly resonates with the preceding ones:
“In fact, public diplomacy is about building relationships: understanding 
the needs o f other countries, cultures and peoples; communicating our 
points o f view; correcting misperceptions; looking for areas where we can
21 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs,
2004), 107-110.
22 Christopher Ross, “Public Diplomacy Comes o f Age,” The Washington Quarterly 25, no. 2 (Spring 
2002): 77-82.
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find  common cause...One way o f  conceptualising public diplomacy is as a 
grid o f  three rows and columns. On one axis are the spheres on which it is 
played out: political/military, economic and societal/cultural. In each o f  
these spheres, we can characterize three dimensions o f public diplomacy 
activities: (1) reacting to news events as they occur in a way that tallies 
with our strategic goals; (2) proactively creating a news agenda through 
activities and events which are designed to reinforce core messages and 
influence perceptions; (3) building long-term relationships with 
populations to win recognition o f  our values and assets and to learn from  
theirs. Each o f these dimensions operates according to a different 
timescale. ”23
Reading over these three separate attempts to give shape to public diplomacy, 
which by no means represent a full spectrum, one finds there to be more agreement than 
not over its core elements. Figuring prominently on one side is communication, which 
largely consists of ‘strategic communications’ or messages specially crafted to support 
policy initiatives by eliciting a desired response from target audiences.24 On the other, the 
three authors also mention the need to build relationships with individuals or groups 
abroad in hopes that the resulting goodwill will enhance a country’s image and increase 
the likelihood that the ‘desired outcomes’ of that country’s foreign policies will be met.
One important divergence worth noting here, since it shall be explored later, is the 
notion of the ‘population’ or ‘public’ understood to be the recipient or interlocutor in a 
typical ‘relationship’. The significance this grouping is often generalized, as seen in the 
samples from Ross and Leonard, to the point of ambiguity, thus making it difficult to 
qualify what exactly constitutes the ‘public’ beyond sometimes amorphous constituencies 
whose commonalities change depending on context. In contrast, Nye asserts 
concentrating relationship-building on ‘key individuals’, which begs the question of
23 Mark Leonard, Public Diplomacy (London: The Foreign Policy Centre, 2002), 8-11.
24 Jarol B. Manheim, All o f  the People, All the Time: Strategic Communication and American Politics 
(Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1991).
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whether public diplomacy is as ‘public’ as the name implies. Hocking has noted that 
explaining what is meant by the ‘public’ in clearer terms is a priority for contemporary 
analysis, as this divide over a seemingly basic assumption simply illustrates.
Being closely associated with the art of propaganda, public diplomacy possesses 
two traditionally dominant approaches that appear regularly in the discourses on practice. 
One is information and the other is influence, and they are often mentioned 
simultaneously since the former is used to perform the latter. As it happens, there are 
some questions as to who should be influenced by whom, and to what end the information 
should be used. The U.S. practice, for one, reveals a dichotomous relationship between 
pure communications activities on the one hand and relationship-building on the other. 
Communicators use information for either the passive objective of education or the more 
aggressive goal of persuasion. Alternatively, the relationship-building component is less 
concerned with informing or persuading than creating understanding. Some scholars have 
interpreted this divide as the difference between ‘one-way’ (monologic) and ‘two-way’ 
(dialogic) public diplomacy. It would seem that the practitioner, then, is beholden to 
two similar activities that relate to target audiences in different -  and conflicting -  ways. 
The communications components dictate the role of an advocate, who is charged with 
conveying a message, portraying an image, and acting as a spokesperson for the party 
generating the communication. In the relationship-building mode the practitioner
25 Brian Hocking, “Rethinking the ‘New’ Public Diplomacy”, in The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in 
International Relations, ed. Jan Melissen (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 32.
26 Shaun Riordan, “Dialogue-based Public Diplomacy: A New Foreign Policy Paradigm?” in Jan Melissen 
(ed.), The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2005; R.S. Zaharna, “Winning Round Two o f American Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim 
Worlds,” Foreign Policy In Focus (13 June 2003), http://www.Q5if.org/commentary/_2003/0306comm.html 
(accessed on 21 January 2004); Ross, “Public Diplomacy Comes of Age,” 82; Aspen Institute, “Soft Power, 
Hard Issues”, Reports o f  the 2005 Aspen Institute Forum on Communications and Society and the 
Roundtable on Public Diplomacy and the Middle East (Queenstown, MD: Aspen Institute, 2006).
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assumes instead the part of mediator transferring information from interlocutors which he 
then uses to advisee each one about the other.
By virtue of the cyclical exchange of information and influence, a third currency 
of public diplomacy thus emerges: engagement. The term itself not only acknowledges 
two-way information flows but also exhibits in practice other qualitative differences, and 
that is why many detailed definitions of public diplomacy tend to separate engagement 
functions from those that perform information and influence. Since the concept of the 
practitioner in public diplomacy is conventionally linked to state-unit behavior, notably in 
the realm of foreign policy and the extant communications to foreign populations, 
practitioners-as-mediators are regarded as advisors who, when thrust into the advisory 
role, deal in the negotiable tender of interests and positions. When acting as advisors, 
public diplomacy practitioners are not unlike intelligence analysts or regional experts; 
they may have access to privileged information that might inform the judgment of 
policymakers and hence be valuable resources at the point of policy formulation. 
Conversely, practitioners assuming the role of the advocate perform exclusively in the 
aftermath of policymaking discussions and on explicit instructions for how to deliver 
communications that build support for policy. Quite apart from notions of 
information/influence-driven approaches where the target audience alone stands to be 
impacted in the relatively near-term by communications, the engagement approach to 
public diplomacy resembles “the cause and effect of public attitudes and opinions which 
influence the formulation and execution of foreign policies” with impacts drawn out over 
the longer-term.
27 Glen H. Fisher, Public Diplomacy and the Behavioral Sciences (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University 
Press, 1972), 7.
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2,2 Public Diplomacy Dimensions
One of the benefits of exploring the case of U.S. public diplomacy since 9/11 is 
that it is helping scholars and practitioners alike work towards settling fundamental 
questions about the empirical nature of public diplomacy. Here it is promising to find 
that the viewpoints of both scholars and practitioners, if not perfect reflections of one 
another, do share considerable common ground from time to time. It can be surmised 
from witnessing the application of public diplomacy approaches during the Cold War that 
the United States permitted engagement activities to operate beneath the dominant 
approaches of information and influence. Thus, there appears to be a fluid relationship 
shared amongst the primary approaches of public diplomacy in a hierarchical sense: 
although they seem to coexist, one approach assumes dominance over, but not to the 
exclusion of others. With the following, it is suggested that each set presents two 
counterpart qualities that are in fact intricately connected and demonstrate more or less 
intensity in relation to its opposite part depending on situational factors. The first set 
deals with patterns in communication styles ranging from propagandists to fully 
transparent vis-a-vis the goal of conveying messages designed to support policy 
initiatives. The second involves timeframes -- public diplomacy operating either a short­
term or long-term track. Lastly, the third set of parameters discusses from which 
communications emerge, sometimes the product of a planned campaign centered on 
certain themes, and other times provoked by unplanned events or statements. They will be 
referred to as reactive and proactive communication postures.
Propagandistic and Transparent Communication Styles. Among scholars and 
practitioners, one of the longest-running debates about public diplomacy involves to what 
extent it should employ propagandistic techniques to influence foreign public opinion, or
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more broadly whether propaganda should be related to public diplomacy at all. Some 
would submit that propaganda and public diplomacy are mutually exclusive styles, as 
Zahama does by contrasting the “secrecy, deception and coercion” of the former with the
<no
“open public communication” of the latter. To be sure, prevailing norms since the start 
the postwar period reinforce negative connotations associated with propaganda, and 
Cull’s recent etymological history of the term confirms its gradual recession in favor of 
the more benign “public diplomacy” coming into fashion by 1965. Others maintain the 
fading of propaganda in name only and minimize the shift in norms to think of it as 
interchangeable with public diplomacy. Some American officials have reinforced this 
notion in their public statements. U.S. Ambassador Richard Holbrooke wrote in 2001, 
“call it public diplomacy, or public affairs, or psychological warfare, or -  if you really
i
want to be blunt -  propaganda.” A more positive explanation offered up by another 
American FSO called public diplomacy, “the finest form of propaganda”. This owes to 
the fact that even after years of expansion in government-sponsored communications 
activities and the accompanying sanitization in terminology, the propagandistic style 
never disappeared but instead became incorporated into the array of continued U.S. public 
diplomacy approaches. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) funded Radio Free 
Europe and Radio Liberty in the 1950’s and 60’s, and operated covert “disinformation” 
media projects involving the publishing of books, magazines and newspapers until these
28 R.S. Zahama, “From Propaganda to Public Diplomacy in the Information Age,” 223.
29 Nicholas J. Cull “Public Diplomacy Before Gullion: The Evolution o f a Phrase,” USC Center on Public 
Diplomacy (18 April 2006), http://uscpublicdiplomacy.com/pdfs/gullion.pdf (accessed on 13 June 2006).
30 See for example remarks o f Nancy Snow, interview by Jerome McDonnell, Worldview, 27 November 
2006: “There’s an ongoing debate amongst scholars as to whether or not the two can be used 
interchangeably. I tend to use them interchangeably because I view propaganda as a process of mass 
persuasion that is inherently value neutral. It really comes down to how it’s used.”
31 Richard Holbrooke, “Get the Message Out,” Washington Post, 28 October 2001.
32 Michael Macy, interview by author, London, 26 January 2006.
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projects were exposed in 1977. Well past the anointed cleansing years of the 1960’s, 
the propagandistic tendencies of public diplomacy occasionally reappeared more publicly 
as a way to further foreign policy imperatives even in the 1980’s to support anti­
communist maneuvers in Central America and, in a more recent case in 2002, when the 
secret Office of Strategic Influence run by the Department of Defense was exposed by the 
New York Times and subsequently disbanded.34 All of this has occurred notwithstanding 
the U.S. military’s tactical use of its own broadcasting, leaflet-dropping and other 
psychological operations.
In fact, influence-related activities that sometimes draw on propagandistic 
communication seem to have a natural home in the idiom of “strategic” public diplomacy. 
According to Manheim, strategic public diplomacy is “public diplomacy practiced less as 
an art than as an applied transnational science of human behavior. It is...the practice of 
propaganda in the earliest sense of the term, but enlightened by half a century of 
empirical research into human motivation and behavior.” This re-conceptualization of 
public diplomacy to include a ‘science’ of political manipulation in fact reveals not a 
mutual exclusion between public diplomacy and propaganda, nor perfect substitution of 
one term for another, but the incorporation of an “enlightened” and propagandistic 
communication style into the public diplomacy domain.
Conversely, there is an alternative technique that does not rest on the 
disinformation and manipulation associated with propaganda, but rather on the credibility
33 Wilson P. Dizard, Jr., Inventing Public Diplomacy: The Story o f the U.S. Information Agency (Boulder, 
CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), 141-143.
34 Robert Parry and Peter Kombluh, “Iran-Contra’s Untold Story,” Foreign Policy 72 (Autumn 1988): 3-30; 
James Dao and Eric Schmitt, “Pentagon Readies Efforts to Sway Sentiment Abroad,” New York Times, 19 
February 2006.
35 Jarol B. Manheim, Strategic Public Diplomacy and American Foreign Policy: The Evolution o f Influence 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 7.
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of transparent communication. Adherents to this style may share a revulsion to 
propaganda (although it arguably helped raise the profile of public diplomacy in the first 
place) and prefer instead to project trustworthy and credible communications via free and 
fair media channels. This was a guiding principle first espoused by the late journalist and 
former USIA Director Edward R. Murrow, reiterated in the findings of a 1975 blue- 
ribbon panel led by Frank Stanton on the reorganization U.S. public diplomacy , and has 
to a large extent governed the style and content of U.S. government sponsored 
broadcasting. Moral arguments surrounding ‘tough-minded’ and ‘tender-minded’ 
factions notwithstanding, many recognize the necessity of transparency in an age when 
“citizens can see quite graphically the effects of their leaders’ foreign policy decision and 
how diplomats cope with them on the ground.” Recognition of this reality has yielded 
strong assertions from leading diplomats, scholars and journalists that the credibility of
governments must be fiercely protected since the proliferation of ICT’s has made it easier
• 18 to expose discrepancies between word and deed.
Short-term and Long-term Timeframes. Public diplomacy characteristically 
reinforces polices that are impermanent. Therefore, as Nye mentions above, it is often
36 Panel on International Information, Education and Cultural Relations, “International Information, 
Education and Cultural Relations: Recommendations for the Future,” CSIS Special Report Number Fifteen 
(Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1975), 12: “The program must recognize 
that the communications revolution has educated the world to a greater skepticism concerning things 
governments say about their societies. Hence, there is a great need today for credibility...”
3,1 Jorge Heine, “On the Manner o f Practising the New Diplomacy,” The Center fo r  International 
Governance Innovation Working Paper 11 (Waterloo, Ontario: The Center for International Governance 
Innovation, 2006), 7.
38 Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, “Changing Minds, Winning 
Peace: A New Strategic Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World,” Report o f  the 
Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy fo r the Arab and Muslim World (Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, 2003), 32; Bruce Gregory, “Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication: Cultures, 
Firewalls, and Imported Norms” (paper presented at the American Political Science Association Conference 
on International Communication and Conflict, Washington, USA, 31 August 2005), 17; Jonathan Alter, 
“Truth: The Best Propaganda,” Newsweek, 4 March 2002.
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short-term by design. Rosenau has generally described foreign policy action, the very 
action public diplomacy is called upon to support, as “constantly unfolding” and 
susceptible to event sequences in the international realm. A typical example of the 
relationship between events, foreign policy and public diplomacy can be seen in the way 
the United States lobbied against Soviet resistance over the NATO-sanctioned 
deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) in Western Europe in 1983 to 
counter a mid-1970’s upgrading of Soviet missiles to the new SS-20, which at that time 
established relative parity between Western and Soviet nuclear capabilities in Europe. At 
the onset of the deployment, political tensions between the two superpowers ran high 
after negotiations to reduce INF in Europe broke down.40 Publicly, however, the dispute 
touched off numerous protests by Europeans opposed to any accelerations in the arms 
race, which the Soviet government was quick to exploit in support of its own position. 
The United States countered with what Reagan National Security Council (NSC) staffer 
Carnes Lord called a public diplomacy “effort of unprecedented intensity and degree of 
coordination throughout the U.S. government” 41 Lord cites a propagandistic arms control 
and public diplomacy campaign to have been critical for raising European suspicions over 
Soviet security motives in the region and exposing “the record of Soviet misbehavior 
under existing arms control regimes.”42 With the European public outcry over American 
intentions somewhat muted as a result, the deployment proceeded as planned. George 
Shultz recalled afterwards, “I don’t think we could have pulled it off if it hadn’t been for a
39 James N. Rosenau, International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory (New 
York: Free Press, 1969), 167.
40 “Treaty Between the United States o f America and the Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics on the 
Elimination o f Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles,” 8 December 1987, Treaties o f the 
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/acda/treaties/inf2.htm (accessed on 5 
January 2007).
41 Carnes Lord, “The Past and Future o f Public Diplomacy,” Orbis (Winter 1998): 62-64
42 Ibid, 64. Also see W. Scott Thompson, “Some Elements o f an American Strategy”, in Arms Control, ed. 
William Kintner (Washington, DC: Washington Institute Press, 1987), 304-306.
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very active program of public diplomacy.”43 (As a preface to the next section it is worth 
mentioning that the American response to European protestors and Soviet opposition to 
the buildup constitutes a reactive posture.)
Aside from its propagandistic style, it is important to note that the timeframe of 
the INF campaign represented an instance of public diplomacy being used to build public 
support for an immediate dividend. Although one could argue the relevance of the long- 
running international debate pertaining to nuclear buildups during the Cold War, the INF 
campaign did not seek to settle larger questions dealing with arms control and 
disarmament. It can be better characterized as the outgrowth of imperatives laid out in 
President Reagan’s National Security Decision Directive 77, in which he deemed public 
diplomacy “to generate support for our national security objectives” and therefore ordered 
the creation of a short-lived “special planning group” (SPG) to operate within the NSC 
and coordinate interagency strategic communication efforts.44 Most noted for organizing 
responses to the INF situation and the Soviet downing of Korean Air Lines Flight 007, the 
SPG also orchestrated support for the contras in Nicaragua. Equally notable may be how 
swiftly the importance of the SPG declined after such policy imperatives faded.
Echoing earlier statements that public diplomacy is essentially a short-term effort, 
it seems plausible to suggest that the limited shelf-life of policy initiatives makes it easier 
for practitioners to pursue simple and immediate goals, and these goals are consequently 
made simpler yet should practitioners concentrate their focus on a narrow timeframe,
43 Hans Tuch, Communicating with the World: U.S. Public Diplomacy Overseas (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1990), 161.
44 President, “National Security Decision Directive 77: Management o f Public Diplomacy Relative to 
National Security,” 14 January 1983. W. Scott Thompson, associate director o f the USIA from 1982-1984, 
writes that the special planning group “gave the [USIA] a voice at the policy level, if only briefly”, in 
Thompson, “Anti-Americanism and the U.S. Government,” Annals o f  the American Academy o f Political 
and Social Science 497 (May 1988): 27.
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thereby eliminating a complex and cumbersome set of long-term concerns. From a 
planning perspective, short-term initiatives allow easier accounting for available 
resources, full concentration on situations at hand and immediate returns from 
performance assessment. Alternatively, long-term initiatives bring forth greater 
complexity in that available human and financial resources are harder to maintain, 
concentration wanders to other pressing matters, and successes, if any, take longer to 
materialize and prove with measurable indicators. Nevertheless, long-term initiatives 
represent a staple in the public diplomacy strategies of many states and organizations, 
albeit they are almost always subjugated in favor of short-term interests. The language 
associated with the long-term often involves terms like “development”, “incubating” and 
“transformation”, and justifiably so since long-term challenges require a sustained 
commitment to create change. Exchange programs assume an important place in the 
arsenal of long-term tactics, emphasizing niche areas such as the arts and sciences, and 
promoting the cultures of sponsoring countries. Seldom known is the fact that the United 
States and Soviet Union engaged in a long-running cultural exchange program that 
remained in place for nearly the entire duration of the Cold War. Other prestigious 
programs include Britain’s Rhodes Scholarship and the Japan Exchange and Teaching 
(JET) Program, both of which provide a unique opportunity for highly-qualified foreign 
scholars to pursue academic and professional endeavors.
In the promotion of cultural identities, the foreign ministries of France, Germany, 
and more recently China dedicate globally-operating organizations and centers to extend 
to foreign populations the heritage of their respective languages, cultures and political 
values. France’s General Directorate for International Cooperation and Development 
focuses on extending awareness of French culture through the Alliance Fran9aises, and 
Germany utilizes its vast network of Goethe-Instituts to actively spread German language
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and culture in attempts to foster a positive image of German politics and society in nearly 
90 countries. The Chinese Ministry of Education opened up its first Confucius Institute 
in August 2006 to foster interest in Chinese language and culture and support teachers of 
the Chinese language overseas. By 2010, the Ministry plans to have 100 such Institutes 
in operation.45
It must not be overlooked that while exchanges over the long-term create 
continued opportunities for personal contact, the media also play an important role in 
communicating messages that sustain the underlying ideas and values of sponsoring 
countries. Media outlets can be the differential in the marathon race to deliver 
information to international audiences and it is incumbent upon the media to build and 
maintain their credibility in part to reflect positively on the societies they represent. For 
state-owned media this means maintaining an appearance of distance from government 
interests, and some say it is chiefly for this reason the BBC World Service enjoys a larger 
audience than all US international broadcasting services combined, despite a smaller 
annual budget46 At the same time, media outlets also represent the worldview of their 
home cultures, and this affords media the sometimes unwitting ability to cultivate positive 
associations for or draw hostility to their sponsoring country. This helps explain the 
controversy that resulted in Denmark and more broadly within Western societies when in 
September 2005 a Danish newspaper editor ran cartoons depicting the Prophet 
Mohammad in a negative light only to invite a firestorm of criticism from Muslim
45 “’China threat’ fear countered by culture,” China Daily (29 May 2006), http://news.xinhuanet.com/ 
english/2006-05/29/content_4613721.htm (accessed on 26 November 2006).
46 Kim Andrew Elliot, letter to a U.K. public diplomacy review team led by Lord Carter o f Coles, 3 January 
2005, http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/papers/vp01.cfm?outfit=pmt&requesttimeout=500&folder=141&paper=2182 
(accessed on 20 December 2006).
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countries.47 This has caused long-term damage to the Danish image, and it is in the wake 
of the crisis that the government has decided to prepare for such crises by investing more 
public diplomacy.
Reactive and Proactive Postures. As with the case of Denmark, sometimes a 
nation or organization finds itself having to answer to charges that place at risk its 
reputation with particular populations. To salvage the public trust during a crisis 
situation, it may employ the tactic of reactive public diplomacy, which can be useful for 
bypassing layers of media and local political interference and explaining positions 
directly to publics, and also in allowing for a quick response mechanism to prevent 
allegations from spinning wildly out of control. Others have termed this notion as ‘crisis’ 
public diplomacy48, or ‘surge capability’49 -  a temporary recourse distinguishable from 
the longer-term, ‘proactive’ campaigns intended to steer public opinion into a favorable 
mood. Reactive public diplomacy does not pretend that winning favor is realistic 
although it may be desirable. Its main purpose is “damage control”, or to ensure that 
public opinion is minimally impacted in relation to conditions prior to the event that 
caused the crisis.
A rudimentary look at some American security and political crises during the 
twentieth century and beyond shows how the United States has relied on reactive public 
diplomacy in a time of crisis. At the outset of the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962, 
the ad hoc “Ex Com” assembled to deal with the matter first did not include the fledgling
47 Shawn Powers, “The Danish Cartoon Crisis: The Import and Impact o f Public Diplomacy,” USC Center 
for Public Diplomacy Special Report (5 April 2006), http://uscpublicdiplomacy.com/pubs/reports/ 
060405_powers.pdf (accessed 22 February 2007).
48 Siobhan McEvoy-Levy, American Exceptionalism and US Foreign Policy: Public Diplomacy at the End 
o f the Cold War, 154-156.
49 Leonard, Public Diplomacy, 32-38.
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USIA in its meetings, but this changed once it was realized that communications would 
play a significant part in its resolution.50 It would be the USIA Deputy Director Donald 
Wilson who suggested integrating photographs into the famous speech by Adlai 
Stevenson before the UN Security Council on 25 October 1962 in which he effectively 
indicted the Soviet Union for deploying nuclear warheads into Cuba.51 Returning to a 
prior example, President Reagan’s NSDD 77 specified the need for response-oriented 
strategies to counter “aggressive political action moves” of the Soviet Union, which he 
delegated to a sub-committee of the aforementioned SPG.
More recent response mechanisms include the Coalition Information Centers 
(CIC) shared by the American and British governments, which they jointly created in 
October 2001 upon the launching of the Afghan military campaign. Emulating the 
domestic political campaign cultures of both countries, and acknowledging the positive 
impact of a similar arrangement used by NATO in Kosovo, CIC operations utilized 
branch offices in Washington, London and Islamabad to remain engaged at all hours of 
the news cycle. Created foremost “to reinforce the message that the war is against 
terrorism, not Islam” on the international front, domestically it compelled an array of 
government agencies dealing with the press and general public to coordinate messages. 
The champion of the CIC on the American side, then-White House counselor Karen 
Hughes, would subsequently adapt its purposes to form the Rapid Response Unit (RRU) 
at the Department of State in early 2006. Along with the reproduction of the command
50 Dizard, Inventing Public Diplomacy, 88.
51 Ibid, and corroborated by Walter Roberts in an interview with the author, Washington, DC, 14 December 
2006.
52 President, National Security Decision Directive 77, 2.
53 Stephen Fidler, “War of words goes hand in hand with war on the ground: Bitter winter nears, and 
George W. Bush knows he will need to feel the warmth o f his close allies”, Financial Times, 8 November 
2001; Defense Science Board Report, 2004, 2 1.
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center for constant monitoring of international media, the RRU issues daily guidance 
complete with talking points for American embassies and consulates to respond to 
emergent matters in the media. In addition, the coordination of talking points creates an 
“echo chamber” effect by repeating and reinforcing messages originating in 
Washington.54
As is typical of crisis situations, however, it is rather uncommon to find an 
apparatus like the CIC or RRU in place to anticipate crises before they happen; crises are 
usually short-lived, as are the temporary offices created to deal with them. Thus 
practitioners recognize the need to maintain, alongside the response-oriented capacity, a 
proactive public diplomacy posture that retains far more control of agenda setting, 
amasses and maintains a stable level of resources to pursue both short- and longer-term 
agenda items, and permits the practitioner to do so for however long or short the situation 
requires. In a non-state example, an organization such as the International Committee of 
the Red Cross prepares for the unpredictable by staffing disaster relief centers and 
logistical crews standing ready to be called into action, but it also sustains a constant level 
of activity in what it calls “humanitarian diplomacy” to advance an agenda against what it 
regards as humanitarian threats and advocates implementation of international 
humanitarian laws.55
With respect to the agenda-setting capabilities of public diplomacy, the insights of 
the communications discipline shed light on the relationship between agendas their 
potential effects on public perceptions, and further towards the shaping of what Walter
54 Glenn Kessler, “Hughes Tries Fine-Tuning to Improve Diplomatic Picture”, Washington Post, 19 April 
2006.
55 International Committee o f the Red Cross, “Humanitarian diplomacy: an introduction,” International 
Committee o f the Red Cross, http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteengO.nsf/html/57JMAN (accessed 9 
February 2007).
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Lippmann called the “world outside and pictures in our heads”.56 In this sense, political 
communications figures try to co-opt international media outlets into telling public not 
what to think, but what to think about. Manheim has discussed examples where
r  o
international actors have successfully steered their agendas for political gains. He raises 
the instance of a visit to the United States by former prime minister of Pakistan, Benazir 
Bhutto, whose chief concern was to reverse the declining American interest in Pakistan 
after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989.59 With the aid of an American 
political consultant, Bhutto approached her visit much like a political campaign and 
centered her agenda on the theme of a U.S.-Pakistan democratic partnership as a way to 
remain relevant to U.S. interests in South Asia. By shifting attention away from the 
geostrategic developments that may have caused the United States to become less 
interested in Pakistan and placing a spotlight on political partnership, Bhutto won rave 
reviews in the American media and, as Manheim notes, succeeded in elevating Pakistan’s 
profile among American opinion leaders.
Moreover, with her visit having transpired solely within the month of June 1989, 
Bhutto’s coup over American public opinion shows that proactive public diplomacy may 
be conducted on a relatively short timescale, and yet the larger portion of public 
diplomacy scholarship in this area has been devoted to longer term models.60 For 
example, Leonard offers a case study depicting Norway’s concentration of public
56 Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York: Macmillan, 1922).
57 Bernard Cohen, The Press and Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963).
58 Manheim, Strategic Public Diplomacy and American Foreign Policy, 127-128.
59 Ibid., 84-91.
60 Some resources on the long-term impact of international broadcasting include James Critchlow, Radio 
Hole-in-the-Head: An Insider’s Story o f  Cold War Broadcasting (Washington, DC: American University 
Press, 1995) and Donald R. Browne, International Radio Broadcasting: The Limits o f  the Limitless Medium 
(New York: Praeger, 1982). For some studies on cultural diplomacy, see Yale Richmond, Cultural 
Exchange and the Cold War: Raising the Iron Curtain (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 2003) and Richard T. Arndt, The First Resort o f  Kings: American Cultural Diplomacy in 
the Twentieth Century (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2005).
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diplomacy resources to cast it as a force for peace and conflict resolution worldwide.61 
Rather than take months, Norway has held to this line for years, and Leonard notes its 
integral participation in the Middle East peace process (1993 Oslo Accords), extended 
mediation efforts in the Sri Lankan internal dispute, and even its fortuitous association 
with the Nobel Peace Prize, which originated in Oslo. What helps in clarifying the 
general regard for proactive public diplomacy as a long-term effort has to do with 
defining objectives. While both reactive and proactive forms deal in the currency of 
messages, the proactive form is more appropriate to the tasks of image and relationship 
building (or repair), which are invariably time-intensive endeavors.
2.3 U.S. Public Diplomacy Institutions
The previous section has shown that public diplomacy activity, usually the 
product of states, is highly dependent on circumstances that a state faces in the world. At 
the same time, it is also true that a state can arrange its public diplomacy apparatus to 
pursue particular objectives, such as growing a national brand, as in the case of Norway, 
or to spread cultural values, as in the cases of China, France and Germany. Some states 
complement their cultural and public diplomacy offices with state-sponsored international 
broadcasting to present their perspective to the world, as the United Kingdom does with 
the British Broadcasting Corporation and Germany with Deutsche Welle, and France with 
France 24. When trying to understand a state’s disposition towards public diplomacy, it 
is helpful to take stock of these organizations.
61 Leonard, Public Diplomacy, 168-175.
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The United States, for its part, does not need to worry about cultural or political 
irrelevance given its enormous influence in contemporary international affairs. On the 
contrary, the main challenges facing American public diplomacy in the post-9/11 era are 
tied to its relevance in areas spanning the politics, military forces, economics and culture. 
Whether the issue has to do with human rights in China, military bases in Central Asia or 
democracy promotion in Cuba, the U.S. public diplomacy apparatus must somehow 
integrate these efforts, along with countless others, into its operations. As for its brand, 
“nation branding” expert Simon Anholt has said that the United States may be too
• (s) • •complex a subject to reduce to a single association. Likewise, American public 
diplomacy is not limited to one office or agency, or even one branch of government, but 
rather the concomitant actions of several entities.
As will soon become apparent, definitive resources on the inner workings of U.S. 
public diplomacy depict a poorly organized structure, but most accounts identify a select 
group of actors as integral to its operations. Based on their proximity to the crafting of a 
cohesive public diplomacy strategy, as well as their ranking relevance in informing, 
influencing or engaging with foreign populations, they can be grouped into two tiers. The 
first tier consists of actors historically charged with strategy formulation who rank high in 
these three given criteria:
The Department o f  State. Secretary of State Colin Powell wrote in May 2003, 
“Every man and woman in the State Department is America’s face to the world.” Of the 
thousands of Foreign Service Officers dispatched by the Department around the world, 
there are, as of 31 March 2007, approximately 700 completely dedicated to the public
62 Simon Anholt, interview by the author, London, 19 October 2006.
63 Djerejian Report, 61.
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diplomacy cone.64 As a matter of practice, public diplomacy officers usually perform the 
frontline duties of face-to-face interactions with foreign nationals, appear in local media, 
and are charged with collecting input on climates of public opinion with respect to the 
United States. The Foreign Service Institute (FSI) trains all of these officers in area 
studies, local language skills and how to deal with the foreign media within roughly 
twenty weeks of courses.65 Historically, some institutions integral to public diplomacy 
have always existed within the Department, but from 1953 to 1999 most programs, 
coordination and strategy for all public diplomacy efforts took place within the USIA. 
Shifting foreign affairs priorities and significant budget cuts after the end of the Cold War 
eventually forced a merger of the agency into the Department. The two principal public 
diplomacy bureaus consist of the Office of International Information Programs (IIP), 
which produces and distributes information to reach key audiences, and the Bureau of 
Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA), which manages government-sponsored 
exchange programs targeting foreign and domestic students, business leaders, and 
political figures.
Broadcasting Board o f  Governors (BBG). In addition to information and 
exchange, a third major component of public diplomacy exists in the form of international 
broadcasting. Upon its inception in 1998, the BBG filled the need of the U.S. government 
to create a firewall protecting the independence of its international broadcasting services. 
These are the Voice of America (VOA), Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), 
Radio Free Asia, Radio and TV Marti, and Worldnet Television. More recently, the BBG
64 U.S. General Accountability Office (GAO), “U.S. Public Diplomacy: Strategic Planning Efforts Have 
Improved, But Agencies Face Significant Implementation Challenges,” Testimony Before the Subcommittee 
on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight, House Committee on Foreign Affairs 
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 26 April 2007), 14. (hereafter ‘GAO 2007’)
65 According to 2006-07 Foreign Service Institute Course Catalogue.
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launched Radio Sawa, an Arabic-speaking service, Radio Farda, in Persian, and A1 Hurra, 
an Arabic-language satellite television network. The BBG defines itself as an 
autonomous entity tasked with protecting “the open exchange of accurate and objective 
news” in regions where the reportage of media outlets is compromised. In support of the 
services of the BBG, the U.S. government spent $645 million dollars on international 
broadcasting in fiscal year 2006.66
The White House. As the officers of the Department of State put forth the face of 
the United States Government, the President of the United States is regarded as the voice. 
The President and his staff deliver messages in high-visibility contexts, and the course for 
how to conduct public diplomacy has been traditionally set by executive offices such as 
the National Security Council, or by groups created by presidential directive. Attempts 
have been made at establishing several offices in the White House charged with the task 
of coordinating the diverse public diplomacy activities occurring across agencies. The 
Office of Global Communications, created by an executive order in January of 2003, 
brought together executives from several agencies “to coordinate strategic
f \7communications from the U.S government to overseas audiences.” President Bush also 
created the Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) in 2002, co­
chaired by the State Department and the National Security Council, to ensure interagency 
cooperation in spreading the American message worldwide. Neither of these efforts 
would exist for very long, adding to the list of false starts another PCC created in 2004 to 
craft an integrated public diplomacy strategy for dealing with Muslim countries. In April 
2006, the Bush administration launched another PCC for establishing interagency strategy
66 GAO 2007, 5.
67 U.S. Goverment Accounting Office, “U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Expands Efforts but 
Faces Significant Challenges,” Report to the Committee on International Relations, House o f  
Representatives (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, September 2003), 18.
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chaired by Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Karen Hughes. The 
strategy was released in June 2007.
The second tier consists of actors not historically recognized for their role in 
public diplomacy, yet recently have assumed a more active role in strategy formulation 
and execution:
Congress. The reviewing of budgets and appropriating of funds to public 
diplomacy programs fall under the powers of Congress, primarily through the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee and the House International Relations Committee. 
Congress provides primary public diplomacy resources at the State Department and BBG 
with a combined budget of nearly $1.5 billion (as of FY 2006) divided almost evenly 
between the two entities. As such, Congress also has a hand in dictating the emphasis of 
public diplomacy efforts by showing favor to certain types of programs or personnel in 
the budget approval process. One source at the State Department explained that Congress 
tends to support policy-relevant functions that yield measurable success in the short term. 
The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) conducts regular non-partisan 
reviews of public diplomacy institutions by evaluating the effectiveness of public overall 
diplomacy strategy and application of resources.
The Department o f  Defense. Recently, the role of this agency in public 
diplomacy has become more salient in the course of post-9/11 military campaigns. 
Historically, the Department is more well-known for its combat operations dealing in 
information. Psychological operations are a port of this, and they usually deal with 
military forces utilizing resources such as radio broadcasts and leaflet dropping to 
influence a target population into behaving in certain ways. There is also the tool of
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military public affairs used during times of war on domestic audiences. The U.S. military 
may also participate more directly in public diplomacy in joint operations with other 
armed forces, disaster relief and rescue operations. Yet the Department is not normally 
considered to be a central piece of the public diplomacy apparatus, and evidence suggests 
it is only recently that public diplomacy is assuming its own organization. It launched a 
small planning staff in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy called the 
Office of Support Public Diplomacy to become more involved in public diplomacy in an 
organized manner.
Beyond this “official” set of actors, there are additional classifications that warrant 
consideration not necessarily for their contributions towards strategy -  they are 
“unofficial” by comparison -  but for their profound impact on the way others view the 
United States. These information channels demonstrate an incidental route to becoming a 
part of the public diplomacy process. Firstly, there are a myriad of private organizations 
acquiring abilities to conduct public diplomacy on their own. Being the fact that 
information communication technologies are impacting the way public diplomacy is done 
around the world, its should come as no surprise that many of these private organizations 
in question are derived from the mass media, such as worldwide 24-hour news networks 
like CNN and internet-based media. Aside from the obvious impact of the media, the 
United States also possesses many agile foreign opinion polling organizations, such and 
the Pew Center for the People and the Press and GlobeScan. There are also influential 
groups comprised of business leaders such as Business for Diplomatic Action and PR 
Coalition.
Secondly, there are the social ramifications of private individuals, who commit an 
act or make a statement that influences foreign public opinion. A 2004 report from the 
RAND Corporation suggests a linkage between public diplomacy and the power of
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individuals to purvey a public good. Well-known non-governmental international 
figures, such as former presidents, may participate in a calculated campaign in part to 
reflect well on the character of American citizens.69 Interestingly, the opposite also 
applies to controversial figures whose act or statement negatively impacts foreign public 
sentiment towards the United States, thus inducing the “official” public diplomacy 
apparatus to swing into the mode of ‘rapid response’ or crisis-management and restore the
70consistency of its message for the sake of the national interest.
What this expansion on the public diplomacy concept and brief glimpse into the 
American apparatus show is that the unique position of the United States in international 
affairs amplifies the complexity of an already nuanced and situation-dependent form of 
political communication. Like other nations, the United States uses public diplomacy to 
preserve its standing in the world and further its national interest because there is a 
proven value in its application. And like other nations, the United States can choose from 
a selection of strategies and tactics and assign actors to conduct a form of public 
diplomacy befitting of its global position. However, as the preeminent global power the 
United States is faced with the paradox of having to solicit the aid of other less-powerful 
states to protect its own interests. But American power has not always needed to 
persuade other international actors in this manner, nor has its public diplomacy always 
embraced a conciliatory tone. During the Cold War the United States could afford to be
68 Charles W olf Jr, and Brian Rosen, Public Diplomacy: How to Think About and Improve It (Washington, 
DC: RAND Corporation, 2004).
69 Harold Pachios, interview by the author, Portland, ME, 29 April 2005. Pachios, the former Commissioner 
of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, suggested that the George H.W. Bush-Bill Clinton 
goodwill tour o f areas ravaged by the Asian Tsunami o f late 2004 was an act o f public diplomacy.
70 Thomas E. Ricks, “Briefing Depicted Saudis as Enemies: Ultimatum Urged to Pentagon Board,” 
Washington Post, 6 August 2002. This story exposed the rather embarrassing incident o f when a RAND 
analyst named Laurent Murawiec gave a highly inflammatory presentation to the DOD Defense Policy 
Board suggesting a massive mobilization o f U.S. power against Saudi Arabia. The Saudi outrage that 
resulted forced U.S. officials to immediately disassociate themselves from the report.
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aggressive in its worldwide campaign against communism, and it was in the wake of the 
fall of communism that murmurs of American unilateralism took form. This latter period 
also happens to usher in American public diplomacy’s most serious decline.
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CHAPTER 3 : THE DECLINE OF U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY, 1991-2001
In summarizing the general level of attention devoted to the welfare of public 
diplomacy, Harold Pachios, former Chairman of the U.S. Advisory Commission on 
Public Diplomacy and a Commissioner throughout the 1990’s said simply, “Nobody 
cared about public diplomacy in the 1990’s. It was only after 9/11 that people started to 
pay attention.”1 Peering into the recent history of U.S. public diplomacy between the end 
of the Cold War and 9/11 one may find the precursor for the weakened structure and 
piecemeal strategy that would soon draw intense scrutiny. The warning signs were far 
less consequential at that time, and the primary goal of this chapter will be to revisit what 
was happening to American public diplomacy during the post-Cold War years to not 
simply recall the seminal events that transpired, but also to create a context within which 
one can correlate a series of fateful decisions that compromised public diplomacy 
institutions. The redistribution of international power prompted by the end of Cold War 
is instructive here, as is the early-1990’s discourse surrounding the assessment of 
American power, which fuelled a debate between the so-called declinists and revivalists 
and propelled the influential conclusion that the United States had achieved 
unchallengeable primacy with respect to other nations. This chapter starts out by calling 
for a clear account of correlating factors, not least of which includes a distinct lack of 
focus or sense of purpose to fill the void left by the absence of the communist threat. 
Parallel to this development there was an intensive movement shared by the legislative 
and executive branches of the U.S. government to reduce the federal budget, which in
1 Harold C. Pachios, interview by the author, Portland, USA, 19 December 2005.
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turn, starting with the 1993 National Performance Review, fixed crosshairs on foreign 
affairs institutions that were regarded by some as having outlived their usefulness. The 
ensuing debate that raged between the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the 
Clinton administration during the mid-1990’s underscored the unique circumstances 
surrounding the most dramatic consolidation of U.S. public diplomacy activities and 
institutions in nearly 50 years.
Framing the decline of public diplomacy in this context serves as the second task 
of this chapter. However striking these changes appeared in their moments of occurrence, 
it is undeniable that without a change in the international system as massive as the end of 
the Cold War, none of these subsequent events would have occurred. For one, careful 
consideration of the impact of that seminal event sheds light on noticeable changes in the 
way the USIA was appraised in the early 1990’s. The desire of political leaders to roll 
back foreign affairs organizations did not elude the USIA, which embarked on a desperate 
search for relevance and reinvention. Before too long, the political environment in the 
United States would become so enmeshed in the budget-cutting surge of foreign affairs 
that by 1997 a merger of the USIA and Department of State would be preordained.
At its very essence, the public diplomacy apparatus that existed in the United 
States from the early 1950’s up until the late 1990’s is best understood as a product of the 
Cold War. This is true in that it was motivated by the foreign policy imperatives of that 
period, namely to confront and counter the expansion of communism by applying one of 
several solutions tailor-made for the tasks at hand. The imperatives, while susceptible to 
fluctuations based on the tone of U.S.-Soviet relations at any given time, remained 
generally consistent throughout, at least as far as public diplomacy’s contributions were 
concerned. A telegram from the U.S. mission in Tehran dating back to 1950 stated one 
of its goals in the execution of information and educational programs to be, “to
82
demonstrate through all media the weaknesses and fallacies of the communist system.” 
Compare this to thirty years later, when President Ronald Reagan would announce before 
the British Parliament plans for what would become the National Endowment for 
Democracy (NED) as part of a reinvigorated public diplomacy campaign, and it was 
explicitly this contest of ideas with the Soviet Union that defined the Cold War, with 
public diplomacy firmly situated at the front lines.
With the end of the Cold War, however, justifications for many of these projects 
would inexorably change to meet new foreign policy challenges and political realities, as 
would be the case in the instance of the NED. Agencies such as the USIA would find 
themselves too closely associated with the singular purpose of defeating communism and 
evaporate altogether. Even though the fall of communism had opened up new front for 
democracy promotion (the liberation of Eastern Europe and the reunification of Germany 
stand out as examples here) a sort of complacency followed the collapse of America’s 
greatest threat and a comprehensive re-evaluation of U.S. foreign policy interests came 
thereafter.
What some American leaders and public intellectuals saw was that the United 
States stood to be the prime beneficiary of a new unipolar international system, and 
unchallenged in its path to primacy. Indeed, the gradual demise of the Soviet Union 
precipitated a redistribution of global military, economic and political power that swung 
in America’s favor. Following on this was the imminent arrival of new sources of power 
to be found in information communications technology wielded by non-state entities in 
many parts of the world. These prevailing conditions are fundamental to understanding
2 U.S. Embassy Tehran, Circular Airgram o f  April 5, 1950.
3 Ronald Reagan, Speech before the British Parliament, London, 8 June 1982.
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the U.S. foreign policymaking elite as their actions led to the resulting steady decline of 
U.S. public diplomacy. The chronicle detailed in this and the following chapters begins 
with recalling the events that led to U.S. public diplomacy becoming dispersed and 
debilitated. This shall present the context in which the decline occurred.
3.1 Power Transitions and Changes in the American Foreign Affairs Institutions
The relationship between U.S. foreign policy and its public diplomacy was and 
remains one of cause and effect; without being buttressed by a just and policy-relevant 
cause, there is little to warrant a wide-reaching effect. During the Cold War, U.S. public 
diplomacy derived its purpose from the power dynamics between the United States and 
the rest of the world. By and large, the priority of dealing with the Soviet Union created 
for the United States not only a prism through which all of its security interests passed, 
but also the precedent for response-oriented manner in which public diplomacy was 
historically used. The USIA, the lead agency for U.S. public diplomacy from 1953 to 
1999, played the part of an advocate for foreign policy, taking up the final determinations 
of policymakers so that it could “define, explain, and advocate” them to audiences 
abroad.4
One prime example from its history involves the calculated U.S. response to 
Soviet-backed suppression of the Solidarity movement in Poland in late 1981. As the 
Soviet Union applied the last vestiges of the “Brezhnev Doctrine” through Polish martial 
law, the Reagan White House seized on this event as an opportunity to expose the
4 Appendix, Budget o f  the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1998, 1126. A brief history o f the 
evolution o f U.S. public diplomacy mission statements from the passage of the Smith-Mundt Act o f 1948 to 
the early years of the Reagan administration can be found in Allen C, Hansen, USIA: Public Diplomacy in 
the Computer Age (New York: Praeger, 1984), 15-25.
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severity of the clampdown. Members of the Reagan administration drew on the 
broadcasting powers of the USIA, whose director, Charles Z. Wick, masterminded the 90- 
minute television special, “Let Poland Be Poland”, which reportedly reached more than 
184 million people in 30 countries.5 The broadcast had the full support of the U.S. 
policymaking elite behind it, and a star-studded line-up of performers aided in 
communicating a unified rejection of the Soviet action.
Alternatively, periods of thaw in U.S.-Soviet relations had the opposite effect of 
setting a softer tone. Whereas a marked reduction in tension would often temper the need 
for provocative measures, questions would also abound as to the need for strong public 
diplomacy. During the detente period of the early 1970’s, and yet again in the early 
1990’s after the disintegration of the Soviet Union the venerable radio institutions of 
Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty confronted threats of budget cuts 
by inquisitive members of the U.S. Congress.6
When the communist threat disintegrated this relationship between U.S. foreign 
policy and public diplomacy would enter a phase of its most radical rethinking since the 
early postwar period. It soon became apparent that with the pendulum of global primacy 
swinging towards the United States, many wondered why public diplomacy continued to 
be necessary. The post-Cold War appraisal of public diplomacy also grew out of the way 
in which the United States viewed itself within the global power dynamic. Merely a 
decade earlier, the Reagan administration took control of a country reeling from an
5 Alvin Snyder, Warriors o f  Disinformation (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1995), 6-11. 
Congressional hearings in 1972 led by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and chaired by Senator
William Fulbright found the radios to be “anathema to detente and that they were archaic remnants o f the 
Cold War”. Laurien Alexandre, The Voice o f America: From Detente to the Reagan Doctrine (Norwood, 
NJ: Ablex Publishing, 1988), 20-22. On post-Cold War funding problems, see James Critchlow, Radio 
Hole-in-the-Head/Radio Liberty: An Insider’s Story o f  Cold War Broadcasting (Washington, DC: 
American University Press, 1995), 180.
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internal sense of weakness and consequently invested in public diplomacy to reassert 
American power. With the United States left standing at the end of the Cold War, the 
resulting confidence had the opposite effect.
Explanations as to why this was the case greatly inform public diplomacy pursuits 
in the 1990’s, and it will be argued in the forthcoming pages how the loss of value in 
public diplomacy caused it to be greatly diminished by decade’s end. Around this time 
there ran a lively debate amongst scholars within the United States, the latest within a sort 
of recurrent stock-taking exercises regarding the question of how much real power the
o
United States wielded in the world. Before the Soviet collapse in the early 1990’s, 
speculation over the stock of power held by the United States was fueled by an 
overwhelming suspicion that it might have been diminishing. Labeled by implication as 
“declinist”, these prognostications, whether they intended to or not, thrived on timely 
circumstances that could be perceived as eroding American power in some way. Samuel 
P. Huntington, for one, conceived of this erosion as cyclical ‘waves’ of declinism 
instigated by momentary mutations in the power of the United States relative to other 
countries.
Paul Kennedy’s The Rise and Fall o f the Great Powers, published in 1988, 
likewise arrived on the heels of the crippling U.S. stock market crash in October 1987 and 
growing fears of another economic recession. That same year, the Japanese per capita 
gross national product exceeded that of the United States for the first time, thus delivering 
the reality of a challenger to U.S. economic primacy.9 In Kennedy’s view, though
7 Kenneth L. Adelman, “Speaking o f America: Public Diplomacy in Our Time,” Foreign Affairs 59:4 
(Spring 1981).
8 Samuel P. Huntington, “The U.S. -  Decline or Renewal?” Foreign Affairs, 67 (Winter 1988/89): 94-96.
9 Hobart Rowen, “U.S. Should Accept Idea of Sharing Power with Japan,” Washington Post, 23 October 
1988.
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certainly not his alone, Japan exemplified a country on the rise and approaching its 
readiness to take advantage of a United States buckling under the overextension of its 
power.10 The ‘overstretch’ that Kennedy spoke of served as the centerpiece of his thesis 
as to why great powers rise and fall, and he further drew from America’s dramatic 
military expansion and growing deficits produced by the Reagan administration to 
support his case. Standing firmly on the side of history, Kennedy predicted yet another 
wave of declinism that saw the United States, like Britain, France and Spain before it, 
collapsing under its own weight.
As it happened, the future did not play out as Kennedy and others had foretold. 
The crumbling of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the Soviet Union soon to follow left the 
United States with the sole claim to superpower status. In light of these developments and 
the dramatically changed perception of U.S. power in relation to the rest of the world, the 
declinist discussion was joined by an opposing but no less influential view about the 
future of the United States. Kennedy himself would come to identify this school of 
thought with those who “believe either that the talk of America’s ‘decline’ has gone too 
far, or that, while things are indeed wrong, they can be corrected.”11 The “revivalists” as 
they came to be known, included a fairly diverse group of commentators, from sociologist
Peter Berger, to journalist Robert Bartley, to U.S. government alumni-tumed-
1academicians Joseph Nye, and Henry Nau. The most notorious of the last grouping 
includes Francis Fukuyama, who famously postulated “liberal democracy as the final
10 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall o f the Great Powers (New York: Random House, 1987), 607-608; 
Clyde V. Prestowitz, Trading Places: How We Allowed Japan to Take the Lead (New York: Basic Books, 
1988).
11 Paul M. Kennedy, “Fin-de-Si£cle America,” Yew York Review o f  Books, 28 June 1990, 32.
12Peter L. Berger, “Is America on the Way Down? (Round Two),” Commentary 93, no. 5 (May 1992): 19- 
20; Robert L. Bartley,”Is America on the Way Down?: No,” Commentary 93, no. 3 (March 1992): 22-27; 
Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature o f  American Power. New York: Basic Books, 
1990; Henry R. Nau, The Myth o f America’s Decline: Leading the World Economy into the 1990’s (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1990).
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1 "Xform of human government” in his “end of history” thesis. Both momentous and 
controversial, Fukuyama’s work appeared a mere two years after Kennedy’s opposing 
forecast and it demonstrated a remarkable contrast between Cold War and post-Cold War 
readings of how much power the United States possessed. It was a dramatic differential. 
In a world without the apparent balance of power constraints, the United States could be 
free to project its power in new and unprecedented ways, and public diplomacy, like other 
modes of projection, would inexorably mutate from its Cold War purposes in areas of 
both strategy and organization.
There are valuable insights to be taken from a rough summary on the discourse 
about American power in the period between Kennedy and Fukuyama. Within a matter of 
a few short years, it would be the revivalist argument wielding the upper hand, which was 
affirmed by America’s unparalleled preponderance of power and roaring economic 
growth throughout the 1990’s.14 “American power,” wrote Michael Cox in 2001, “is now 
more complete than it was back in 1941 or even 1945,” the nascent years of Henry Luce’s 
“American Century” wave of revivalism.15 While history could do more to support these 
claims by the end of the century, American foreign policy figures of the early 1990’s put 
their trust in unfolding events in international system that appeared to working in their 
favor. Already the signs that a withdrawal of interest in foreign affairs was imminent, 
which typified the confidence of the period.
13 Francis Fukuyama, “The End o f History,” National Interest (Summer 1989): 3.
14 G. John Ikenberry, “Liberal Hegemony and the Future of the American Postwar Order,” in International 
Order and the Future o f Word Politics, ed. T.V. Paul and John Hall (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999); Michael E. Cox, “Whatever Happened to American Decline? International Relations and the 
New United States Hegemony,” New Political Economy 6, no. 3 (2001): 311-40; “Imperial Overstretch?” 
The Economist, 27 June 2002.
15 Cox, “American Decline,” 332; Henry Luce, “The American Century,” Life, 17 February 1941.
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“Leaders and nations do not choose strategies de novo” notes Bracken, even if 
their future ramifications are yet to be known.16 In a poignant example supporting 
Bracken’s argument, Brent Scowcroft, National Security Advisor under President George 
H. W. Bush, revealed this in a National War College address:
In the first decade after the Cold War, we just coasted and took a breather 
after the tensions o f  the Cold War. After all, Fukuyama was arguing the 
“end o f history” and that everyone was on the road to becoming open, 
free-market, democratic societies. ”17
The reformation of the international system and encouragement brought on by revivalism 
set the context in which American leaders opted to weaken the USIA, Voice of America, 
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and other areas of public diplomacy in the decade after 
the Cold War. The widespread acceptance of the revivalist view committed U.S. public 
diplomacy institutions and foreign policy in general to a lower profile. When considering 
the context, it is of little surprise that the conduct of foreign affairs and the expression of 
American power would move in this direction between 1991 and 2001.
3.2 Anatomy of a Decline
Setting the parameters of time in this way is useful for focusing on the relationship 
between U.S. public diplomacy and the unique set of circumstances prevailing in the 
1990’s. Aside from being useful, it is also instructive when attempting to isolate the 
ambiguous notion of the decline of U.S. public diplomacy in this context, as one could 
argue that its decline had been an uneasy constant for a long time. It is true, for example
16 Paul Bracken, “The Structure of the Second Nuclear Age,” Orbis 47, no. 3 (Summer 2003): 399.
17 Neil R. Klopfenstein, “USIA’s Integration into the State Department: Advocating Policy Trumps 
Promoting Mutual Understanding”, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, National War College 
(2000), 9-10.
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that USIA suffered from a diminishing number of employees from its peak of over 12,000
1 &in 1967 to fewer than 7,000 in the late 1990’s. In addition to organizational decline, 
there has also existed a fluctuating rise and decline of influence, or a varying degree of 
closeness which public diplomats could communicate with their superiors. There have 
been perilous encounters with powerful chairmen of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, as in the cases of Senator J. William Fulbright in the early 1970’s and 
Senator Jesse Helms in the mid-to-late 1990’s, with scant backing from the White House, 
interspersed with ‘comebacks’ (though not in the case of Helms) characterized by closer 
ties with the White House.19 Arndt, on the other hand, considers the period between 1981 
and 2001 as the “two decades of decline” -  a period in which cultural diplomacy, a 
dimension of public diplomacy relating to educational and cultural exchange, was 
eschewed by realist-leaning leadership at USIA in favor of more aggressive anti-Soviet 
campaigns in the 1980’s.20
While compelling cases can be made to show that periods of retrenchment have 
been a constant companion to public diplomacy, what sets apart the period between 1991 
and 2001 from others can be distilled into two principal factors. In the first, it is 
undeniable that the public diplomacy apparatus in place for nearly four decades faced a 
renewed attempt at marginalization starting shortly after the end of the Cold War. Much 
of what constituted public diplomacy for the United States at this time emerged 
necessarily from the Cold War and consequently derived purpose and focus from the
18U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, Report o f  U.S. Advisory Commission on Public 
Diplomacy 1991, 18-19; Susan B. Epstein, “State Department and Related Agencies FY1998 
Appropriations,” CRS Report fo r Congress, 10 December 1997, 4.
19Frank Ninkovich, “U.S. Information Policy and Cultural Diplomacy,” Foreign Policy Association 
Headline Series 308 (Fall 1996), 32.
20 Richard T. Arndt, The First Resort o f  Kings: American Cultural Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century, 
(Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2005), 532-543.
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9 1policy aims its programs were created to support. Parts of the infrastructure operating at 
one time or another within the USIA included educational exchanges, cultural centers and 
international broadcasting, and all had been formed early in the postwar period to
99encourage democratic development as a way to ward off communism. Without the 
backdrop of the Cold War, public diplomacy wholly took on the ominous appearance of a 
fish out of water, an “expensive anachronism” that the U.S. government no longer needed
9^
in its arsenal.
Having become vulnerable in this way, public diplomacy institutions met with 
adversity from detractors devoted to the business of dismantling it, and this is the second 
factor distinguishing the latest period of its from others. All those figures who were 
instrumental in diminishing public diplomacy shared in the “budget-cutting zeal” that 
arrived with the Clinton administration in 1993.24 Between 1990 and 2001, the budget for 
public diplomacy allotted by the U.S. Congress declined by nearly 33 percent in constant 
dollars.25 The cuts struck deep into the organization: over 2,000 positions at USIA were 
eliminated between 1990 and 1999, a reduction of over 20 percent. The number would 
have been higher still had the proposed extinction of RFE/RL in the Clinton
9 ( \administration’s 1993 federal deficit-reduction plan seen its way through to completion.
21 United States Department o f Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication, Report o f  
the Defense Science Board on Strategic Communication, Office o f the Under Secretary of Defense, United 
States Department o f Defense, September 2004, 37 (hereafter Defense Science Board, 2004); On Cold War 
broadcasting, see The Hoover Institution and the Cold War International History Project of the Woodrow 
Wilson International Center for Scholars. Report from Conference on Cold War Broadcasting Impact, 
Stanford University, Palo Alto, USA, 13-16 October 2004, 41-45. For cultural and educational exchange, 
see Yale Richmond, Cultural Exchange and The Cold War: Raising the Iron Curtain (University Park, PA: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003).
22 United States General Accounting Office, USIA: Options fo r  Addressing Possible Budget Reductions, 
September 1996, 2.
23 Antony J. Blinken, “Winning the War o f Ideas”, Washington Quarterly 25, no. 2 (Spring 2002): 105.
24 James Critchlow, “Public Diplomacy during the Cold War: The Record and Its Implications,” Journal o f  
Cold War Studies 6, no. 1 (Winter 2004): 84.
25 In 1990 dollars. See Appendix C for graphic representation.
26 Steven A. Holmes, “A Cold War Icon Comes Under Siege,” New York Times, 21 February 1993.
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Meanwhile, after educational exchanges experienced a slight windfall in Eastern Europe 
in the early 1990’s, between 1995 and 2001 the number of annual educational and 
cultural exchanges fell from 45,000 to 29,000.27
It should be clarified that as a matter of principle no one had categorically 
dismissed public diplomacy as a form of statecraft, but interpretations of it as a temporary 
rather than a permanent fixture in foreign affairs prevailed at this time. “They did 
yeoman service during a time when they were required,” the head of the U.S. Advisory 
Commission on Public Diplomacy said of RFE/RL in 1993. “But the world has turned.” 
In addition to an absence of institutional support at the official level, there also lacked any 
broad and sustained domestic constituency to keep public diplomacy programs afloat. 
Pragmatically speaking, those familiar with public diplomacy viewed it as a form of 
weaponry, or “something that happens during wartime” that could be decommissioned as 
one would a military base. As with other areas of the wartime infrastructure, writes 
R.S. Zahama, “the extensive wartime information apparatus is dismantled” once the 
campaign draws to a close.
The task of remaking American foreign affairs agencies entered into its planning 
phase in 1993, and soon thereafter lawmakers took up proposals in Congress that included 
drawing down public diplomacy. The man who sought to execute this portion of the plan 
in an expedient fashion was Senator Jesse Helms, the chairman of the Senate Foreign
27 United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, Report o f  U.S. Advisory Commission on 
Public Diplomacy 2002, 10.
28 “End U.S.-backed Radio Networks, Panel Urges,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 19 March 1993.
29 Bruce Gregory, telephone interview by the author, 1 February 2006.
30 R.S. Zahama, “From Propaganda to Public Diplomacy in the Information Age,” in War, Media, and 
Propaganda: A Global Perspective, ed. Yahya R. Kamalipur and Nancy Snow (Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2004), 221.
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Relations Committee. Helms laid bare his feelings for the USIA on the floor of the U.S. 
Senate in 1998:
“With the fu ll support o f the administration, this legislation shuts down 
two Federal Agencies -  the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and 
the U.S. Information Agency. Isay “now”.
The statement was made in reference to the Foreign Affairs Reform and 
Restructuring Act o f  1998, the law did eventually shut down those two agencies, folding 
the USIA into the Department of State and placing all U.S. government broadcasting 
under the responsibility of a quasi-independent agency called the Broadcasting Board of 
Governors (BBG). With that, Helms would secure his place in crafting the conduct of 
U.S. public diplomacy, and foreign policy in general, for years to come.
In effect, what the preceding suggests is that in order to redress the question of 
how U.S. public diplomacy staggered between the end of the Cold War and 9/11, one 
must take into consideration the changed international system as well as domestic 
political forces. With these arguments in place, the next part of this chapter shall briefly 
discuss the series of events, in three segments, that resulted in the weak structure and 
ineffective strategy in place prior to 9/11.
3.3 Fighting for Survival, 1991 to 1995
The story behind the organizations once responsible for “telling America’s story” 
suffers remarkably from a relatively sparse and antiquated representation in the literature. 
Many sophisticated efforts of this kind that are publicly available often pre-date the fall of
31 U.S. Congress, Congressional Record, 105th Cong., 2nd sess., 24 April 1998, S3563.
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communism, although there are some notable releases in the years since that time. 
Often inspired by the experiences of the retired USIA officers or international 
broadcasters who wrote them, the most recent group includes dealings with international 
broadcasting in Radio Hole-in-the-Head/Radio Liberty: An Insider’s Story o f  Cold War 
Broadcasting (1995) by James Critchlow, and Warriors o f  Disinformation: American 
Propaganda, Soviet Lies, and the Winning o f the Cold War - an Insider’s Account (1995) 
by Alvin Snyder. Wilson P. Dizard’s Inventing Public Diplomacy: The Story o f  the U.S. 
Information Agency (2004) offers an institutional history of that organization with a 
majority of the details leading up to the end of the 1980’s. Recently, two volumes on 
cultural diplomacy have been added: Yale Richmond’s Cultural Exchange and the Cold 
War: Raising the Iron Curtain (2004) and the exhaustive First Resort o f  Kings - 
American Cultural Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century (2005) by Richard T. Arndt.34 
Richmond’s work contains a collection of loosely chronological vignettes from Cold War 
interactions while Arndt’s resembles more of a proper historical narrative.
Considering that there are some capably written accounts on the subject matter, it 
is striking that most of these sources have very little to say about the decline of U.S. 
public diplomacy in the 1990’s. One possibility may be that these retiree authors were 
not comfortable expanding on issues and events occurring after their tenures. Dizard and 
Critchlow, for example, both retired from their respective government posts in 1980 and
32 The most complete list o f topical references would include the thorough dissection o f the USIA in Allen 
C. Hansen, USIA: Public Diplomacy in the Computer Age, an earlier version o f the same in John W. 
Henderson, The United States Information Agency (New York: Praeger, 1969). On broadcasting, Alan Heil, 
Jr., Voice o f  America: A History (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), and for educational and 
cultural exchange, Richmond, Cultural Exchange and the Cold War.
33 Critchlow, Radio Hole-in-the-Head; Snyder, op. cit., Wilson P. Dizard, Jr., Inventing Public Diplomacy: 
The Story o f  the U.S. Information Agency (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004).
34 Richmond, op. cit.; Arndt, op. cit.
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1985, respectively, and thus may have had few insights to offer thereafter. Another 
possible reason that remarks on the 1990’s may be in rather short supply is, by contrast to 
the fond memories of some authors, the story from the end of the Cold War onward was 
not a good one to tell.
Whatever the case may be, it might be believed that the inherent limitations of 
organization insiders to write a full account of what happened in the 1990’s could be 
compensated by other means. In 1991 approximately 9,000 people remained in public 
diplomacy-related positions, and with well over a third of this total based overseas there 
exists are sizeable population to comment of events during that time. Re-evaluation of 
public diplomacy institutions was well underway by 1993 and plans for integrating some 
of them within the Department of State had already been proposed by early 1995, so 
evidence is strong that the reduction of public diplomacy was clearly more consequential
♦ i othan existing accounts suggest. The only explanation for these inconsistencies is the 
perceived notion that public diplomacy is “an academic and policy orphan,” an outgrowth 
of the dearth of public diplomacy scholarship identified first in the late 1980’s that
IQ
proceeded to become more visible in the following decade. In the absence of any 
substantial contributions in the academic discourse, a lack of primary source material, and
35 Critchlow, Radio Hole-in-the-Head, 177; Dizard, op. cit., 255.
36 Snyder devoted less than seven pages to it, but enough, however, to reveal that USIA insiders knew 
President Clinton “could not have cared less about public diplomacy.” Snyder also acknowledges the need 
for the U.S. government to cease international broadcasting operation. Of his 556 pages, Arndt used all o f  
six to cover the 1990’s and say that “foreign affairs took a back seat to the economy,” leaving the USIA 
with “unfocused leadership” preoccupied with organizational self-preservation
37United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, Report o f  U.S. Advisory Commission on 
Public Diplomacy 1991, 19.
j8 The Clinton administration’s goal o f balancing the federal budget from the earliest days in its first term 
led to the aforementioned proposal to eliminate RFE/RL by 1995. More advanced plans for downsizing 
and consolidation arrived in early 1995 based on recommendations by Vice President Gore’s National 
Performance Review (1994).
39 Carnes Lord, “The Past and Future o f Public Diplomacy,” Orbis 42, no. 1 (Winter 1998): 50. Lord cites a 
1998 piece by David Abshire, who then considered its scholarship and analysis to be “almost nonexistent”.
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little more than periodic reports from the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public 
Diplomacy, it has only been since 9/11 that questions concerning U.S. public diplomacy 
have been revisited with regularity, in turn prompting more attempts to understand the 
historical implications of the preceding decade.40
The story itself begins most appropriately in 1991, when the collapse of the Soviet 
Union provided the symbolic end of the Cold War and subsequently set in motion the 
main drivers of a pronounced devaluation in U.S. public diplomacy. Though the collapse 
seemed a “joyless victory” for some, the result did herald a marked shift in American 
public mood that desired more attention to domestic issues and less toward foreign 
affairs 41 The 1992 presidential campaign of Bill Clinton would exploit this to its full 
advantage, while carefully allowing a necessary reappraisal of foreign policy tools to 
support a new American position in a profoundly different security environment. Work 
was well underway late in the administration of George H.W. Bush to “find solid footing 
in a country dissolving into chaos.”42 Chief among the issues at stake were arms control 
and the re-targeting of missiles, formalizing relations with the newly independent states 
(NIS), and assisting in stabilizing them by way of democracy promotion and free market 
reforms.43 The last two of these issues found a natural residence within the USIA, which 
in suddenly uncertain times embraced the new assignments like a company venturing into 
an untapped market. The Freedom Support Act of October 1992 provided an assistance
40 For a more dedicated historical review o f this nature, see Stephen Johnson and Helle Dale, “How to 
Reinvigorate U.S. Public Diplomacy,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1645 (Washington, D.C.: 
Heritage Foundation, 2003), 2-4.
41Donald E. Nuechterlein, America Recommitted: A Superpower Assesses Its Role in a Turbulent World 
(Lexington, KY: University o f Kentucky Press, 2001), 215-17; David Gergen, “Adopting U.S. Foreign 
Policy Making to Changing Domestic Circumstances, “ in Beyond the Beltway: Engaging the Public in U.S. 
Foreign Policy, ed. Daniel Yankelovich and I.M. Destler ( New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1994), 
78-93.
42 James Baker, quoted in Nuechterlein, America Recommited, 214.
43 Nuechterlein, America Recommited, 216.
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package for Russia and the NIS which substantially raised financial support for 
democratic institutions. Among them was the “America Houses” initiative -  a self-styled 
‘home base’ for American public and private sector workers stationed abroad to aid in 
carrying out their assistance programs. The Act also offered increased funding for a large 
segment of students within the NIS wishing to study in the United States, with the goal of 
providing the opportunity to hundreds of undergraduate and graduate students, and 
thousands of high-school students.44
In total, USIA’s fiscal year 1993 budget for work in the NIS had doubled from the 
previous fiscal year to over $97 million. The budget composition stressed exchange 
programs ($64.65 million), followed by broadcasting ($14.74 million), salaries and 
expenses ($14.5 million), and USIA publications ($3.5 million).45 These figures reflected 
two trends that appeared to dominate early in the post-Cold War reallocation of resources. 
First, there was a clear imperative to fill the vacuum opened up by the departure of 
communism into areas with a previously nonexistent American presence. Second 
educational and cultural exchange programs were chosen to spearhead U.S. involvement 
in these politically fragile areas, and in turn these programs enjoyed a welcome, though 
brief, windfall. Between 1991 and 1994 the combined budget for educational and cultural 
exchanges more than doubled (from $163 million to $351 million). This sharp increase 
may be traced not only to democracy promotion in former communist countries such as 
the NIS, but also to a broader attempt in the early to mid-1990’s to use exchange as a 
method to encourage free markets. One notable case involves the role of exchanges in 
laying the groundwork for the passage of the North American Free Trade Act (NAFTA)
44 USIA European Wireless File, “USIA Programs and Initiatives in NIS,” 5 April 1993,4-9.
45 Ibid., 1.
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in 1993. According to Nancy Snow, the USIA’s International Visitor Program “brought 
key Mexicans to the U.S. and key U.S. citizens to Mexico to meet with pro-NAFTA 
sectors.” Snow also adds that “in a six-week period during October and November 1993, 
USIS-Mexico received six congressional delegations.”46
By comparison, what came to be viewed as boom years for the engagement side 
of public diplomacy proved equally decimating for the information side in that U.S. 
international broadcasting and its costly infrastructure yielded to free markets and 
technological advancement, the very things its programs promised to listeners during the 
Cold War:. In a stroke of irony, it appeared that these stations had so succeeded in doing 
their jobs that they had made themselves expendable 47 Audiences once loyal to VO A 
and RFE/RL gravitated to new homegrown radio and television stations. Meanwhile, by 
the mid-1990’s the Russian listenership of VO A shortwave broadcasts, now free from 
signal jamming, dropped to 5 percent, as opposed to 13 percent during the Cold War 
when it was routinely being jammed 48 Private television outlets, on the other hand, 
garnered an increasingly high proportion of the global audience as demonstrated by the 
“CNN effect” during the 1991 Gulf War. Between 1992 and 1995, VO A absorbed a 25 
percent reduction in staff, suffered a cut in direct broadcast hours from 1,080 to 850 hours 
weekly, and cancelled numerous language services.49 However, an even more damaging 
illustration of government-sponsored international broadcasting appears shortly after the 
inauguration of President Clinton, whose first federal budget proposed the termination of
46 Nancy E. Snow, “United States Information Agency,” Foreign Policy in Focus 2, no. 40 (August 1997), 
http://www.fpif.org/briefs/vol2/v2n40usia_body.html (accessed on 24 February 2006).
47 Critchlow, Radio-Hole-in-the-Head, 180.
48 Snyder, Warriors o f  Disinformation, 270.
49 Edward J. Feulner, “The Voice o f America: Don't Silence America's Voice in the Global Marketplace o f  
Ideas,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1052,1  September 1995, http://www.heritage.org/ 
Research/PoliticalPhilosophy/BG1052.cfm (accessed3 March 2006).
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RFE/RL by 1996 at a reported savings of $210 million per year.50 The move elicited a 
furious lobbying campaign to save the stations, including an intervention on the part of 
Czech President Vaclav Havel, who convinced President Clinton to accept moving 
RFE/RL’s headquarters in 1995 from Munich to Prague, where it now resides. Budget 
tightening also motivated the passage of the U.S. International Broadcasting Act of 1994, 
whereby consolidation of government-sponsored international broadcasting under a single 
board. The Broadcasting Board of Governors aimed to eliminate duplicate language 
services and increase strategic focus.51
What this comparison demonstrates is not unlike many other such fluctuations 
endured by public diplomacy institutions in prior decades, where a fixed amount of 
resources is pooled into one area at the cost of another. Meanwhile, the net figures for 
budget and staffing sank. From 1990 to 1996 the USIA opened 26 new posts, most in the 
former Soviet Union, but elsewhere closed 28 and cut total staffing by 19 percent.52 In 
fact, a closer look at public diplomacy between 1991 and 1995 gradually reveals more of 
its unstable footing as time wore on. The aggregate downward trend of all public 
diplomacy programs was compounded by the decisive development of the National 
Performance Review (NPR), a project launched in the first months of the Clinton 
administration that aimed to “redesign, to reinvent, to reinvigorate the entire national 
government”. Over the duration of the Clinton presidency it is believed that the NPR, 
headed by Vice President A1 Gore motivated the reduction of the U.S. government 
workforce by approximately 426,000, shrinking in size thirteen of fourteen targeted
50 Snyder, Warriors o f Disinformation, 269.
51 United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, Public Diplomacy fo r  the 21st Century: 
Report o f  U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, March 1995.
52 United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, A New Diplomacy fo r  the Information Age: 
Report o f  the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, November 1996.
53 William J. Clinton, speech given at Washington, DC, 3 March 1993.
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agencies.54 One of its purposes meant to slim down the practice of public diplomacy, first 
with the consolidation of international broadcasting as described above, but also in the 
replacement of overseas USIS posts. This measure involved transferring USIS library 
contents to the local libraries of host countries and, when possible, relocating resources to 
the nascent internet.
These tasks were underway in 1994 when the Department of State, responding to 
the objectives set out in the NPR, produced its own restructuring plan titled the Strategic 
Management Initiative (SMI) in October of that year. The SMI led to the landmark 
proposal by Secretary of State Warren Christopher in January 1995 for the Department to 
assume control of the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency, and USIA. In a strange turn of events the SMI was rejected by the 
White House, which preferred an alternative strategy to trimming the budgets of these 
agencies while maintaining their independence. It was instead embraced by the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, which in March 1995 promptly introduced legislation -  the 
Foreign Relations Revitalization Act — to abolish the three agencies. Unlike previous 
attempts at restructuring, when specific components of the American public diplomacy 
apparatus were targeted, this marked the first time since its inception in 1953 that the 
USIA faced the very real threat of complete abolition. There had been one other occasion 
remotely of this kind -  in 1974, when a panel at the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies produced a set of recommendations on updating public diplomacy institutions that 
temporarily transformed the USIA into the U.S. International Communication Agency
54 National Partnership for Reinventing Government Archives, “History o f the National Partnership for 
Reinventing Government: Accomplishments, 1993 -2000: A Summary,” http://govinfo.library.unt. 
edu/npr/whoweare/appendixf.html (accessed 12 December 2006) .
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(USICA).55 The remarkable aspects of using legislation to redistribute public diplomacy 
institutions rests first and foremost on a similar desire to adapt public diplomacy to a 
changed world. In the opinion of Senator Olympia Snowe, one of the Act’s initial co­
sponsors, this new environment called for integrating public diplomacy:
"...into our basic foreign policymaking institutions. The world has 
changed dramatically in the last decade and, with it, the demands on our 
foreign policy structure. Gone is the cold war and the certainty o f  a single 
opposing force in our foreign relations. Gone, too, is the highly focused 
foreign policy we once waged against an expansionist and authoritarian 
Soviet Union and its satellites. ”
Yet this primary interest in adaptation was overidden by a domestic imperative to 
slash costs. Snowe continued:
“In the 1990's we face a new imperative: To maintain a strong, aggressive 
foreign policy, but to streamline our operations, achieve cost servings, and 
meet the new criteria o f  a changing world. State Department consolidation 
is an idea whose time has come. ”5
This caveat to the adaptation argument effectively set in motion the political 
machinery which would ultimately abolish the USIA. It is only due to an high-profile 
struggle over foreign affairs reforms between President Clinton and Senator Helms that 
the process took three years to complete.
55 Allen C. Hansen, USIA: Public Diplomacy in the Computer Age (New York: Praeger Publications, 1984), 
22-23; Panel on International Information, Education and Cultural Relations, “International Information, 
Education and Cultural Relations: Recommendations for the Future,” CSIS Special Report Number Fifteen 
(Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1975).
56 Senator Olympia J. Snowe, speaking for the Foreign Affairs Revitalization Act, on 31 July 1995, to the 
U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 104the Cong., 1st sess., Cong. Rec.: S10933.
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3.4 The Final Years of USIA, 1996-1998
Having already sustained heavy losses in the first part of the 1990’s and poised to 
lose more, U.S. public diplomacy institutions appeared inextricably enmeshed in the 
general devaluation of foreign affairs by the executive and legislative branches of the 
U.S. government. Despite the momentum of this trend and the underpinning political 
forces at play, its potentially negative effects on the conduct of U.S. foreign affairs did 
not go unnoticed. The overriding goal of budget reduction, as Muravchik pointed out in 
1996, dealt too severely with foreign policy pursuits, and as a share of GDP foreign
cn
policy spending had diminished by one-third from the end of the Cold War up to 1996.
It dealt too severely, he added, because marginalizing foreign policy amounted to paying 
off the budget deficit at the expense of foreign policy, as if to ignore that the U.S. 
economy actually did possess the financial resources to shoulder a stronger foreign 
policy. Indeed, by 1996 the U.S. economy had entered a period of remarkable growth as 
GDP would increase by 3.7 percent over 1995. Budget-reducing measures caused a 
steady decline in the federal deficit, and within two years it would move into surplus for
fO
the first time since 1969. Why seek reductions from the one percent of the federal 
budget allotted to foreign affairs, Muravchik asked. Moreover, it could not be proved that 
the end of the Cold War necessarily eliminated all potential threats to American 
security.59 Contrary to “End of History” assertions, uncertainty still very much hovered 
over the liberal democracies of the former Soviet Union, and civil war raged in former
57 Joshua Muravchik, “Affording Foreign Policy: The Problem Is Not Wallet, but Will,” Foreign Affairs 75, 
no. 2 (March/April 1996): 10.
58 Economic data available from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department o f Commerce; Details 
on the federal budget surplus available in Alan Viard, "The Federal Budget Surplus Surprise," Expand Your 
Insight, Federal Reserve Bank o f Dallas, 1 August 1999, http://www.dallasfed.org/eyi/usecon/ 
9908surplus.html (accessed on 9 October 2006).
59 Muravchik, “Affording Foreign Policy,” 13.
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Yugoslavia. In areas such as the Middle East, Afghanistan and North Korea regimes 
hostile to the United States remained at large, and the economic rise of China also left a 
number of global security issues unresolved.
Along these lines, new and compelling ideas arguing in favor of a stronger and 
more nimble public diplomacy architecture emerged to stave off debilitating reforms and 
cuts. Mobilization of these ideas centered on a firm belief that information technology 
would define the conduct of foreign relations in the coming future, and that more rather 
than less of an investment in public diplomacy would be required to meet this demand. 
At the time of Muravchik’s writing, Joseph Nye and Admiral William Owens helped 
stimulate this discourse by building on the soft power thesis in conceiving of and 
“information edge” for the United States, whose advantages, among others, lay in 
engaging undemocratic states, facilitating democratic transitions, and preventing and 
resolving conflicts.60 To take advantage of this would rely heavily on a robust delivery 
of information programs from the USIA, not only in the form of radio programs as in the 
Cold War but other newer forms of media including the internet. Nye and Owens found 
the proposal to eliminate the USIA, “ironic...just when its potential is greatly expanding,” 
and urged Congress to protect it with adequate funding.61 The U.S. Advisory 
Commission on Public Diplomacy strongly opposed plans that would weaken public 
diplomacy further and had already argued against a merger between the USIA and 
Department of State the previous year. It repeatedly cautioned against slashing the 
USIA budget and, when the final decision came in 1997 for USIA’s eventual elimination, 
it turned its attention towards the future. Inspired by the Nye/Owens article, the Advisory
60 Joseph S. Nye and William A. Owens, “America’s Information Edge,” Foreign Affairs 75, no, 2 
(March./April 1996): 29-31.
61 Ibid., 30-36.
62 U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy (1995), 1.
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Commission took the intriguing step of reframing public diplomacy activities in the 
context of the ‘information age’ -- a future in which power resources would be derived 
increasingly from the ability to gather, process and share information for military, social, 
economic and political aims. The future-oriented view of the Advisory Commission 
held that traditional tools of diplomacy, particularly those treating the opinions of foreign 
publics as an afterthought, were giving way to a ‘new diplomacy’ comprised of tools and 
skills to meet the challenges of a more informed and complex web of actors on the 
international scene and a growing number of transnational issues such as immigration, the 
environment and organized crime.64 The New Diplomacy equated to vast increases of 
three resources: investment in interactive digital technologies enabling voice, video, print 
and data communication with U.S. missions abroad, foreign audiences and non­
governmental organizations; shifting of international broadcasting resources away from 
radio and into television and toward the internet; and embracing distance learning 
capabilities using digitized reference services and libraries. In short, the Commission 
assented to the need for a rethinking in public diplomacy already underway, but in a 
manner more mindful of new opportunities in a changed world. Contrary to the 
legislations being considered in Congress, the Commission’s plan advocated for halting 
budget reductions, increasing capital investments, and enhancing public diplomacy’s 
policy advisory role, but above all maintaining organizational independence.65
Meanwhile, any real powers retained by public diplomacy institutions continued 
to erode as budgets fell further from 1996 onward. Educational and cultural exchanges 
that had seen a brief surge in funding as a consequence of higher participation in the
63 Nye and Owens, “America’s Information Edge,” 20-36.
64 U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, A New Diplomacy for the Information Age, November
1996.
65 Ibid.
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former Soviet Union now sustained drastic cuts across the board. The federal 
appropriation for the Fulbright Program was reduced by one-third between FY 1995 and 
FY 1996. Efforts were underway to raise contributions from partner nations and the 
private sector, but these alternate sources could muster only 63 cents for every dollar 
spent by the U.S. government.66 The budget of the famed International Visitor Program, 
which organized travel programs for foreign professional to gain exposure to American 
culture, and was known for famous alumni such as Margaret Thatcher, Anwar Sadat and 
Indira Gandhi, also fell by 20 percent in one year. Between 1996 to 1998, the total 
budget for educational and cultural exchanges would fall by 22 percent in constant 
dollars. International broadcasting would witness a drop in its own budget from $487 
million in 1994 to $350 million by the end of 1996, trimming approximately 1,500 staff 
in the process.67 The consolidation of RFE/RL and VOA settled under the new 
Broadcasting Board of Governors, which absorbed Cuba-focused Radio and TV Marti 
and somehow launched Radio Free Asia in late September of 1996.
In spite of all this, any lasting hopes that these adjustments would prevent the 
restructuring under consideration in the Senate were soon dashed by an announcement on 
18 April 1997 that the Clinton administration would reverse its original objection of the 
SMI and support a comprehensive reorganization of foreign affairs agencies. This 
reversal can be explained in part by the efforts of Senator Jesse Helms, a long-serving 
Republican senator from North Carolina. As Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee from 1994, he had established a reputation for himself as the bete noir to 
many foreign affairs initiatives promoted by the Clinton administration, and displayed a
66 Juliet Antunes Sablosky, “Recent Trends in Department o f State Support or Cultural Diplomacy: 1993- 
2002,” in Cultural Diplomacy Research Series (Center for Arts and Culture, 2003), 12; United States 
General Accounting Office (1996), 41.
67 Alan L. Heil, Jr., Voice o f  America (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 358-9.
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special disdain for USAID, ACDA, and USIA. The basis of his sentiment derived from 
an unwavering view that certain government agencies were meant to have terminal 
existences, as expressed in the following:
“ ...[B]ack in the middle o f  the 20th century—and when I  say that I  sound 
like I'm talking about a long time ago—Congress created a number o f  
temporary, independent federal agencies. I  think it was a bad mistake. I f  I  
had been here, I  would not have voted to do that, having the hindsight that 
I  have.
To be sure, the conservative Senator Helms echoed an ideological suspicion that 
keeping so-called “temporary” federal agencies in operation would lead to the expansion 
of government. Helms illustrated his own reservations of some agencies’ tendencies to 
outlive their usefulness by quoting Ronald Reagan: “There is nothing so near eternal life,” 
he said, “as a temporary Federal agency.”69 Helms exhibited his hostility toward foreign 
affairs institutions in other ways; he lobbied vigorously for reform at the United Nations 
through his blockage of nearly $1 billion in arrearages owed by the United States, 
thwarted a series of ambassadorial nominations, and was successful in obstructing
70important international treaties from Senate ratification. One of the treaties targeted by 
Helms was the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), an international pledge by which 
its nation-signatories would agree never "to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, 
stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons 
to anyone." Signed in January 1993 by President George H.W. Bush, it had been awating 
ratification from Congress for over three and a half years, and with six months remaining
68 U.S. Congress, Congressional Record, 105th Cong., 2nd sess., 24 April 1998, S3570.
69 Ibid.
70 Rebecca K.C. Hersman, Friends and Foes: How Congress and the President Really Make Foreign Policy 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 89.
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71until going into force with or without the United States as a signatory. The first session
of the 105th Congress (1997) would determine the fate of the CWC.
In demonstrating a willingness to negotiate the treaty toward its ratification, the 
Clinton administration assigned new Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright to front a 
conciliatory campaign in order to win over the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. At 
her confirmation hearing Albright assented to keeping an open mind about the pending 
reorganization of foreign affairs agencies, and served notice to Senator Helms of the
77bargaining to come. In the ensuing months Albright would work to forge a constructive 
relationship with Helms, which included a famous appearance together, hand-in-hand, for 
a joint lecture with Helms in North Carolina on 25 March 1997.73 The strategy proved 
remarkably effective. Only two weeks prior in Washington, Helms warned that the treaty 
“would not leave my committee”; in North Carolina with Albright, Helms announced 
“there’s a very good chance that there could be a treaty.”74
However, it is widely speculated that Helms’ change in tone was less related to 
such political theatre than the imminent revelation of the backing of the restructuring plan 
by the administration, an issue that Albright and Helms had been discussing privately, 
and this in turn fuelled the theory that Helms’ tacit concession on the CWC, which passed
71 Helms clarified his opposition to the treaty, in an open letter to Senator Trent Lott on 29 January 1997, 
with concerns about 1) elimination o f chemical weapons in Russia and in other countries o f concern; 2) 
high confidence in the CWC’s verifiability; 3) US responses to noncompliance with the CWC; 4) the 
primacy o f the US Constitution vis-a-vis the CWC; and 5) protection o f confidential business data.
72 Hersman, Friends and Foes, 95.; Carroll J. Doherty, “Chances Improve for Revamp o f Agencies,” 
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 55, no. 9 (1 March 1997): 546.
73 O f this event, Thomas Lippman wrote: “the two flattered each other, praised each other, and promised to 
cooperate when they could and disagree respectfully when necessary. Helms, sitting at a front-row desk, 
beamed like an infatuated schoolboy as Albright discussed world affairs...” In Thomas W. Lippman, 
Madeleine Albright and the New American Diplomacy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000), 43.
74First statement: Thomas W. Lippman, “Unmodified, Chemical Weapons Pact Is Doomed, Sen. Helms 
Warns,” Washington Post, 9 March 1997; Second statement: Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright and 
Senator Jesse Helms, statement at a joint press conference in Wingate, North Carolina, USA, 25 March
1997.
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the Senate by a margin of 3-to-l on 24 April 1997, depended on the reinvigorated 
restructuring plan endorsed by Clinton a week earlier. Though Clinton initially denied 
any bargaining of this sort had occurred, an array of sources spoke to the contrary, 
including two members of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy from that 
time.75 Clinton himself would later admit in his 2004 autobiography that an exchange of 
the USIA and ACDA for the ratification of the CWC had indeed taken place.76 A report 
from the Henry L. Stimson Center cites an anonymous Albright staffer who reasoned that 
the quid pro quo allowed Helms “to lose with dignity”, implying special attention given
77to preserving the senator’s position in the wake of defeat.
With the path now cleared of the greatest obstacles, legislators proceeded over the 
next eighteen months to fine-tune the bill, the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring 
Act o f  1998, that would put into law unprecedented changes for public diplomacy. As 
expected, political wrangling persisted throughout the period, notably on the issues of 
U.N. debt repayment and the notorious “Mexico City policy” involving government 
support for foreign family planning agencies believed to be performing abortions. On a 
separate track, a task force formed to plan the consolidation to USIA into the Department 
of State. Resigned to the fate of being dismantled, the primary goal of each division 
within the USIA was to find a way to remain relatively intact and yet integrate into the 
Department. The interagency task force agreed that the Education and Cultural Affairs
75 Harold C. Pachios, interview by the author, Portland, USA, 19 December 2005, and Bruce Gregory, 
telephone interview by the author, 1 February 2006.
76 Bill Clinton. My Life (New York: Random House, 2004), 753: "I spent most o f the month [April 1997] in 
an intense effort to convince the Senate to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention: calling and meeting 
with members o f Congress; agreeing with Jesse Helms to move the Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency and the U.S. Information Agency into the State Department in return for his allowing a vote on the 
CWC, which he opposed..."
77 Michael Krepon, Amy E. Smithson and John Parachini, The Battle to Obtain U.S. Ratification o f  the 
Chemical Weapons Convention: Occasional Paper Number 35 (Washington, D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson 
Center), July 1997.
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division (ECA), home to the Fulbright Program and Humphrey Fellowship, would be left 
largely unchanged and be overseen by a new Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and 
Public Affairs. The USIA’s Bureau of Information, also known as the “I-Bureau”, which 
oversaw “rapid response” implementations of public diplomacy strategies, including for 
specific requests of U.S. missions abroad, crisis situations and national security 
initiatives, transformed into the new Office of International Information Programs (IIP). 
The Bureau of Research and Media Reaction, responsible for measuring the effectiveness 
of public diplomacy programs through polling and analysis of foreign media, merged
•  •  751with the Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research. USIS libraries would 
cease to exist after the merger and functionally resume as Information Resource Centers, 
managed by the new Bureau of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. A relatively long 
struggle ensued in Congress over the placement of international broadcasting out of 
concern over budgetary oversight, which a large agency could perform, and the matter of 
journalistic integrity that an agency affiliation might put at risk. Ultimately, the latter 
argument won out in the Senate and the VO A, surrogate home stations, and television 
broadcasting unit came under the control of the Broadcasting Board of Governors with
70conditional and organizational ties to the Department.
On 1 October 1999 these changes went into effect and the USIA disappeared after 
forty-six years in operation. In effect, public diplomacy became the shared responsibility 
of the Department of State and the BBG. Having been shed of their organizational
78 United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, Consolidation o f  the USIA Into the State 
Department: An Assessment After One Year (Washington, DC: Department o f State, October 2000), 5; 
Reorganization Plan and Report, Pursuant to Section 1601 of the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring 
Act o f 1998, 105th Cong., 2nd sess., 30 December 1998.
79 Heil, Voice o f America, 362-3. The Act included requirements, for instance, to “require the inclusion of 
U.S. government editorials in VO A programming” and a stipulation to “support United States foreign 
policy objectives during crises abroad”. Organizationally, the Secretary o f State would come to hold a 
permanent ex-officio role on the BBG Board.
109
independence, the component parts of public diplomacy became dispersed across both 
agencies. The capacity to engage with foreign audiences through exchanges resided in 
the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs while the Office of International 
Information Programs supervised information-gathering and dissemination, with neither 
able to coordinate or easily provide guidance to the other. The two years preceding 9/11 
would yield mixed reviews on how well the new arrangement would deliver on these 
imperatives, not only projecting outwards to foreign audiences, but also working and 
communicating at the core of its organization.
5.5 Relocation into the State Department, 1999-2001
Under new management, U.S. public diplomacy would proceed into a new chapter 
of its existence remade as an operation within the Department of State. In essence, the 
merger took the form of a crude marriage done in such a way as to force two misshapen 
pieces into fitting together. In an auspicious moment prior to the completion of the 
merger, President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive 68 (PDD 68) calling for 
cooperation between senior officials from the Defense, Commerce, State, Justice, 
Commerce and Treasury Departments, along with the Central Intelligence Agency and 
Federal Bureau of Intelligence, to establish an International Public Information (IPI) Core 
Group to “influence foreign audiences in support of US foreign policy and to counteract
on
propaganda by enemies of the United States.” Aiming to respond to an immediate need 
for one agency to develop information/influence strategies in engagements in Kosovo and 
Haiti, it was issued in secret and top aides at both the USIA and State Department were
80 President, International Public Information (IPI) Presidential Decision Directive PDD 68, 30 April 1999, 
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-68.htm (accessed on 24 February 2006).
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decidedly left out of the picture. One year after the merger, it soon became apparent 
through reports that in spite of assurances from Secretary Albright, it had not been as
89 • •  •successful as hoped. The U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy reported a 
range of divisive structural issues obstructing a smooth transition. In its October 2000 
report, the Commission observed how “getting things done in the public diplomacy field 
has proven to be much more difficult since consolidation.” Navigating the complex 
bureaucratic organization within the State Department proved frustrating for former USIA 
officers in that the policy orientation of the Department did not mesh well with the 
program orientation of USIA. The State Department, the report noted, “does policy, not 
programs. USIA was all about programs.”84
While some functional programs such as the “I-Bureau” and ECA remained 
mostly intact, the integration spread many public diplomacy programs and specialists 
among the Department’s many annexes. Once accustomed to working beneath one roof, 
former USIA employees soon found themselves physically dispersed and out of regular 
contact. They also encountered bias in selections for senior positions based on their 
backgrounds in public diplomacy, and many mid-level staff performing public diplomacy 
duties discovered a wide gulf separating them from policy-relevant matters, hence
81 Ben Barber, “Group Will Battle Propaganda Abroad,” Washington Times, 28 July 1999. The IPI has 
continued under the Bush administration, known colloquially as the “Fusion Team”. However, it is difficult 
to ascertain the relevance o f the IPI alongside newer initiatives such as the Office o f Global 
Communication, created to establish consistency of messages among principal agencies dealing in foreign 
affairs, and the Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating Committee, orchestrated by the National 
Security Council also for the purpose o f increasing interagency cooperation.
82 House Committee on International Relations, International Affairs Budget Request; Budget Views and 
Estimates, 106th Cong., 2nd sess., 16 February 2000. Albright testified that “the Department’s integration 
with ACDA and USIA has been successful.”
83 U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, Consolidation o f  the USIA into the State Department, 
7.
84 Ibid., 8.
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challenging one of the very arguments for the merger in the first place. Overall, it was 
concluded that the State Department had thus far not embraced, nor had it allocated ample 
attention to its new public diplomacy responsibilities. Incumbents at the Department 
were prone to regarding the practice as a “waste of time” and subordinate to more
oz:
pressing policy matters.
The period of transition under the newly-elected Bush administration in early 
2001 did little to resolve these ongoing issues, with the exception of new ideas proposed 
by the incoming Secretary of State Colin Powell. Foremost among them was the 
nomination of a former advertising executive, Charlotte Beers to be his Undersecretary 
for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. Beers’ nomination represented an intriguing 
choice for the job. An advertising industry legend, Beers first made a name for herself in 
the 1960’s managing the account of Uncle Ben’s, a brand of instant rice, for the venerable 
J. Walter Thompson advertising firm, for whom in the 1970’s she helped steer the 
fortunes of companies such as Sears, and, in her heralded reprise at the firm two decades 
later, IBM. The branding of America would be her next assignment.
With Beers’ pedigree, Powell’s gambit showed promise and, at the very least, 
suggested a genuine interest on the part of the new administration in revitalizing public 
diplomacy in a post-USIA era. However, as the months in anticipation of her 
confirmation dragged on through the summer, much doubt remained about the prospect of 
a clear public diplomacy vision for the 21st century, put at risk not merely by the fractured 
relationship between ex-USIA officers and the Department of State, but also by fears that 
the sluggish State bureaucracy hampered the ability of public diplomats to keep sharp, as
85 U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, Consolidation o f  the USIA into the State Department.
86 Blinken, “Winning the War of Ideas,” 105.
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Nye and Owens had advocated in 1996 and the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies in 1998, an information edge in communicating with the rest of the world. As 
one close observer had concluded around that time, “In the nearly two years since 
reorganization... no new vision has been put forward for American diplomacy, and not
an
nearly enough has been done to bring State's mission into the information age.” The 
Internet, for instance, continued to be underexploited at State, where, contrary to USIA 
employees who benefited from agency-wide access, providing a similar outlet for officers 
remained years away.88
In the field, with new forms of media such as satellite television and high-speed 
Internet service rapidly proliferating in areas of high geopolitical importance, an upgrade 
from the Cold War mainstay of analog radio transmission appeared long overdue. 
However, the plans for such an upgrade remained unfinished as the modernization of 
Voice of America had been ongoing since 1995, and resources for broadcasting of news
OQ
outlets via the Internet were noticeably absent from the BBG’s FY 2001 plan. Lacking 
in these and other information technologies, with operations clearly in flux, and a new 
Under Secretary waiting in the wings, U.S. public diplomacy approached 9/11 with what 
best characterized as a severely weakened organization and no clear strategic vision. 
Knowing this, of course, makes it less surprising to the keen observer that it would not 
perform up to the enormous task soon to be set out.
87 Jamie F. Metzl, “Can Public Diplomacy Rise from the Ashes?” Foreign Service Journal (July/August 
2001) http://www.camegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfin?fa=view&id=758 (accessed on 11 
January 2007).
88 The rollout o f the OpenNet Plus, a system providing agency-wide and unlimited Internet access, was not 
completed until early 2003.
89 United States General Accounting Office, “U.S. International Broadcasting: Strategic Planning and 
Performance Management System Could Be Improved,” Report to the Chairman, Committee on the Budget, 
House o f  Representatives (September 2000), 22.
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3.6 To 9/11 and After
The period of 1991 to 2001 informs understanding post-9/11 public diplomacy in 
two significant ways. First is the way in which the end of the Cold War altered 
America’s pursuit of relations with the rest of the world, and the second involves 
domestic desires for an overhaul of the ‘anachronistic’ public diplomacy system that 
persisted into the post-Cold War era. However, one must take into account both the 
changing dynamic of power in the international system between 1989 and 1991 as well as 
the way leading scholars were interpreting the impact of the events of those years. Their 
interpretations weighed heavily on the minds of policymaking elites in the United States 
and the triumph of the American revivalists influenced the employment of public 
diplomacy for the next decade. Persuaded by the vindicated revivalist argument that the 
standing of the United States after the Cold War rested on firm ground, American policy 
elites and legislators determined that the ‘peace dividend’ afforded the downgrading of 
public diplomacy in forthcoming years. Ironically, it was the apparent revival in 
American power that facilitated the decline of its public diplomacy.
While the first two years of the USIA-State merger suffered from a host of 
challenges, this would not be enough to command the full attention of political leadership 
until well into the post-9/11 period, to which this study now turns.
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CHAPTER 4 : REDISCOVERY IN THE POST-9/11 ERA
Thus far, the recent history of American foreign affairs up to 2001 depicts among 
other things a diminishing regard for public diplomacy among influential political elites. 
These attitudes shifted virtually overnight after 9/11, but only enough to rekindle interest 
levels that had waned over the course of ten years. Organizationally, much had changed 
with the phasing out of the USIA and merging of public diplomacy institutions into the 
Department of State. Substantively, however, little had been done to transform public 
diplomacy into a 21st century operation. In the 9/11-inspired “battle for hearts and 
minds” U.S. public diplomacy would prove more of a non-entity than an asset to 
American foreign policymakers and to the United States itself. In the course of tracing 
the post-9/11 history of U.S. public diplomacy, this chapter raises a number of factors, 
including domestic wrangling over strategy and organization and the climate of public 
opinion abroad, to yield this conclusion. These are but a few of the leading causes for 
why U.S. public diplomacy could not rise to meet the challenges laid out before it in the 
post-9/11 era, and in the following pages their development will be tracked over the 
tenures of four Under Secretaries of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. Their 
approaches and responses to the public diplomacy conundrum continuing into this time 
period will be presented to parallel the period’s history and the emergence of several key 
developments affecting the international standing of the United States -  the inclination 
towards unilateralism in dealing with problems of international security and order, 
attempting to advance a bold agenda for democratization in the Middle East, and 
sustaining a barrage of international criticism in its dealing with both matters.
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The United States during this period is seen to assert itself in some ways that its 
superpower status can afford and other ways it could not. It unleashed its vast military 
capabilities on the suspected forces that aided in realizing the 9/11 attacks, but did not do 
so without angering adversarial as well as allied populations. The American successes in 
its brief and efficient confrontations with other armies contrast sharply with the protracted 
and as yet unresolved ‘battles’ with global public opinion. The unforeseen consequences 
of the latter grew out of challenges reflecting the changing nature by which governments 
and foreign populations communicate with each other and the rising relevance of ‘soft’ 
qualities such as image and credibility. It has remained unresolved as to whether hearts 
and minds may be properly viewed as a commodity to be won, won without compromise, 
and if so, to what ends. The years after 9/11 chart the slow progress of the United States 
recognizing the salience of these non-military challenges and the ways in which it has 
confronted them.
4.1 Birth of a *Battle ’
Of the new terminology burned into the parlance of many Americans in the 
sobering aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, none captured the new national mood any 
better than those pertaining to war. The sense of invasion invoked a search for placing 
the event’s magnitude in context with those the past, drawing comparisons with the 
infamous 1941 Japanese invasion of Pearl Harbor that signaled the entry of the United 
States into World War Two.1 With solemn acquiescence, Americans shored up their
1 Annie Nakao and Carol Ness, “Comparison to Pearl Harbor Recall Another Time and Place,” San 
Francisco Chronicle, 14 September 2001; Todd J. Gillman, “Sept. 11 Attack Triggers Memories, 
Comparisons o f Pearl Harbor,” Dallas Morning News, 3 December 2001; Fred L. Borch, “Comparing Pearl
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support for the wartime presidency of George W. Bush, who in the days that followed 
characterized the national response succinctly as the ‘war on terror’. An endless stream 
of special news broadcasts and published reports catapulted the phrase into immediate 
circulation, and national attention soon gravitated towards how such a war would be 
waged, who would be targeted, and how to define the war’s scope and dimensions. 
Preparing the public for these questions, Bush offered foresight into the unique nature of 
what lay ahead:
This war will not be like the war against Iraq a decade ago, with a 
decisive liberation o f  territory and a swift conclusion. It will not look like 
the air war above Kosovo two years ago... Our response involves far more 
than instant retaliation and isolated strikes. Americans should not expect 
one battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have ever seen.3
Fighting an elusive enemy characterized only by its proclivity to cause ‘terror’ 
also provoked declarations of this being a ‘new’ or ‘different’ kind of war, and 
commentators, under no illusions it would be over immediately, soon grappled with its 
long-term ramifications. Within a week of the attacks, the online version of The 
Economist released an article discussing the commencement of parallel war, “the battle 
for hearts and minds”. Of this struggle, the article boldly asserted that the United States 
was already losing foreign support barely a week into its war on terror. Displeasure of 
Arabs toward the American campaign was “rising fast”, and, more surprisingly, its
Harbor and "9/11": Intelligence Failure? American Unpreparedness? Military Responsibility?” The Journal 
o f  Military History 67, no. 3. (July 2003): 845-860.
2 ‘War against terror’ first used publicly in 9/11 address to country and South Lawn address on September 
16, 2001. First indications of a strategy to pursue the ‘war on terror’ began to emerge in Bush’s address to 
the Joint Session o f Congress on September 20,2001.
3 George W. Bush, Speech to Joint Session o f Congress, Washington, 20 September 2001.
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authors also sensed rumblings of European discontent on the upswing.4 Winning the 
battle would require the United States to convince the world, and to a large degree the 
Arab-Muslim world, of its political and moral justifications for prosecuting the new war.
From an etymological perspective, it is worth pointing out that language of the 
‘hearts and minds’ variety re-emerged, in a sense, after a conspicuous absence. Not since 
the Cold War had Americans viewed themselves in the midst of an ideological struggle, 
only this “noxious mix of religious cant and anti-Western demagoguery”5 propagated by 
Osama bin Laden and others of the extremist ilk of Islam seemed vastly more complex 
and in some respects more unsettling than the erstwhile communist threat. During the 
Cold War, for example, the functional epicenter of the communist movement in and 
around the Soviet Union facilitated the concentration of most American-led containment 
activities. Intelligence in the wake of the 9/11 attacks estimated over 50 clandestine al- 
Qaeda cells in existence worldwide, thus illustrating the enemy’s elusive and surreptitious 
nature.6 As with the Cold War, fighting the war on terror would require a multi-faceted 
approach which would not only disarm the aggressors, but also delegitimize their 
purposes in the minds of would-be sympathizers. To some, the United States had fought 
and won a “war of ideas” before, and to do so again would call for an approach that was 
seen to prevail in the past: to pursue an aggressive campaign to persuade misinformed 
and, in some cases, uninformed audiences of the sincerity of American intentions and the 
moral clarity of its values.
4 “The Battle for Hearts and Minds,” Economist.com, 17 September 2001, http://web.lexis- 
nexis.com/executive/form?_index=exec_en.html&_lang=en&ut=3361708221 (accessed on 29 September 
2006).
5 “The War of Ideas”, Washington Post, 9 October 2001.
6 Peter Grier and Dante Chinni Staff, “In the New Fight, Shades o f the Cold War,” Christian Science 
Monitor, 2 October 2001.
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4.2 An Old Formula for a New Era
The clearest and most concise language articulating the post-9/11 thrust of U.S. 
public diplomacy is found steeped in the provisions of its 2002 National Security Strategy 
(NSS), which contends for promoting “the free flow of information and ideas to kindle 
the hopes and aspirations of freedom of those in societies ruled by the sponsors of global 
terrorism.”7 In a similar fashion, the 2006 version of the NSS urged public diplomats to 
“advocate the policies and values of the United States in a clear, accurate, and persuasive 
way to a watching and listening world.”8 When put into practice, these amounted to an 
expansion in the scope of broadcasting capabilities, including new shortwave radio 
stations in the Middle East -  Radio Sawa (Arabic) and Radio Farda (Farsi) -  and an 
Arabic-langauge satellite network, A1 Hurra, launched in February 2004. The ill-fated 
Shared Values Initiative, a multimedia campaign launched in 2001 to impress upon Arab- 
Muslims the contentment of fellow Muslims residing in the United States, ran aground 
when many other Arabic-language media chose to not cooperate in the project. Another 
education initiative included the establishment of “American Comers” ~  overseas 
information centers specifically targeting younger audiences to expose them to “diverse 
and representative views of American life, and U.S. foreign policies”. From 2002 
through 2005, nearly 260 American Comers were opened worldwide.9 In fact, from this 
picture one could argue the United States pursues public diplomacy in the post-9/11 era as 
it did during the Cold War era -  an uncompromising promotional campaign of the U.S.
7 National Security Council, National Security Strategy o f  the United States (Washington, DC: White 
House, 2002), 6.
8 National Security Council, National Security Strategy o f  the United States (Washington, DC: White 
House, 2006), 45.
9 U.S. Department o f State, Bureau o f Resource Management, “FY 2005 Performance and Accountability 
Report,” November 2005, http://www.state.gOv/s/d/rm/rls/perfipt/2005/html/56388.htm (accessed on 5 
October 2006).
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role in the world, a high reliance on dissemination of value-laden messages, and a 
worldwide cultivation of positive associations with the United States, especially among a 
new generation of youth.
If the overarching strategy of U.S. public diplomacy after 9/11 seemed merely to 
repackage old messages to deal with a new set of problems, its institutions proved equally 
if not more unsuitable to the tasks at hand. Of 25 reports released in the post-9/11 period 
containing suggested improvements in the conduct of public diplomacy, a vast majority 
of recommendations focused on organization: reorganizing public diplomacy at the White 
House, creating a new public diplomacy agency, redefining the role of the under 
secretary, increasing embassy involvement, “coordinating better”, increasing private 
sector involvement, and increasing financial and/or human resources. Most of the 
criticism herein has been leveled at the U.S. Department of State, which after absorbing 
the merger of the United States Information Agency (USIA) in 1999 proceeded to 
systematically disperse its components amongst the Department’s many bureaus. The net 
result produced the Bureau of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, which in the 
aftermath of 9/11 has seen at the helm four different under secretaries — a job made no 
less challenging by continuous devolution and interagency turf wars during this time.10 
For instance, it was disclosed in February 2002 that the U.S. Department of Defense had 
set up within two months of the 9/11 attack its own clandestine communications bureau, 
the Office of Strategic Influence (OSI) to purvey news items, including false ones, to 
foreign audiences.11 In June 2002 the White House, at the urging of then-Counselor to 
the President Karen Hughes, launched the Office of Global Communications (OGC) with
10 Susan B. Epstein and Lisa Mages, “Public Diplomacy: A Review of Past Recommendations,” CRS 
Report fo r  Congress, 2 September 2005. See Appendix B.
11 James Dao and Eric Schmitt, “Pentagon Readies Efforts to Sway Sentiment Abroad,” New York Times, 
19 February 2006.
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the goal of consolidating strategic communications from the U.S government into 
consistent messages for overseas audiences. Meanwhile, three months later the National 
Security Council established another similar entity, the Strategic Communications Policy 
Coordinating Committee (PCC) to “coordinate interagency activities, to ensure that all 
agencies work together and with the White House to develop and disseminate the
19President’s messages across the globe.”
They were not to last, however, as each would be rendered either inactive or 
ineffective within two years. The public outcry over the OSI forced Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld to dissolve it one week after its disclosure; by late 2004 the OGC 
would be deemed a “second-tier organization” with no involvement whatsoever in 
strategic matters; and the PCC met several times with “marginal impact” over the course 
of its brief history -  it would disband in 2003.13 From these and other false starts, it 
becomes understandable why observers would devote so much attention to the 
reorganization of public diplomacy agencies, but no less important are the consequences 
of these miscues as they reverberate into the pursuit of strategy. Countering negative 
foreign sentiment over foreign policy may depend on deft persuasion (if not a changes in 
the policies themselves), but such disarray severely diminishes the likelihood that 
persuasive arguments may emerge at all.
To be fair, most observers recognize that post-9/11 failures experienced by the 
United States are not limited to domestic mishandling of strategy and organization. There
12 United States Department o f Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication, Report o f  
the Defense Science Board on Strategic Communication (Washington, DC: Office o f the Under Secretary o f  
Defense, United States Department o f Defense, September 2004), 25
13 Ibid; United States Government Accountability Office, “U.S Public Diplomacy: Interagency 
Coordination Efforts Hampered by the Lack o f a National Communication Strategy,” Report to the 
Chairman, Subcommittee on Science, the Departments o f  State, Justice, and Commerce, and Related 
Agencies, Committee on Appropriations, House o f  Representatives (Washington, DC: Government Printing 
Office, April 2005).
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are also the overriding challenges of practicing public diplomacy in the ‘information age.’ 
Much has changed since the days of the Cold War, when “public diplomacy efforts ran 
essentially one way” and “programs and activities were pushed out to target audiences”.14 
In those years, the main challenges of public diplomacy amounted to perfecting the means 
to reach populations with limited information about the world within and beyond their 
borders, and, as a result, deprived to some degree of their political participation. But by a 
proliferation of information and communications technologies (ICT’s) it has become far 
more difficult for governments to control information flows as was once possible. 
Whereas the Soviet Union could at one time filter information by jamming the shortwave 
radio signals of the BBC and Voice of America with some success during the Cold War, 
internet usage in the 21st century has skyrocketed in Russia and former Warsaw Pact 
countries. In the period between 2000 and 2006, Russia’s internet usage increased by 
over 660 percent to include 23.7 million users, or over 16 percent of its population.15 In 
almost the same period, worldwide mobile phone usage doubled from one to two billion 
users, and as services multiply and diversified, mobile phones allowed information to 
travel across a staggering range at lightning speed.16 Satellite television broadcasting 
world events in real time to all parts of the world and far surpass the pace, versatility and 
news-gathering resources of government-operated information channels. With all these 
developments benefiting the consumer, the information problematic of the post-9/11 era 
has not revolved around access, as it had in the past but rather the increasingly scarce 
commodity of attention.
14 Christopher Ross, “Public Diplomacy Comes o f Age,” The Washington Quarterly 25 (Spring 2002): 82.
15 As o f 18 September 2006 from “Internet Statistics Usage -  The Big Picture,” http:// 
www.intemetworldstats.com/stats.htm (accessed on 9 October 2006).
16 Economist Intelligence Unit, “The 2006 E-Readiness Rankings,” http://a330.g.akamai.net/7/330/25828/ 
20060531184642/graphics.eiu.com/files/ad_pdfs/2006Ereadiness_Ranking_WP.pdf (accessed 9 October 
2006).
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To Joseph Nye this arrangement has resulted in a trend he has called a ‘paradox of 
plenty’. It is a situation where information is so abundant that overwhelmed audiences 
seek to “distinguish the valuable information from background clutter” in order to be 
better informed than their would-be adversaries. Nye views the proliferation of ICT’s as a 
kind of large-scale power distribution mechanism, a function of his assertion that 
“information is power” and that ICT’s enable larger segments of the world’s population 
to gain access to that power. In consequence, the decentralization of information control 
by governments combined with the spread of ICT’s allows smaller nations, sub-national 
groups, private organizations, and even foreign publics en masse to wield soft power to 
their advantage and sometimes with damaging impact to the soft power cache of more 
powerful states.17 One of the stark lessons to be gained from observing U.S. public 
diplomacy in practice during these years is how other international actors have used their 
own soft power caches to exploit worldwide negative perceptions of the United States. 
Therefore, the forthcoming chapter intends to discuss the consequences of new 
information technology landscape and the ‘paradox of plenty’ that constrains the ability 
of the United States to counter these negative perceptions.
4.3 Charlotte Beers and ‘Brand America *
On 15 March 2001 Secretary of State Colin Powell, barely two months into his 
post with the newly elected Bush administration, appeared before the House Budget 
Committee of the United States Congress to present his department’s budget for the 
coming fiscal year. Questions were asked about the Department of State’s seemingly
17 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs 2004), 
106.
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endless problem areas, including those of its reputedly weak organizational infrastructure 
dependant on outdated tools of diplomacy. On this point, Powell countered with an 
optimistic and ambitious plan to deal with these problems, drawing special attention to 
one new initiative: “I am going to be bringing people into the public diplomacy function 
of the Department who are going to change from just selling us in the old USIA (United 
States Information Agency) way to really branding foreign policy.” In short, Powell saw 
the potential of moving the Department of State beyond simply managing the foreign 
relations of the United States by transforming it into a world-class marketing machine. 
“Branding the Department, marketing the Department, marketing American values to the
1 ftworld,” he summarized.
Though it seemed a minor footnote in a much broader vision for American 
preponderance, the comment indicated a fresh start was forthcoming for U.S. public 
diplomacy and, for those who had lamented its diminishing status for most of the 1990’s, 
the potential for revitalization. By 2001, some may have seen in Powell the opportunity 
of breathing new life into public diplomacy, but for all the talk of technology and virtual 
embassies it became evident Powell’s primary interests laid elsewhere. For while the 
Advisory Commission, Nye, Barry Fulton19 and others spent a good deal of the late 
1990’s heralding the coming of the New Diplomacy, another thread of public diplomacy 
research interpreted its main challenges to be centered around the problem of public 
relations. Nobody could dispute the unparalleled advantage held by the United States in 
its capacity to develop and harness new technologies to exchange information, but there 
were also untapped benefits to be reaped by promoting to the world American values such
18 House Committee on the Budget, State Department Budget Priorities, 107th Cong., 1st sess., 15 March 
2001 .
19 Center for Strategic and International Studies, Reinventing Diplomacy in the Information Age 
(Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 9 October 1998).
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as liberal democracy, free markets and religious diversity. The principal question thus 
went: could nations like the United States gain from developing their values into a more 
concerted national image carrying persuasive messages? Much like a company crafts an 
image to persuade consumers to buy its products, only now the consumers would be 
foreign publics and the product the nation itself. It was the application of branding 
techniques to enhance the image of an entire country that gave rise to the concept of 
‘nation-branding’ and an alternate form of soft power emphasizing image and reputation 
in addition to the powers of communication. “Soft power,” wrote nation-branding 
pioneer Simon Anholt, “is making people want to do what you want them to do, which is 
fundamental to the idea of branding and fundamental to the idea of America” The 
consonance of the two ideas certainly appeared to strike a chord with Powell, who after 
recent stints on the boards of Gulfstream Aerospace and AOL may have been inspired to 
inject innovative private-sector wisdom into the outmoded ways of the State Department.
Two weeks after his March testimony to the House Budget Committee, Powell 
selected Charlotte L. Beers to be his Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public 
Affairs. The nomination of Beers, with whom Powell shared board membership at 
Gulfstream, resonated perfectly with the nation-branding vision, not to mention the Bush
91administration’s desire to “run government like a business.” A long-time advertising 
executive, Beers skillfully presided over three well-known agencies including the 
venerable J. Walter Thompson, where she built her own sterling reputation. She first 
made a name for herself at Thompson in the 1960’s as an upstart account manager for 
Uncle Ben’s, an American brand of instant rice. Her initial success at Thompson marked
20 Simon Anholt and Jeremy Hildreth, Brand America: The Mother o f  All Brands (London: Cyan Books, 
2004), 44.
21 David Jackson, “Experienced Cabinet Will Speed Up Learning Process for Bush,” Dallas Morning News, 
21 January 2001.
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the first of many more to come, and in the 1970’s she helped steer the fortunes of 
companies such as Sears, and, in her heralded reprise at the firm two decades later, IBM. 
Even with the enormous task of branding America touted as her next assignment -  her 
“most sophisticated” she would later remark -- the nomination had gone largely unnoticed 
beyond a few footnotes in advertising industry publications and languished for the next 
several months in the congressional committees.
Meanwhile, public diplomacy remained low on the foreign relations agenda of the 
Bush administration during the first eight months of 2001 as did general concern for the 
national image. Leading up to the Bush victory in 2000, it had long been felt by 
conservative theorists of American foreign policy that the United States was too 
constrained by the rising number of international laws and treaties created throughout the
' joCold War and in the years thereafter. Now settled in the White House and emboldened 
by ideas intricately associated with ‘neoconservatives’, the foreign policy hawks of the 
Bush administration set about releasing itself from these commitments with the goal of 
freeing its hand in the management of foreign affairs. It did not occur without raising 
vociferous objections. In 2001, the United States withdrew from five international 
treaties, including the Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty, and levied strong opposition to a host 
of others, such as the International Criminal Court and Kyoto Protocol, both of which had 
been negotiated under the Clinton administration. Responding to the new American 
position on Kyoto, the French minister for the environment deemed it “completely 
provocative and irresponsible” while then-EU Commission president Romano Prodi 
argued, “if one wants to be a world leader, one must know how to look after the entire
22 Robert Kagan, O f Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (New York: 
Knopf, 2003); Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs 70, no. 1 (1990/1991); 
Patrick E. Tyler, “Pentagon Drops Goal o f Blocking New Superpowers,” New York Times, 23 May 1992 
(1992 Defense Policy Guidance).
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earth and not only American industry.”23 In a defiant gesture to its predecessors, the Bush 
team also seemed to systematically extricate itself from preceding engagements in North 
Korea and the Middle East despite contradicting previous statements made by Powell that 
the U.S. would remain engaged.24 For his part, Powell would go on to be one of the least- 
traveled Secretaries of State in 30 years, mostly out of a disdain for flying, and in effect 
subordinating Murrow’s cardinal rule of bridging “the last three feet” between oneself 
and one’s interlocutor to accomplish effective public diplomacy.
Contrast this with the jarring effect of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, which among 
other outcomes produced the kind of interest in public diplomacy not seen among 
American policymakers and opinion leaders since the 1980’s. At that time, Charles Z. 
Wick presided over a relatively robust USIA for eight years and preserved its relevance in 
the Cold War effort in part through his close relationship with President Ronald Reagan. 
With war again on the horizon after 9/11, political leaders and policymakers 
‘rediscovered’ public diplomacy only to find a much weaker organization, and a vacant 
post atop the muddled public diplomacy organizational chart at the Department of State. 
Within three weeks of the attacks, Congress accelerated Beers confirmation and rapidly 
approved her for the Under Secretary position. Here at the outset of the new “battle for 
hearts and minds” the radical new direction advocated by Powell, and reflected in Beers’ 
appointment in particular, assumed a level of relevance to American foreign policy that 
could not have been foreseen under pre-war circumstances. Beers did not waste time 
capitalizing on the sudden spike in political will and set out to package and sell American
23 Edmund L. Andrews, “Bush Angers Europe by Eroding Pact on Warming,” New York Times, 31 March 
2001.
24 Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy 
(Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, 2005), 64.
25 Glenn Kessler, “Powell Flies in the Face o f Tradition,” Washington Post, 14 July 2004.
127
values to skeptical audiences around the world. At her Senate confirmation hearing, she 
promised to seize “opportunities to put the legitimate emotional context of who the
96American people are and their messages in all channels of distribution.”
However, with the attention also came scrutiny. Many questioned the wisdom of 
tapping an advertising executive, albeit an accomplished one, to assume such a suddenly 
vital role. There was a certain uneasiness with the new ‘nation-branding’ approach, and 
that the proposed packaging of the United States into a more digestible commodity for 
populations abroad would amount to a naive folly. From a pragmatic standpoint some 
felt the United States presented too complex a subject for branding purposes. Said Wally 
Olins, one of the world’s foremost practitioners in the branding of nations, “The US is 
outstanding in the sense that it is the only country in the world which is so well known
97that you can guarantee people from all other countries will have a view on it.” The 
overall international perception of post-9/11 United States presented myriad viewpoints 
that various populations expressed in admiring and hostile tones; often times these 
associations contradicted themselves. Unlike starting from scratch with a new and 
unknown product, much of Beers’ plan would involve challenging existing negative 
perceptions of the United States held by foreign populations, and in some cases 
reconciling variable strands of American identity into a consonant message. Marketing 
strategies aside, it did not escape observers that Beers crucially lacked any real foreign 
policy experience. "I'm not sure what an ad person brings to public diplomacy in a time 
of war," remarked William J. Drake of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
9 0
"I just find the notion that you can sell Uncle Sam like Uncle Ben's highly problematic."
26 Peter Carlson, “The U.S.A. Account,” Washington Post, 31 December 2001.
27 Richard Tomkins, “Brand o f the Free,” Financial Times, 20 October 2001.
28 Alexandra Starr, “Charlotte Beers’ Toughest Sell,” Newsweek, 17 December 2001, 56.
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A Wall Street Journal column suggested that Beers was unfamiliar with the challenges 
presented by the Middle East: “[Beers] recently talked about using the Internet to get out
9 0the American message. That'd reach only the 1% of the Arab world that's wired.” In 
spite of these deficiencies, Powell nevertheless stood by his choice: “She got me to buy 
Uncle Ben's rice. And so there is nothing wrong with getting somebody who knows how
1 A
to sell something”
Under Beers’ direction, the Department of State concentrated on improving 
relations with Arab-Muslim populations by churning out a series of brochures, books and 
multilingual television spots, which sought on one hand to explain who American people 
were, while denouncing the 9/11 attacks on the other. Ambitious projects such as one 
titled “American Rooms”, involving multimedia kiosks strategically placed in non- 
Embassy partnering institutions worldwide exemplified part of the future-oriented vision, 
a desire to somehow endear the United States to “the 11-year old mind”, that Beers 
wished to convert. While Bush confidant Karen Hughes coordinated day-to-day ‘rapid 
response’ functions from the White House so that government agencies could uniformly 
refute accusations emerging in he international media (a technique Hughes would later 
employ as Under Secretary), Beers sought to promote positive impressions of the United 
States using the Internet to launch two new pamphlet projects. The first, titled The 
Network o f  Terrorism, attempted to lay out a startling portrait of the newest global 
contagion while the second, Muslim Life in America, aimed to convince Muslim 
populations around the world that the two entities need not exist in a state of mutual
29 Albert R. Hunt, “An Accelerated Agenda for the Terrorism Threat,” Wall Street Journal, 25 October 
2001 .
30 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Campaign Against Terrorism, 107th Cong., 1st sess., 25 October
2001 .
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exclusivity. Subtly articulated and decorated with gloss and human interest, each 
contained a singular message; the first inferred terrorism to be not merely inimical to the 
United States, but to humanity as well, while the second intended to establish 
commonalities between the Arab-Muslim world and the West. Working to bridge the 
cultural gaps by using a long-term communication plan driven by advertising techniques 
became a hallmark of the Beers public diplomacy strategy. Yet, in the same way that 
Uncle Ben’s and IBM cemented her golden reputation in the private sector, it would be 
another campaign known as the “Shared Values Initiative” that would establish her legacy 
at the State Department.
From the outset of 2002, the phrase “shared values” acquired a buzzword-like 
significance amongst public diplomacy practitioners, buttressed by the logic, in the words 
of one senior public affairs official, of “those who don’t like America don’t know 
America.” In April, as Beers canvassed lawmakers on Capitol Hill for increased 
funding of public diplomacy activities, signs of a bold new approach to communicating to 
foreign populations began to emerge, namely the acquisition of air time on foreign 
broadcast media outlets to run U.S. government-sponsored documentaries. 
Traditionally, U.S. government broadcasters transmitted material over their own outlets, 
such as VO A and the Worldnet television network, and thereby exercised full control 
over dissemination. In fact, parallel to this new approach the Broadcasting Board of 
Governors was months away from launching Radio Sawa, a new 24-hour, Arabic-
31 U.S. Department of State, The Network o f  Terrorism (Washington, DC: U.S. Department o f State 
International Information Programs, 2001); U.S. Department o f State, Muslim Life in America (Washington, 
DC: U.S. Department o f State International Information Programs, 2001).
32 Miranda Green, “Washington focuses on propaganda war: The White House is trying to make its PR as 
slick as its military in the battle to win hearts and minds,” Financial Times, 13 March 2002.
33 House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, and State, Commerce, Justice, 
State and Judiciary Appropriations, 107th Cong., 2nd sess., 24 April 2002.
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language radio service geared for younger audiences. Beers opted to embed her 
campaign within mainstream information sources as with the creation of the youth- 
oriented, Arabic-language glossy magazine Hi to fill a noticeable absence of favorable 
news and images of the United States in Arab-Muslim print media coverage. But Beers 
also stressed the comparative advantage of using local media to relay messages, 
evidenced by a speech to the National Defense University in September 2002 when she 
remarked, “Messages delivered by an independent third party will often carry an 
authenticity and credibility that government pronouncements cannot.”34 With the help of 
the public relations firm McCann-Erickson, Beers applied a budget of $15 million to the 
production of a number of television spots to be broadcast on state-run television and 
satellite stations in the Middle East. The footage would portray a cross-section of Muslim 
Americans cheerfully describing their lifestyles with the purpose of debunking claims of 
American hostility towards Islam. As it happened, only four Muslim countries -  
Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan and Kuwait — agreed to run the spots, while historically 
friendly countries such as Egypt and Lebanon surprisingly rejected the proposal. The 
popular pan-Arab satellite station al-Jazeera first agreed to broadcast but negotiations 
with the Department of State later collapsed over the matter of money. Sensing the 
Ramadan season as the ideal period for broadcasting, the Department pushed forward to 
run the spots from late October 2002 to early December 2003.
34 Charlotte L. Beers, Speech at the National Defense University, Washington, DC, 18 September 2002.
j5 Alice Kendrick and Jami A. Fullerton, Advertising as Public Diplomacy: Attitude Change Among 
International Audiences, http://www.smu.edu/smunews/adamerica/Advertising%20as%20Public%20 
Diplomacy.pdf6 (accessed on 15 February 2007).
36 Extended runs o f the spots proceeded in Africa and Central Asia after the Middle Eastern campaign 
ended in January 2003, according to a briefing on 16 January 2003 by Department o f State Spokesman 
Richard Boucher.
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However, the completion of the broader campaign in Arab-Muslim countries -  
and very little to show for it -  sparked a wave of domestic criticism signaling that it had 
failed in its objectives. In mid-January 2003, the Wall Street Journal circulated news that 
the indefinite suspension of the television campaign came about when State Department 
officials decided to “emphasize public relations rather than print ads”, although this 
reason was immediately rejected by Beers and Spokesman Richard Boucher. Other 
reasons for the rumored suspension drew on the fact that several countries refused to air 
the spots in the first place, which suggested a critical overestimation of foreign 
cooperation with what some states considered abetting foreign propaganda. More 
common critiques echoed the widely held view that Madison Avenue salesmanship had 
much to learn about U.S. foreign relations. “Simply showing that Muslims are happily 
integrated into American society isn’t even a good step towards tackling the real worries 
of Muslims abroad,” wrote Anholt of the Shares Values Initiative.
As it happened, the true concerns of the campaign’s would-be audiences had less 
to do with Muslim life inside the United States than the impact of American foreign 
policy on Muslim life outside. According to Youssef Ibrahim of the Council on Foreign 
Relations, the spots “failed because they weren’t credible in the first place” and that Beers
- IQ
was ill-suited to “put a gloss on policy” that curried no favor in the Arab-Muslim world. 
To be sure, the campaign faced an uphill battle in attempting to win over Arab nations 
just as the United States was gathering momentum to wage war upon one, Iraq, by March 
of that year. On the other hand, it seems the Beers approach also drew fire from those 
expecting some form of policy advocacy to be included in the overarching public
37 Victoria O’Connell, “U.S. suspends ad campaign aimed at winning over Muslims,” Wall Street Journal, 
16 January 2003.
38 Anholt and Hildreth, Brand America, 142.
39 Marketplace, NPR, 16 January 2003.
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diplomacy strategy.40 In fact, Beers steadfastly maintained that the Shared Values 
Initiative was not intended as a policy communication, but an attempt to seek a dialogue 
occurring beyond the parameters of policy.41 In eschewing the policy debate in favor of 
long-term inculcation of common values themes like faith and family, Beers made the 
mistake of implementing a long-term strategy for both long-term and short-term needs. 
Reporters and pundits regularly questioned the wisdom of her approach.42 More than 
that, it became evident that the gulf between public diplomacy and policy goals revealed 
an insurmountable caveat for her glittering product. As the Iraq War loomed in early 
2003, Beers found herself mired in the contradictions of two campaigns -  the public 
relations one that she championed and the impending military one, as she explained to the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 27 February, “The gap between who we are and 
how we wish to be seen and how we are in fact seen, is frighteningly wide.”43 In four 
days time, Beers would tender her resignation.
4.4 Losing Ground in the *Battle for Hearts and Minds’
In retrospect of Beers’ seventeen-month tenure in public service, one would be 
hard-pressed to draw any positive conclusions from her accomplishments. Part of the 
reason for this may be attributed to Beers’ inability to placate critics about her past.44 Her 
advertising experience, seen by Powell as a huge asset, in fact remained a liability from
40 Robert Satloff, “Special Policy Forum Report: Battling for the Hearts and Minds in the Middle East: A 
Critique o f U.S. Public Diplomacy, Post-September 11,” PolicyWatch #657 (Washington, DC: The 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 17 September 2002).
41 Charlotte L. Beers, interview by Aaron Brown, NewsNight with Aaron Brown, CNN, 16 January 2003; 
Beers, Speech at the National Press Club, Washington, DC, 18 December 2002.
42 Nancy Snow asks, “Can you sell Uncle Sam the way you sell Uncle Ben?” in Propaganda, Inc.: Selling 
America's Culture to the World. New York: Seven Stories Press, 2002.
43 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, America and the Islamic World, 108th Cong., 1st sess., 27 February
2003.
44 “Distorted Image Muslims Rebuff U.S. Outreach Efforts,” Sacramento Bee, 6 March 2003.
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start to finish and was viewed by some as tainted by the assumption that “if only the 
United States clearly articulated its message...the rest of the world would jump on the 
American bandwagon.”45 To be sure, the interpretation that the problem of U.S. foreign 
relations in the Middle East were rooted in communication dominated public diplomacy 
under Beers — these communication problems were narrowly defined (e.g. clarifying 
American values and way of life), and this may have taken for granted the significance of 
context, both in being able to communicate messages in a broader context of the 
representative society, and in the tailoring of messages that might resonate in the broader 
context of the receiving society 46 Thus by keeping to a simple set of messages -  
slogans, perhaps, in the advertising industry -  and no noticeable impact to show for their 
transmissions, it cleared the way for some critics to marginalize those things that Beers 
aspired to do as Under Secretary.
However, it should also be known that a great portion of criticism over Beers dealt 
not with what she aspired to do, but what she had ignored. The policy discourses beneath 
her public diplomacy strategy were never accepted by Beers as a legitimate point of 
contention. “The problem is not our brand,” wrote conservative scholar Joshua 
Muravchik, “it is their buying habits.”47 By playing down the role of policy in the 
steadily rising anti-American tide abroad, Beers had unknowingly aided in exacerbating 
two increasingly troublesome trends impeding U.S. public diplomacy. In the first 
instance, it became evident that the ability of American Foreign Service Officers (FSO’s)
45 David M. Edelstein and Ronald R. Krebs, “Washington’s Troubling Obsession with Public Diplomacy,” 
Survival 47, no. 1 (Spring 2005): 90.
46 Anholt and Hildreth, Brand America, 145; Robert J. Callahan, “Neither Madison Avenue Nor 
Hollywood,” Foreign Service Journal (October 2006): 33.
47 Joshua Muravchik, “Hearts, Minds and the War against Terror,” AEI Online, 1 June 2002, 
http://www.aei.org/include/pub_print.asp?pubID=14896 (accessed 28 February 2006).
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to advocate policy had been compromised. A 2003 survey of Public Affairs Officers 
(PAO’s) posted in American embassies abroad found that, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, 
opposition to U.S. foreign policy had become a moderate, major, or very major 
impediment for nearly 62 percent of respondents aiming to achieve public diplomacy 
objectives m their host countries. More tellingly, the survey found that approximately 
71 percent of PAO’s had received some/little or no consultation from the Office of the 
Under Secretary or other State Department or administration leadership regarding the 
nature or implementation of policy initiatives prior to their release.* A public relations- 
style plan led by Washington had the unintended effect of cutting out the FSO from the 
public diplomacy process.
In the second instance, marginalizing policy discourses from public diplomacy 
meant that Beers had overlooked the most paramount of causes for this grim reality, 
thereby obstructing the very ‘dialogue’ she was attempting to promote. The one indicator 
that area scholars, pollsters, and analysts cite repeatedly as the primary cause of Arab 
resentment toward the United States is American foreign policy. Not to be divorced from 
a general character assessment of the United States, the two are often grouped together to 
support arguments that Americans are motivated to dominate the Arab world and wage 
war against Islam. Thus it becomes clear as to why, for example, Osama bin Laden, an 
Islamist, and Saddam Hussein, a secularist, would champion the Palestinian cause as well
48 United States Government Accounting Office, “U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Expands 
Efforts but Faces Significant Challenges,” Report to the Committee on International Relations, House o f  
Representatives (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, September 2003). Based on responses from 
118 PAO’s, except in *, which denotes that 118 PAO’s received some/little or no guidance from the Office 
of the Under Secretary while 117 received some/little or no guidance from other State Department or 
administration offices.
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as their own at the same time.49 Both of these figures recognized what studies of Arab 
people also show, which is that citizens from around the Arab world, in spite of their 
many differences, share in each other’s disaffection with the American international 
agenda as it pertains to their region and extant activities. Of these primary policy 
disputes, the Israel-Palestine issue consistently ranks as the leading grievance over U.S. 
policy, according to another Zogby poll published in September 2002, titled, “What 
Arabs Think.” When confronted with the question of what the United States should do to 
improve its relations with the Arab world, most respondents in each of eight Arab- 
Muslim countries surveyed responded that the U.S. should first and foremost change its 
position on Israel.50
Yet more damage to the credibility of the United States accumulated by way of 
issues surrounding the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the resulting hostility extended 
from Muslims to more traditional Western allies. For those who disapproved of 
prosecuting the Iraq War, the American decision to proceed in the face of resistance 
further widened the gulf between the United States and a host of other nations. These 
were the conclusions of a seminal report released in June 2003 by the Pew Global 
Attitudes Project titled, Views o f  A Changing World, and by virtue of its broad scope of 
worldwide public opinion on a variety of issues (including data from more than 66,000 
people in 49 countries), it swiftly became the definitive source on how foreign publics felt 
about not only the policies, but the underlying values of the United States. Contrary to 
Beers presumption, the Pew report concluded that a majority of surveyed participants in 
fact accept many of the espoused American ideals, such as democracy and the free market
49 Fred Halliday, Two Hours That Shook The World: September 11, 2001: Causes and Consequences 
(London: Saqi Books, 2002), 40.
50 James Zogby, What Arabs Think: Values, Beliefs and Concerns (Utica, NY: Zogby International/The 
Arab Thought Foundation, September 2002), 83-91.
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economic system.51 In fourteen countries where the populations are predominantly 
Muslim or contain a significant Muslim population, a majority of respondents expressed 
support for political and religious freedoms along with affirming the importance of a free 
press. This is not meant to overstate any similarities between the American value system 
and those of its counterparts, but that it may illuminate the point about where the true 
wedge issues lie, not so much in ideals and values, but rather in the preponderance of 
American power vis-a-vis its foreign policy.
Meanwhile, new evidence gathered by a consortium of public policy institutions 
suggested that American foreign policy was to a great extent heightening tensions with 
Europe as well. A project led by The German Marshall Fund of the United States and the 
Italian Compagnia di San Paolo produced the inaugural issue of a survey titled
Transatlantic Trends in September 2003. Analysis of the gathered data, which included
responses from 8,000 Americans and Europeans, showed a deepening apprehension of 
American power and portrayed the European view of U.S. unilateralism as a “possible 
threat” to international security by 2013. European publics were largely united in their 
opposition to the Iraq War, which helped steer the outcomes of national elections in 
France and Germany in 2003 and later in Spain in 2004. Likewise, the survey captured
trends in Europeans’ decreasing favorability towards the United States, general
disapproval of the foreign policy of the Bush administration, and lack of confidence in the 
United States exerting strong global leadership.54
51 Pew Global Attitudes Project, Views o f  a Changing World, 2003 (Washington, DC: The Pew Research 
Center for the People and the Press, 2003), 7-11.
52 Ibid., 33-41.
53 German Marshall Fund o f the United States and the Compagnia di Sao Paolo, Transatlantic Trends 2003, 
10.
54 Ibid., 4-6.
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In other words, the substance of American foreign policy could not be neatly 
separated from the resultant damage inflicted upon its own image, as Beers attempted to 
do. Firstly, the underperformance of post-9/11 American foreign policy seemed to be 
caused by the international disenchantment the policy itself had created. Secondly, 
polling figures from that time suggest that the acute rise in anti-Americanism in the post- 
9/11 era had more to do with American foreign policy than any other single issue. As it 
will be seen in Chapter Eight, these claims can be questioned on the integrity of their 
correlations, but should one accept that taken together these points pose an intriguing 
dilemma for scholars and practitioners of U.S. public diplomacy. To the extent that 
American foreign policy has been maligned by foreign publics, how would a public 
diplomacy strategy best be conceived to combat the problems America has faced since 
9/11? By early 2003, it had become a matter of recognition and some debate that the 
widespread unpopularity of American foreign policy that overall negative impressions of 
the United States abroad were undermining foreign policy. There was on one view held 
by hawkish American public intellectuals that public diplomacy should be used as the 
selling mechanism for foreign policy, and the public diplomats of the Department of State 
had summarily failed in their ascribed mission to communicate abroad the intended policy 
messages and build sympathy for America’s grand strategy.55 A less vociferous and 
alternative view wondered if placing too much blame on public diplomacy equated to 
shooting the messenger. This argued that the distaste bred by American foreign policy 
might have exceeded the persuasive powers of any campaign, no matter how skilled the
55 Newt Gingrich, “Rogue State Department,” Foreign Policy 137 (July/August 2003); “Brand America, 
Bill Moyers and More,” The Weekly Standard, 1 March 2004; Muravchik, “Hearts, Minds, and the War 
against Terror.”
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sales force. Had American public diplomacy been tasked with the objective of defending 
the indefensible?
In the wake of these high profile struggles and subsequent exit of Charlotte Beers, 
an increased amount of research was undertaken to wrestle with this question and 
elaborate further on the troubling state of U.S. public diplomacy. Of the important 
studies to emerge in 2003, some included the government-sponsored analysis of the U.S. 
Government Accounting Office, which in September released the first of a number of 
reports highlighting the strategic shortcomings of post-9/11 public diplomacy, and the 
Advisory Commission offering suggestions on how to maximize communication with 
cost-effective tools and resources.56 But public policy institutions also showed more 
interest, which thus presented opportunities to grapple more critically with the 
relationship between foreign policy and public diplomacy. A paper published by the 
Heritage Foundation in April, for example, adopted the commonplace notion that public
C<7
diplomacy should serve primarily as the mouthpiece for foreign policy. Hence, its 
suggestions presupposed the declining global image of the United States resting on public 
diplomacy’s poorly executed support of America’s international efforts. In essence, the 
Heritage authors’ explanations for the ongoing disputes between the United States and the
co
rest of the world were not a function of ineffective policies, but poor policy advocacy.
56 United States Government Accounting Office, 2003; U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, 
The New Diplomacy: Utilizing Innovative Communication Concepts That Recognize Resource Constraints, 
July 2003.
57 Stephen Johnson and Helle Dale, “How to Reinvigorate Public Diplomacy,” The Heritage Foundation 
Backgrounder 1645, 23 April 2003.
58 On this note, it is instructive to point out likenesses between the Heritage paper and Mr. Gingrich’s 
Foreign Policy article published soon thereafter. In the area o f policy advocacy, Johnson and Dale (the 
Heritage paper authors) follow on the themes of the paper in an article published on 14 May 2003 arguing, 
“While foreign support for U.S. policies may not always be possible, or expected, understanding should be 
a constant goal.” Similarly Gingrich opines, “The world does not have to love us, but it must be able to 
predict us.” Put together, the logic echoes a Machiavellian view on the expression o f power, or in the 
words o f  Caligula, “Oderint dum metuant” (Let them hate as long as they fear).
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By stressing advocacy in the aftermath of the formulation of policy, the Heritage paper 
embodies one of two philosophies about the role of public diplomacy.
Alternatively, some reports suggest that public diplomacy should be integrated 
into the policy formulation stage, a proposition that surfaced, albeit with little success, in 
past administrations.59 A Council on Foreign Relations task force introduced for the first 
time since the attacks of 9/11 the possibility that American foreign policy was a liability 
beyond that which any public diplomacy effort could successfully defend. A majority of 
panel members reasoned that “the concerns of public diplomacy -- how U.S. actions and 
words impact the rest of the world and the outcomes these actions provoke — have not 
been incorporated into the foundations of the U.S. foreign policy process.”60 
Accordingly, the recommendations that emerged from this study concentrated above all 
on making public diplomacy an integral part in the process of formulating foreign policy. 
Instead of relegating public diplomacy strictly to a peripheral advocacy role it would 
reside closer to the core, placed in close proximity to the president and apprising decision 
makers of the likely reaction of foreign publics prior to policy implementation. The study 
also attempted to raise the recent lack of preparedness shown by U.S. public diplomacy 
institutions in the aftermath of 9/11 to impress upon Congress that maintaining a nimble 
and well-equipped organization at all times, not merely in times of war, served the best 
interests of the country.61
59 The Kennedy administration expressed intentions to make USIA Director Edward Murrow a fixture at 
policy meetings. The Carter administration reorganized USIA into the short-lived USICA to boost its 
engagement activities. See Chapter Seven for more detail on these attempts.
60 Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force on Public Diplomacy, Finding America's Voice: A 
Strategy fo r  Reinvigorating U.S. Public Diplomacy (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2003), 6. 
(hereafter’CFR Report’)
61 Ibid., 8-16.
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Of course, amongst the steadily rising scholarship devoted to public diplomacy, 
virtually all studies and commentaries stressed the need for structural improvements both 
within the State Department and at the interagency level. The common threads to this 
effect included bolstering the public diplomacy competencies of FSO’s, increasing funds 
for educational and cultural exchanges, streamlining and updating government 
broadcasting, improving communication between agencies to ensure consistency in 
efforts, placing greater emphasis on opinion polling, and engaging the best practices of 
the private sector. (Avoiding duplication of efforts is also a common suggestion. The 
redundancies of U.S. international broadcasting are a prime example of this.)
The study that arguably gained the most attention in 2003 was that produced by an 
advisory group led by Edward P. Djerejian, a former U.S. ambassador to Syria under 
Presidents Reagan and George W. Bush and Israel under President Clinton. After being 
called upon by Powell to head the study, Djerejian assembled a fourteen-member group 
eventually named the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim 
World. The Advisory Group was comprised of current and former ambassadors, public 
intellectuals, journalists, and experts on Arab and Muslim countries all tasked with 
proposing new ideas and future directions for conducting public diplomacy in those parts 
of the world. The resulting recommendations in its report, Changing Minds, Winning 
Peace, were not groundbreaking in the sense that they further identified public diplomacy 
limitations in areas of strategic direction, organizational structure, interagency 
cooperation, funding, cultural and linguistic deficiencies of FSO’s posted in Arab and 
Muslim countries, augmenting prioritization in the executive branch, and achieving a
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fOsophisticated use of ICT’s. What made this study unique was the fact that unlike reports 
from the Government Accounting Office or the Congressional Research Service, which 
address the interests of Congressional committees, or studies from public policy 
institutions released for the general public, the Djerejian report was commissioned from 
the highest levels of government, thereby inviting the very real possibility of effecting 
change there. However, this potential was usurped by the mandate that established the 
scope of the report. Djerejian himself was fond of characterizing Arab-Muslim resistance 
to the U.S. as “80 percent policy and 20 percent communication” and curiously, these 
figures are out of proportion with the contents of the report, save for a few paragraphs on 
the subject of policy it is almost exclusively devoted to the task of communication. 64 
“Our mandate was to address public diplomacy, not to advise the administration on 
policies,” Djerejian maintained.65 But this critical imbalance would leave a lackluster 
impression, and some sources familiar with the report agree that it was a missed 
opportunity for public diplomacy experts to be more candid with the Bush administration 
on policy.66 In the end, Changing Minds, Winning Peace was decidedly more profound 
for the areas it ignored as opposed to those that it covered.
62 Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, “Changing Minds, Winning 
Peace: A New Strategic Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World,” Report o f  the 
Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy fo r  the Arab and Muslim World (Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, 2003).
63 Edward P. Djerejian, telephone interview by the author, 10 December 2003.
64 Edward P. Djerejian, “A New Strategic Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim 
World,” (speech given at Council on Foreign Relations, New York, NY, 7 October 2003); “Distorted 
Images: The Role o f Global Media in Public Diplomacy. Misperceptions Between America, and the 
Muslim and Arab World,” (panel discussion at the Secretary’s Open Forum, U.S. Department o f State, 
Washington, DC, 20 November 2003); Edward P. Djerejian, telephone interview by the author, 10 
December 2003.
65 Djerejian, Speech at Council on Foreign Relations, 7 October 2003.
66 Harold Pachios, telephone interview by the author, 29 April 2005; Bruce Gregory, telephone interview by 
the author, 1 February 2006.
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4.5 Between Beers and Hughes: Instability and Uncertainty
At the same time, one could debate whether or not a more candid assessment from 
Djerejian’s group might have affected the course of American foreign policy at this time 
or, for that matter, the deteriorating state of its public diplomacy. The vacancy created by 
the March departure of Beers fell to Patricia Harrison, already serving as Assistant 
Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs and now assuming the role of 
Acting Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. This would be the first 
of two occasions that Harrison would serve in this surrogate capacity. The first stint 
lasted until December 2003, at which time the Senate confirmed her replacement, 
Margaret B. Tutwiler, a former Special Advisor for Communications to President George 
W. Bush and more recently ambassador to Morocco. At a glance, Tutwiler seemed a 
good fit for the job, bringing to it an appropriate combination of public relations 
experience from the private sector, service under three administrations largely from 
within the Department of State, and valuable insights from her exposure to the Arab- 
Muslim world. In her prepared testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, she appeared to understand the enormity of the task before her: “There is not 
one magic bullet, magic program or magic solution. It does not exist. What does exist is a 
recognition that we did not get into this situation overnight, and we will certainly not get 
out of it overnight.” But any indication of a personal willingness for long-term 
dedication would be belied by what amounted to a very short tenure. Tutwiler made her 
first public appearance in early February, but within three months -  and after reported
67 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Confirmation Hearing o f  Margaret D. Tutwiler, 108* Cong., 1st 
sess., 29 October 2003. In one o f the only notable moments to come out o f Tutwiler’s six months at the 
helm o f  public diplomacy, Senator Richard Lugar famously remarked at her confirmation hearing, “We've 
asked in various ways how the United States can be so often all thumbs at public diplomacy when we are so 
expert at the strategy and tactics o f public relations, marketing and advertising.”
68 Ibid.
143
frustration with the new job -  she announced on 29 April 2004 that she would step down 
to become an executive vice president at the New York Stock Exchange.69 The sudden 
change would once again leave the Department’s dysfunctional public diplomacy 
apparatus under Harrison’s improvised command for nearly another year.
However, with this indictment of faltering leadership at the Department of State in 
plain view, it is important to recognize the myriad developments impacting U.S. public 
diplomacy both from movements within the government itself and by events occurring in 
the wider world. The findings of the 9/11 Commission, released on 22 July 2004 bore 
important implications for a number of U.S. government agencies and responsibilities. 
Those concerned with public diplomacy and international broadcasting took note of one 
particular passage, which stressed that in order for the U.S. to win the war on terror, it 
needed to apply “all elements of national power: diplomacy, intelligence, covert action, 
law enforcement, economic policy, foreign aid, public diplomacy, and homeland
7 ndefense.” The report went on to say that if any one of these elements took precedence
71over another, “we leave ourselves vulnerable and weaken our national effort.” 
Specifically, the Commission called upon the need to revive scholarship, exchange and 
library programs, in part to underscore their roles in preventing an enormous Islamic
77youth demographic from gravitating towards terrorism. The primacy of security was 
further reinforced by effective communications when the Commission voiced its staunch 
support for international radio and television broadcasting. The Commission also
69 Reports of Tutwiler’s frustration are corroborated by Christopher Marquis, “Promoter o f U.S. Image 
Quits for Wall St. Job,” New York Times, 30 April 2004; “President Bush addresses people o f Middle East 
regarding abuse at Abu Ghraib Prison,” NBC Nightly News, 5 May 2004.
70 9/11 Commission, Final Report o f  the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2004), 363-364
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid., 377.
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recommended increasing the Broadcasting Board of Governors’ (BBG) budget for 
operating in the Middle East, a request that was ultimately approved. Such a high- 
profile forum as that provided by the Commission and its related testimonies lent a much- 
needed vote of confidence for public diplomacy at an uncertain time for its strategic and 
organizational underpinnings.
To even greater effect did the Commission reinforce the work of the BBG, which 
had since 9/11 expanded its radio broadcasting arsenal to include new or revitalized 
services in Afghanistan and Iran along with the new Radio Sawa service for the Arab­
speaking world. The BBG’s most ambitious project of the period represented the pan- 
Arab satellite television station al-Hurra, or “the free one”. The brainchild of BBG 
member and broadcasting executive Norman J. Pattiz, al-Hurra was launched in February 
2004 at the cost of $102 million targeting audiences in 22 Arabic-speaking countries.74 As 
a 24-hour commercial-free network, news would constitute most of its programming 
alongside features on other subjects including sport, leisure and entertainment. This 
would place the new channel in direct competition with homegrown channels al-Jazeera 
and al-Arabiya as it aimed to dull the impact of the latter’s perceived anti-American slant 
with a countervailing pro-American news source. Early reviews of al-Hurra from 
independent sources indicated low viewership due to the strong competition from roughly
73 The 9/11 Public Discourse Project, Report on the Status o f  9/11 Commission Recommendations, Part HI: 
Foreign Policy, Public Diplomacy, and Nonproliferation, 14 November 2005. http://www.9- 
1 lpdp.org/press/2005-1 l-14_report.pdf (accessed 6 November 2007), 11-12.
74 Total includes setting up cost o f $40 million and an operating budget o f $62 million. White House, 
“High Hopes For New Arab-Language Television Service,” The White House Bulletin, 9 February 2004; 
Neil MacFarquhar, “Washington's Arabic TV Effort Gets Mixed Reviews,” New York Times, 20 February
2004.
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170 satellite stations broadcasting in the region, inviting criticism and checking the 
optimism often expressed by BBG members.
The BBG dedicated 40 percent of the al-Hurra 2004 fiscal year budget to 
broadcasting in Iraq and made the channel available to Iraqis via public access to boost 
support for the American mission there. It was badly needed. Mounting evidence from 
opinions polls identified Iraq as a catalyst for negative views of the United States, and an 
unusually candid April 2005 report of the Government Accounting Office showed highly 
unfavorable ratings -- not only among surveyed Muslim nations, but also in Western
7 f \countries — sustained for more than a year after the U.S. invasion in March 2003. In 
April 2004 American forces tallied nearly 140 fatalities, the single most deadly month to
77date (later surpassed by the toll in November). A Gallup poll taken in late April 2004 
showed an unprecedented number of American respondents, 49 percent, conceding that 
the war had not been a mistake, a 24 percent increase since the war began over a year
7 0
earlier. With rising anti-American sentiment abroad, disturbing numbers from Iraq and 
eroding domestic support, not to mention the Coalition Provisional Authority being 
poised to handover political control of Iraq on 30 June 2004, the situation could ill afford 
another setback.
75 Robin Wright, “U.S. Struggles to Win Hearts, Minds in the Muslim World; Diplomacy Efforts Lack 
Funds, Follow-Through,” Washington Post, 20 August 2004.
76 United States Government Accountability Office, “U.S. Public Diplomacy: Interagency Coordination 
Efforts Hampered by the Lack of a National Communication Strategy,” Report to the Chairman, 
Subcommittee on Science, the Departments o f State, Justice, and Commerce, and Related Agencies, 
Committee on Appropriations, House o f  Representatives (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 
April 2005).
77 Sewell Chan, “10 GIs Die in Attacks in Iraq; Spain's New Leader Orders Withdrawal,” Washington Post, 
19 April 2004.
78 Based on findings from a Gallup poll conducted over the weekend o f 29 April -  1 May 2004. Analysis 
accessed at http://www.publicagenda.org/specials/terrorism/terror_pubopinion6.htm (accessed on 30 
November 2006).
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But the ongoing campaign to put a positive face on Iraq, and the image of the 
United States, suffered a serious blow in late April 2004 with the revelation that 
American soldiers had abused Iraqi detainees at Abu Ghraib prison. Reactions were 
immediate and deeply accusatory of the United States in that it had betrayed its own 
values to succumb to the very inhumane acts that characterized the reigns of tyrants. Even 
as top administration officials set the gears of crisis management in motion, the 
groundswell of international condemnation marshaled all available public affairs 
resources to the fore. One anonymous State Department official was quoted as saying, 
"We're now realizing that we can't expect the Pentagon to handle all of these criticisms 
and requests to focus on the public affairs disaster this has caused...We're frantically
• « 7Qworking this issue and trying to come up with a strategy.” As for public diplomacy, 
Middle East scholar Shibley Telhami summarized the effect of the scandal thus: "One 
single picture like the one we have seen outweighs the millions of dollars that we spend in
finpublic diplomacy." Once burned into the collective memory of foreign publics, the 
images of Abu Ghraib served as a harsh reminder that even long-term and well-financed 
public diplomacy could be undone virtually overnight, and furthermore established the 
limits of what it could and could not control.
4.6 Karen Hughes * Rapid Response
After nearly four tumultuous years as Secretary of State, Colin Powell would 
resign on 15 November 2004 shortly after the re-election of George W. Bush. 
Conservative columnist Max Boot authored an obituary in which he traced Powell’s
79 Robin Wright, “In U.S., Seeking to Limit Damage,” Washington Post, 4 May 2004.
80 Nightly News, NBC, 5 May 2006.
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demise to being “not very good at selling the administration’s policies”, among other
O 1
shortcomings. Boot also portrayed Powell as a victim of circumstances beyond his 
control, calling U.S. public diplomacy “neutered since the cold war”, and suggested that
Q }
Bush administration do more to placate criticism from abroad. When National Security 
Advisor Condoleezza Rice received the nomination to succeed Powell, some interpreted 
this as an effort by Bush to close ranks on the foreign policy front, possibly indicating a 
shrewd change in the way the international aims of the United States were communicated. 
Rice clarified her intentions in the opening statement of her confirmation hearing on 18 
January 2005, saying pointedly, “the time for diplomacy is now ...If I am confirmed,
O ’!
public diplomacy will be a top priority for me and for the professionals I lead.”
The nomination of Rice could also be interpreted as a signal of the increased 
seriousness with which the White House would deal with escalating anti-American 
sentiments abroad. On 14 March 2005, Bush put forth the selections of Dina H. Powell, 
the Assistant to the President for Presidential Personnel, to head the Department of State’s 
Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, and former White House communications 
advisor Karen Hughes to fill the vacant post of Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and 
Public Affairs. The appointment of Hughes, known as a loyal and long-standing figure 
throughout Bush’s political career, was seen to significantly increase the likelihood that
OA
public diplomacy concerns would be heard at the highest levels. Hughes was also 
regarded as a catalyst of organizational change -  in October 2001 she oversaw the 
creation of the Coalition Information Centers (CIC’s), with hubs in Washington, London
81 Max Boot, “The Legacy of a Failed American Salesman,” Financial Times, 18 November 2004.
82 Ibid.
83 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Confirmation Hearing o f Condoleezza Rice, 109th Cong., 1st sess., 
18 January 2005.
84 Cam Simpson, “Bush Asks Karen Hughes to Smooth U.S. Relations with Arab World,” Chicago Tribune, 
15 March 2005.
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and Islamabad, to orchestrate immediate American responses to stories emerging in the
oc m #
24-hour international news cycle. Hughes is also believed to have originated the idea of 
the OGC, expanding on the CIC’s to develop integrated public diplomacy strategy and 
provide guidance to field officers from the White House.
Having been persuaded to return to the administration after a nearly three-year 
absence, Hughes’ nomination was warmly received excepting the fact that she had 
virtually no foreign affairs experience and faced questions over how she planned to apply 
her domestic campaigning successes to interactions with foreign audiences. During her 
confirmation hearing in July 2005, Hughes affirmed that “the mission of public 
diplomacy is to engage, inform, and help others (i.e. foreign populations) understand our
O-T
policies, actions and values.” “But,” she continued, “I am mindful that before we seek to 
be understood, we must first work to understand...I recognize that the job ahead will be 
difficult. Perceptions do not change quickly or easily.” Hughes leaned on these principles 
when embarking on her publicized first foray into the Middle East in September 2005. 
Billed as a ‘listening tour’ through Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, the audiences she 
encountered were often cordial but also brought on hard questions about the war in Iraq, 
American democracy promotion efforts and a universalist notion of women’s rights. A 
female Saudi student challenged Hughes’ assumption that Saudi women suffered
85 Karen DeYoung, “U.S., Britain Step Up War for Public Opinion,” Washington Post, 1 November 2001; 
Martha Brant, “Bush’s New War Room,” Newsweek, 12 November 2001, 29.
86 Karen DeYoung, “Bush to Create Formal Office to Shape U.S. Image Abroad,” Washington Post, 30 July
2002 .
87 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Confirmation Hearing o f  Karen Hughes, 109th Cong., 1st sess., 22 
July 2005.
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QQ
intolerable social injustice, and insisted “we’re all pretty happy” to resounding applause.
O Q
“It’s a huge challenge, it’s confirmed,” Hughes conceded afterwards.
Claiming to have read many of the oft-cited reports proposing improvements for 
U.S. public diplomacy, Hughes spearheaded attempts to enhance domestic understanding 
of public diplomacy, develop an integrated strategy and streamline the communications 
process. Mentions of public diplomacy’s “four pillars”, also known as the catchier “four 
E’s” -  engagement, education, exchange and empowerment -  arose repeatedly in her 
early public speeches.90 Hughes would revive the Strategic Communications PCC three 
years after it faltered in 2003 to resume the task of establishing the elusive integrated 
public diplomacy strategy.91 Yet the greatest strength Hughes would bring to the 
position rested in her ideas to shape and lead public opinion as she had done for a number 
of electoral and domestic issues campaigns. In November 2005 she would recreate the 
function of the CIC’s in the guise of the new Rapid Response Unit (RRU). Designed as 
before to ensure cabinet offices stayed on message in dealing with emerging news items 
on U.S. foreign engagements, the daily impact of the RRU on the operation of American 
missions overseas came in the form of briefs containing a short summary of leading 
international news items matched with talking points employing the strict language of
88 Steven R, Weisman, “Saudi Women Have Message for U.S. Envoy,” New York Times, 28 September
2005.
89 Isabel Malsang, “U.S. Envoy, On Image Push, Hears Catalogue o f Concerns,” Agence France Presse, 28 
September 2005.
90 Karen Hughes, “Remarks With Under Secretaiy for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Karen Hughes 
at Town Hall for Public Diplomacy,” 8 September 2005, Washington,
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/52748.htm (accessed on 14 December 2006). Hughes, “Remarks to 
the 2005 Forum on the Future o f Public Diplomacy, 14 October 2005, Washington, 
http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/papers/vpOl.cfm?outfit=pmt&folder=7&paper=2510 (accessed on 14 December 
2006).
91 Karen Hughes, “Transformational Public Diplomacy”.
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• •  * Q9 • •administration positions. During this time, Hughes would also begin actively 
encouraging U.S. ambassadors to address local media with greater frequency and develop 
guidance, in a memo titled “Karen’s Rules”, on how to achieve greater exposure beyond 
the usual clearance constraints endemic to the Department of State.
Undaunted by the challenges presented in her initial tour, Hughes has remained a 
highly visible in relation to her recent predecessors, visiting the Middle East and 
Southeast Asia on several occasions in addition to South Asia, Central America, South 
America, Europe and Africa. Yet the immediate returns on her investments in new 
communications operations and personal outreach efforts showed a world still generally 
hostile to American intentions. The 2006 Pew Global Attitudes Project indicated that 
between 2005 and 2006 favorability towards the United States again suffered downturns 
amongst its most trusted allies as well as the very skeptics Hughes sought to win over.94 
The news did not improve at home either. In May 2006, the Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) cited several deep fissures in the current public diplomacy strategy, and 
that the frameworks of the Hughes team could not be implemented by a Foreign Service 
corps unclear on how to conduct public diplomacy. It stated that “U.S. embassies face 
multiple challenges in implementing their public diplomacy programs, including the need 
to balance security with public outreach and concerns related to staff numbers, time, and
92 David E. Kaplan, “O f Jihad Networks and the War o f Ideas,” U.S. News & World Report, 22 June 2006. 
Sample o f RRU guidance can be accessed at http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/graphics/ 
rapidresponse.doc.
93 Elizabeth Williamson, “Karen’s Rules on Diplomacy: Talk to the Media -  If You Dare,” Washington 
Post, 6 November 2006; Karen Hughes, “Empowering, Not Muzzling, Our Ambassadors,” Washington 
Post, 16 November 2006.
94 Pew Global Attitudes Project, “America's Image Slips, But Allies Share U.S. Concerns Over Iran, 
Hamas,” 13 June 2006.
151
language capabilities.”95 The GAO further reiterated these deficiencies in a subsequent 
report released in April 2007.96
But Hughes had never been under the illusion that hardened negative attitudes 
toward the United States would instantly change, sometimes referring to the job of public
07diplomacy as a “long-term endeavor” that would take years to yield results. As of early 
2007, Hughes has claimed progress on such long-term necessities as a new integrated 
strategy put forth by the PCC on Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication (not yet 
implemented), and on the expectation that the several new programs and offices created 
under her watch would serve as a foundation for the future. A January 2007 hosting of 
the Private Sector Summit on Public Diplomacy signaled a genuine interest in
QO
summoning the cooperation and the best practices of influential private sector actors. In 
these ways, Hughes fulfilled the promise made upon her appointment that she would 
inject new ideas into a static public diplomacy apparatus.
On the notion that Hughes’ close proximity to Bush might impact policy pursuits, 
the outcome is less conclusive. On the one hand, she has maintained that no single act of 
hers would be sufficient to change an established policy position, maintaining that the 
policymaking process is deliberated and decided over many pieces of advice.99 On the
95 U.S. Government Accountability Office, “State Department Efforts to Engage Muslim Audiences Lack 
Certain Communication Elements and Face Significant Challenges,” Report to the Chairman, 
Subcommittee on Science, the Departments o f  State, Justice, and Commerce, and Related Agencies, 
Committee on Appropriations, House o f  Representatives (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 
May 2006), 4.
96 U.S. Government Accountability Office, “U.S. Public Diplomacy: Strategic Planning Efforts Have 
Improved, But Agencies Face Significant Implementation Challenges,” Testimony Before the Subcommittee 
on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight, House Committee on Foreign Affairs 
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 26 April 2007.)
97 Glenn Kessler, “Hughes Tries Fine-Tuning To Improve Diplomatic Picture,” Washington Post, 19 April
2006.
98 U.S. Department of State and the PR Coalition, Private Sector Summit on Public Diplomacy: Models for  
Action, 2007.
99 Karen Hughes, interview by Owen Bennett-Jones, Newshour, BBC World Service, 6 June 2006.
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other hand, there is evidence to suggest that Hughes input has been influential in shaping 
recent messages and statements by the administration, at one point reportedly persuading 
President Bush to drop the term “Islamic fascism” from speeches, for its inflammatory 
and negative connotations.100 Hughes has also been reported as saying she would or did 
deliver reactions from audiences in Morocco and Indonesia back to Washington for 
Bush’s consideration.101
4.7 Approaching the Present: Whither U.S. Public Diplomacy?
In the prolonged wave of interest in public diplomacy that has followed the events 
of 9/11, there are occasions when, in the regular course of debate, attention returns to the 
question of funding. Proponents of a higher valued public diplomacy apparatus 
frequently point out the enormous disparity that exists between defense and public 
diplomacy budgets. (To clarify this point, as of 2006 public diplomacy receives an
10 'Jallotment one-third of a percent of the Department of Defense budget. ) When the U.S. 
government turned to its public diplomacy institutions to prosecute the new “battle for 
hearts and minds”, what it found was a loose conglomeration of offices in search of a new 
identity, purpose and shape, in addition to being underfunded. In short, it was a shell of 
its Cold War predecessor having been depleted by years of obscurity. As Secretary of 
State, Colin Powell tried to change this by rebuilding public diplomacy in the image of a 
private sector public relations department. This failed, and moreover produced what the
100 James Kitfield, “Behind the ‘Islamo-Fascist’ Rhetoric,” The National Journal, 23 September 2006.
101 Hughes, BBC World Service, 6 June 2006; Audrey McAvoy, “Hughes Intends to Convey Critical 
Remarks from Asia Trip to President Bush,” Associated Press Worldstream, 27 October 2005.
102 Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, “Changing Minds, Winning 
Peace: A New Strategic Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World,” Report o f  the 
Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World (Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, 2003), 25; CFR Report, 47.
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Wall Street Journal called “the near-collapse of U.S. public diplomacy” by attempting to 
sell the United States as a manufacturer does with its products. “But the U.S. can't be 
sold as a "brand", the article firmly stated. “What America has to ‘sell’ is freedom and
i mdemocracy.” With hindsight, it is now clear to see the odds stacked against this 
scheme from succeeding. Returning to the point about funding, for instance, it worth 
noting that the Department of State at this time spearheaded a new “branding” campaign 
in a vastly more complex geopolitical landscape, with greatly increased political 
participation of foreign publics enabled in large part by the proliferation of ICT’s such as 
the Internet, satellite television and mobile phones, and all this with a budget left virtually 
unchanged in constant dollars since 1980.104 The challenges facing down U.S. public 
diplomacy since 9/11 extend well beyond funding, but little foresight has gone into 
making it a viable option for 21st century statecraft as well.
The fall of Charlotte Beers emerged by way of a revived and ongoing dilemma 
regarding the purposes of American public diplomacy, which are often at odds with the 
messages conveyed by its own foreign policy. This became clear in the unfolding 
momentous debates, especially on the international stage, over the correctness of the 
American foreign policy response to the 9/11 attacks. A more traditional view, and 
indeed one that prevailed at time during the Cold War, holds that public diplomacy 
should do no more that advocate policy; the case of the implementation of American 
foreign policies in the Middle East reveals an unrequited persistence to do so until the 
realities of a questionable policy have more recently become too great to ignore. Between 
advocating for or advising on policy, Under Secretary Beers chose neither; instead she
103 “The Powell Lesson”, WSJ Opinion Journal, 16 November 2004, http://www.opinionjoumal.com/ 
editorial/feature.html?id=l 10005901 (accessed on 4 November 2006).
104 See Appendix B.
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pursued more profound linkages between the aims of American foreign policy and its 
high-minded values. Beers once pointed out the distinction in one of her few public 
interviews as Under Secretary: “In addition to what our policies are, what we haven't felt 
the need to communicate is what is the value system” of this country, Beers said. "What 
are our beliefs? What do the words 'freedom' and 'tolerance' mean?"105 These questions, 
while hardly irrelevant, plotted a very long course in a moment calling for immediate 
results.
It took nearly two years for Powell to recognize that public diplomacy, for a litany 
of reasons, was not up to the task at hand, and it required the very compelling evidence of 
the Pew Global Attitudes Project, Zogby International and the German Marshall Fund to 
make this point. By then, however, foreign public opinion of the United States had 
dropped precipitously in a vocal rejection of American unilateralism, then in strong 
opposition to the Iraq invasion, and later in outrage over the Abu Ghraib scandal and 
other revelations. Various studies since 2001 have examined the question of why U.S. 
public diplomacy has failed so miserably, and many of their conclusions attained salience 
in the confusion that prevailed in 2003 and 2004. Their diagnoses followed similar paths; 
their prescriptive measures included bolstering the public diplomacy competencies of 
FSO’s, increasing funds for educational and cultural exchanges, streamlining and 
updating government broadcasting, improving communication between agencies to 
ensure consistency in efforts, placing greater emphasis on opinion polling, and engaging 
the best practices of the private sector. While many of these suggestions have been
105 Jake Tapper, “Selling Brand America,” Salon.com, 2 November 2001, http://archive.salon.com/politics 
/feature/2001/11/02/branding/index.html (accessed on 13 May 2005).
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heard, few have been implemented, and virtually none of them address the ongoing 
dilemma of public diplomacy’s identity crisis: to advocate or to advise?
It was the conclusion of the 9/11 Commission that it should stress policy advocacy 
as evidenced by its statement that public diplomacy should “explain the civic principles 
and system of [American] government contained in our founding documents, and to 
portray the American way of life factually.”106 The same holds true for analysts at the 
Heritage Foundation as well as high-profile and influential public figures such as former 
Speaker of the House of Representatives Newt Gingrich, Representative Frank Wolf (R-
107Virginia), and a host of current and former government broadcasting officials. Other 
studies saw the value of placing public diplomacy in an advisory role; the independent 
task force behind the CFR report opined that the communication of policy could no 
longer be expressed in a ‘push-down’ style, meaning a center-periphery relationship 
where policy messages emanate in one direction, from governments to target
10Rconstituencies, without prior consultation with the latter. Public diplomacy perforce 
serves a dual capacity that echoes the sentiments of the late journalist and USIA director 
Edward R. Murrow, when he argued public diplomacy must be present at “the take offs” 
at the formulation of policy, as well as the “crash landings”, or more literally, the policy 
feedback from abroad. At its heart, this debate implies a choice between ‘one-way’ and 
‘two-way’ policy communication, with ramifications for the relationship between public 
diplomats and policymakers.
106 The 9/11 Public Discourse Project, Report on the Status o f 9/11 Commission Recommendations, 11.
107 Johnson and Dale, “How to Reinvigorate U.S. Public Diplomacy”; Gingrich, “Rogue State Department”; 
Frank Wolf, “Engaging the Arab/Islamic W orld-Next Steps for U.S. Public Diplomacy,” (panel discussion, 
George Washington University, Washington, DC, 27 February 2003); Sanford J. Ungar, “Pitch Imperfect,” 
Foreign Affairs 84, no. 3 (May/June 2005): 7-13.
108 CFR Report, 34.
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Yet beyond the immediate scope of this debate lie other fundamental questions 
always omnipresent in the strategizing and conduct of public diplomacy. One area of 
note is the consideration of time; some activities, such as cultural and educational 
exchanges invariably require more time to bear fruit than with more the immediate nature 
of news broadcasting, for example. How best to arrange the time orientation of U.S. 
public diplomacy activities will be crucial to the establishment of a sustainable strategy. 
Another matter is the posturing associated with public diplomacy; some programs require 
a long-term, or proactive posture orientation seen more clearly in public relations 
campaigns, while in other occasions a reactive posture orientation is required to deal with 
crisis situations, as with the Abu Ghraib scandal. Weighing the balance between these 
functions will have implications on what kind of organizations public diplomacy shall 
incorporate to be successful in the future. A further recurring problem to re-emerge 
during the post-9/11 era begs the question of how to evaluate public diplomacy. For 
example, most evaluation techniques utilized by the State Department and BBG rest on 
the amount of instances a particular program or broadcast is exposed to target audiences. 
While it may be impressive to say, as members of the BBG have, that al-Hurra reaches an 
estimated 20 million people per week, some say the chief indicator of success is more 
accurately traced to the nature of the effect these programs and broadcasts are having.109 
This is an important question because the necessity for lawmakers to see instant rewards 
from public diplomacy often conflicts with the full perspective one must adhere to when 
considering new ideas and directions.
109 Kasie Hunt, “Are U.S. Arabic Programs Being Heard?” The National Interest 37, no. 29, 16 July 2005.
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Moving forward, the forthcoming chapters will capitalize on the material 
presented in the previous two chapters, which sought to illustrate the recent history of 
U.S. public diplomacy with an ample portrayal of causes for its most recent challenges, 
and in a broader sense its complex and integrated nature. It may be agreed that American 
public diplomats, given the context in which they must perform, possess on the onie hand 
a unique capability to explain and advocate the foreign policies of the United States to 
populations overseas, while on the other hand a largely untapped potential to deliver 
feedback from those populations for the benefit of American foreign policymakers, and 
ultimately the target areas in which they are applied.
It is the view of this study that the conflict between these two roles encapsulates 
the debate over the future course of U.S. public diplomacy. It is an ongoing debate, and 
among the various ideas and strands of thought in circulation two movements appear to 
be coalescing and advancing distinct models to solve the myriad problems at hand. The 
juxtaposition of the two camps can be characterized as a crossroads between public 
diplomacy’s past and the future. The past invokes the legacy of Cold War public 
diplomacy activities, and admirers of this legacy stake a bold claim to it having succeeded 
to some degree in defeating communism through a state-of-the-art communications 
initiative buttressed by long-term cultivation of dissident views through educational and 
cultural exchanges. They also argue that heeding the lessons of Cold War public 
diplomacy will be useful in creating a “revival” of its effectiveness. Alternately, the latter 
group mandates a public diplomacy strategy and organization that is radically 
transformed from its Cold War precursor to deal with an equally transformed 
international relations environment. Key to this argument is the application of ICT’s to 
reach target audiences more rapidly and on a broader scale, but by this same token there
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is also some attention granted to the changed distribution of power since the end of the 
Cold War and the widening political involvement of non-state actors (largely made 
possible by ICT’s). It is perceived that each of these two groups own a large stake in 
deciding the future of U.S. public diplomacy, however it is also arguable that each brings 
to the table certain merits and some drawbacks. In the chapters to come, this study will 
closely examine what these merits and drawbacks consist of and this examination shall 
first turn to the Cold War-inspired advocacy model.
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CHAPTER 5 : KEEPING WITH TRADITION:
U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND THE COLD WAR
By now, it should be clear from the preceding chapters that the state of post-9/11 
U.S. public diplomacy has more to do with events and decisions made years before this 
period than those of the more recent time. In certain instances, moments in the history of 
U.S. public diplomacy prior to 1991 add background for what may have transpired further 
on, but it is arguably the years between 1991 and 2001 that observers can unlock the most 
pivotal, and most damaging, events to impact public diplomacy institutions at any time in 
their history. Hence, the post-Cold War period is valuable for its explanatory power in 
illuminating the causes for public diplomacy’s weaknesses and imbued regard for 
irrelevance.
At this point, the study now shifts from explaining what has transpired in the past 
to analyzing the impact of past events on U.S. public diplomacy’s possible futures. This 
chapter moves from the initial research question of why U.S. public diplomacy has failed 
in its attempt to protect America’s standing in the post-9/11 era to the next logical 
question: what should be done about it? There is no shortage of commentary on this 
matter and the compendium of ideas hails from sources both domestic and foreign to the 
United States, so it is incumbent upon scholarship to describe ongoing discussions in a 
lucid and structured way. The following two chapters shall attempt this by consolidating 
the multitude of ideas into two contrasting models that appear to be at play -  advocacy 
and advisory. Starting with the former model, this chapter first delves into the Cold War 
years of U.S. public diplomacy, not only regarded by many as its ‘golden era’ but also it 
is during this time that that the tradition of advocacy came into full acceptance as the 
dominant mode of pursuing political communications. Some attention in this and the
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following chapters will be devoted to assessing the viability of the two models as bases 
for addressing the challenges facing U.S. public diplomacy at this time.
In light of the record of recent struggles, the consensus of observers is that U.S 
public diplomacy in the post-9/11 era has fallen well short of expectations at a time of 
great need. One belief holds that it is in a state of crisis. This was the conclusion reached 
by the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication (DSB), an 
advisory committee operating within the United States Department of Defense after an 
extensive two-part assessment of U.S. strategic communications activities conducted in 
2001 and 2004.1 A cacophony of criticism, mostly motivated by an unanswered spike in 
anti-Americanism around the world, and accompanied by a laundry list of strategic 
miscues and organizational failings, echoed the consensus captured by the DSB. “Our 
public diplomacy,” remarked the Brookings Institute’s Shibley Telhami, “is broken.”2
5.1 Benchmarking the Cold War
Since 2001 over thirty research efforts, produced by both governmental and non­
governmental bodies, have been undertaken to address the complex questions of what is 
wrong with U.S. public diplomacy and what can be done to repair it. Interestingly, what 
they share is a select use of language to call for “revitalization” and “reinvigoration” of
1 United States Department o f Defense Science Board Task Force on Managed Information Dissemination, 
Report o f  the Defense Science Board Task Force on Managed Information Dissemination (Washington, 
DC: Office o f the Under Secretary o f Defense, United States Department of Defense, October 2001). 
United States Department o f Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication, Report o f  the 
Defense Science Board on Strategic Communication (Washington, DC: Office o f the Under Secretary of  
Defense, United States Department of Defense, September 2004). (hereafter ‘DSB Report 2004’) A more 
recent comparison o f recommendations is available in Susan B. Epstein and Lisa Mages, “Public 
Diplomacy: A Review o f Past Recommendations,” CRS Report fo r  Congress, 2 September 2005. See 
Appendix B for the matrix o f recommendations presented in that report.
2 Shibley Telhami, “Engaging the Arab/Islamic World: Next Steps for U.S. Public Diplomacy” (panel 
discussion at the Public Diplomacy Institute of George Washington University, Washington, DC, 27 
February 2004).
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public diplomacy in attempts to invoke what is regarded in certain quarters as a prime 
example of its effectiveness — the Cold War era.
Considering the outcome of the Cold War, and more precisely the perception of 
some that the end of the Cold War represented an ideological victory for the United 
States, it would be sensible to extend due credit to those people, programs and institutions 
who helped proliferate the ideas that hastened the collapse of the Soviet Union. At 
forefront of these efforts, it follows that the U.S. public diplomacy apparatus at that time- 
which included the USIA, international broadcasting outlets such as Voice of America 
(VOA) and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), the Peace Corps, and individual 
participants in exchange programs such as the Fulbright and Humphrey fellowships -- 
should claim a substantial portion of that credit. Crucially, this would hold true insofar as 
one accepts what in International Relations theoretical terms is known as the 
“constructivist” explanation of what brought on the end of the Cold War, in which 
ideational determinants figure prominently. Opposing, or “rationalist” arguments rooted 
in realist thinking would summarily rule out, or at least discourage the existence of such a 
relationship by disregarding or downplaying ideational causes and other internal workings 
of the state.4 In lieu of such causes, the rationalist might suggest it is better to examine 
more material causes for Soviet demise, such as an imploding economy or overstretched 
military. In light of this example one must ask that if, by accepting the former view, 
there exists a fundamental challenge to the impact of public diplomacy even from a broad 
theoretical perspective, then perhaps the impetus to bring back the sensibilities of the 
Cold War-era public diplomacy strategy require more qualification than meets the eye.
3 For a summary o f theoretical explanations regarding end o f the Cold War see Daniel C. Thomas, “Human 
Rights Ideas, the Demise of Communism, and the End of the Cold War,” Journal o f Cold War Studies 7, 
no. 2 (Spring 2005): 111-113.
4 Shaun Riordan, The New Diplomacy (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2003).
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For the constructivist this point may hardly warrant searching. In one well-known 
example, 9/11 Commission Chairman Thomas Kean invoked the legacy of that period 
when he remarked, “just as we did in the Cold War, we need to defend our ideals abroad 
and we've got to defend them vigorously.”5 Such a statement would not be so poignant 
without realizing its implications: a positive correlation between the outcome of the Cold 
War and the public diplomacy strategy of the time, made by a figure with enormous 
policy influence. Could it be that prevailing analyses of this correlation are clouded by 
the benefits of history and rose-tinted hindsight? If possible, then it merits questioning 
whether those public diplomacy programs can be termed a success and, in turn, use their 
legacies to serve as a model for emulation. This in turn inspires the main question to be 
explored in this paper: can U.S. public diplomacy during the Cold War be deemed a 
success?
5,2 The Making of a Success Story?
For a moment, let us explore some of the appeal behind the “success story” 
narrative. As with the aforementioned example, the invocation of the Cold War model 
delivers a potent and symbolic benchmark, without much conjecture or detail necessary, 
for two implied but nonetheless overriding reasons.6 The first reason lies in the power of
5 The 9/11 Commission, Final Report o f  the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United 
States (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2004), 364. House Committee on Government 
Reform, The 9-11 Commission Recommendations on Public Diplomacy: Defending Ideals and Defining the 
Message, 108th Cong., 2nd sess., 23 August 2004.
6 Some reports, such as the Brookings Institution’s “The Need to Communicate”, liken the present-day 
imperative of dealing with the Islamic world to the ideological struggle o f Cold War by using sweeping 
statements such as, “[Exchange programs] should be expanded and retargeted towards the Islamic world—  
as they were focused on key Cold War battlefields pre-1989 and in Eastern Europe in the post-Cold War 
era.” See Hady Amr, “The Need to Communicate: How to Improve U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Islamic 
World,” The Brookings Project on US. Policy Towards the Islamic World Analysis Paper 6 (January 
2004).
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contrast. The simple passage of time over the post-Cold War period, and in turn the 
increasing distance between the present and the apparent halcyon days of public 
diplomacy has the ability to amplify the amount of deterioration American public 
diplomacy institutions has suffered. Instrumental to the benchmarking of the Cold War, 
the contrast offers a compelling explanation of just how far the standard has plummeted 
in the years since. Theories to this effect generally employ one of two assertions. In the 
first instance, “budget-cutting zeal” among lawmakers and “End of History” acolytes 
prevalent during the early years of the Clinton Administration systematically 
dismembered public diplomacy institutions and programs by sharing in the notion that the 
close of the Cold War made them no longer vital to foreign relations. The second 
assertion holds the Bush Administration accountable for policies driving foreign 
favorability of the United States to new lows combined with backfired experiments in 
management and interagency coordination in the aftermath of 9/11. Adherents to this 
latter view cite figures unearthed in the Pew Global Attitudes Project’s “View of a 
Changing World, June 2003”, which revealed dramatic declines in favorability towards 
the United States among Middle Eastern states as well as traditional Western European 
allies, most acutely since 2001. They also point to the tenure of advertising whiz 
Charlotte Beers as Under Secretary of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, whose 
controversial “Shared Values” branding campaign targeting the Arab-Muslim world drew 
widespread cynicism.8
7 S. Enders Wimbush, telephone interview by the author, 12 October 2005. Wimbush is the former director 
o f Radio Liberty from 1987 to 1993. Prime examples of this argument in literature can be found in James 
Critchlow, “Public Diplomacy during the Cold War: The Record and its Implications,” Journal o f  Cold War 
Studies 6, no. 1 (Winter 2004): 84-89 and Carnes Lord, “The Past and Future o f Public Diplomacy,” Or bis 
(Winter 1998): 68-72.
8 Pew Global Attitudes Project, Views o f  a Changing World, 2003 (Washington, DC: The Pew Research 
Center for the People and the Press, 2003). See Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force on
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The second main reason for establishing the Cold War-era as the public diplomacy 
benchmark for effectiveness lies in justifying the investment of new ideas, money and 
people to address contemporary challenges in the international environment. Here, 
historical memory correlates vital public diplomacy contributions of broadcasting and 
educational and cultural exchanges to the Cold War triumph of liberal democracy over 
communism, in turn analogizing this to the incipient battle for hearts and minds taking 
place within the war on terror. The ideological struggle assumes center-stage at 
moments, for example, when the CFR report warned, “As with the Cold War, the United 
States is facing a long and protracted challenge over a way of life.”9 It was during the 
former period that “the nation developed the political will for efforts that...played a 
critical role in ending the Cold War,” concludes the DSB report. “We cannot succeed 
again without comparable vision and commitment.”10 By capitalizing on an enduring 
legacy of ideological contributions to the demise of Soviet Union, this appeal carries with 
it an inherent justification for “reinvigorating” public diplomacy.
By benchmarking the Cold War, it enables a compelling contrast and ample 
justification that otherwise be benign if not for its narrow view of history, fused with 
overtones of patriotism, and blithely dismissive of alternate perspectives on events and 
their outcomes. Despite impulses to overlook them, alternate perspectives put forth 
several plausible reasons why a closer look at the ‘success story’ is worth pursuing. First, 
it is clear from the example of the rationalist approach above that there are counterclaims
Public Diplomacy, Finding America's Voice: A Strategy for Reinvigorating U.S. Public Diplomacy (New 
York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2003), 2 and Appendix D (hereafter ‘CFR Report’) for details and its 
analysis o f Pew study. An expansive analysis on both assertions appears throughout Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft 
Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), chaps. 1, 4 and 5; The 
appointment o f former Bush aide Karen Hughes recently re-ignited these arguments, which appeared in 
Bruce Stokes, “Public Diplomacy: America is Job No. 1,” National Journal, 7 May 2005.
9 CFR Report, 27.
10 DSB Report 2004, 84-5.
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to the notion that ideational causes chiefly contributed the fall of the Soviet Union, in 
which case the accomplishments of American public diplomacy would have less 
redeeming value than its advocates would believe.11 Consequently, it does not 
automatically hold -  without establishing a strong causal relationship— that in such 
theatres as Poland, Czechoslovakia, the Baltic States or the Soviet Union it was the 
promotion of human rights and democratic ideals that made the difference, nor can it be 
traced undisputedly to U.S public diplomacy, for reasons to be discussed in the 
forthcoming pages.
But for the moment, consider the ramifications of presuming the affirmative to 
this question, that it was indeed a success. Historical memory to this end would judge the 
performance of U.S. public diplomacy by the evidence that the outcome of the Cold War 
was favorable to the values and beliefs of the United States, thereby cementing the case 
that its influence was undeniably positive. Moreover, as the insights of that period 
become instructive in dealing with contemporary problems, historical memory of this 
selective account is bolstered and gains broader acceptance as the ideal to be emulated for 
a future “revitalization”. In other words, a prevailing account of what caused the end of 
the Cold War and the concomitant positive attributions given to U.S. public diplomacy 
towards that end now have the potential, as witnessed in the aforementioned reports and 
testimonies, to shape the way public diplomacy is performed in a markedly different 
world
11 Such examples might consist o f “prudential” realist theories put forth by Kenneth Waltz (on international 
environmental changes and unit-level attributes), Robert Gilpin (on hegemonic retrenchment) and Robert 
Jervis (on defensive security strategies) in Kenneth A. Oye, “Explaining the End o f the Cold War,” in 
International Relations Theory and the End o f  the Cold War, ed. Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse- 
Kappen (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 58.
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Some of the most vocal proponents of this logic, however, are not necessarily the 
institutions behind the reports or even highly visible politicians, but quite often the 
veterans of the Cold War-era USIA and international broadcasting programs, overseers of 
exchange programs, or other high-ranking U.S. government officials with compelling 
first-person narratives who speak most authentically on the subject. Examples of USIA 
alumni include William A. Rugh, James Critchlow and Alvin Snyder, each contributing 
to the discourse on the future of public diplomacy by drawing on their experiences over
19the course of the Cold War. Among American broadcasters, Sanford Ungar, VOA 
Director from 1999 to 2001, and S. Enders Wimbush, Director of Radio Liberty from 
1987 to 1993, point to a simpler and more effective organization, influential programming 
and respected news coverage as reasons why broadcasting outlets enjoyed higher 
listenership and deserved credit for shaping the political environment behind the Berlin
I1!
Wall. With respect to exchange programs, Yale Richmond draws from his thirty years 
in the American Foreign Service and, notably, his work in U.S.-Soviet exchanges to show 
how these encounters exposed countless Soviet political and intellectual elites to “new 
thinking” via Western ideas of democracy and human rights, as well as through the 
performing arts, the natural and social sciences, and literature.14 Finally, there is Carnes 
Lord’s account as a staffer on national security affairs to Presidents Reagan and George
12 William A. Rugh, Building US-Muslim Understanding and Dialog: Public Diplomacy in the Arab and 
Muslim Worlds (briefing, Foreign Press Center, Washington DC, 16 March 2005); Critchlow, “Public 
Diplomacy during the Cold War,” 87-89; Alvin A. Snyder, Warriors o f  Disinformation: American 
Propaganda, Soviet Lies, and the Winning o f  the Cold War (New York: Arcade, 1995).
13 Wimbush, interview by the author, op. cit.; Sanford J. Unger, “Pitch Imperfect,” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 3 
(May/June 2005): 7-13.
14 Yale Richmond, Cultural Exchange and the Cold War (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 2003).
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H.W. Bush attributing a commitment of the Reagan Administration to public diplomacy 
as being instrumental in winning “the ideological struggle”.15
Backed up by years of experience, these accounts go much further than the mere 
sweeping claim of success of Cold War public diplomacy. Almost strictly anecdotal by 
nature, their stories deliver credence through the use of corroborating evidence from 
symbolic events and from the experiences of their counterparts in the Soviet government 
who witnessed this ostensible sweep of ideas from the other end. There has been some 
interpretation of the evolution in the thinking of Aleksander Yakovlev, a close confidant 
of Mikhail Gorbachev and holder of chairmanships during the 1980’s of the Central 
Committee’s Department of Propaganda and later the Commission on International 
Policy. As one of the staunchest supporters of glasnost and democratic change, 
Yakovlev, after 10 years of “exile” as an ambassador to Canada, reportedly drew on his 
extensive exposure to the ideas of the West to influence policy and act as a catalyst for 
the “new thinking”. A radical thinker in his youth, Yakovlev spent one year of study, in 
1958-59, in the United States, where he was able to experience American people and 
society first-hand. Suggesting that Yakovlev’s experience bears witness to the value of 
academic exchange, Richmond notes that Yakovlev was “deeply influenced” by his year 
abroad; exposed to the writings of American scholars and others he could not have found 
in the Soviet Union, he would years later instruct his staffers within the Soviet Academy 
of Sciences to read the works of John Kenneth Galbraith and Daniel Bell.16
There is also the story of Boris Yeltsin and his indebtedness to Radio Liberty for 
backing him in his rise to become the first Russian president of the post-Soviet era.
15 Lord, “The Past and Future of Public Diplomacy,” 65-66.
16 On Yakovlev’s American experience: Richmond, 27-32; on his use o f American scholarly literature: 
Robert D. English, Russia and the Ideas o f  the West, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 184-5.
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Yeltsin rewarded the U.S.-funded Russian language radio broadcaster by issuing a decree 
on 27 August 1991, just days after the collapse of the Soviet Union, allowing it to open an
1 7office in Moscow and to operate in Russia unhindered. On the occasion of Radio 
Liberty’s fortieth anniversary in 1993, Yeltsin proclaimed, “It would be difficult to 
overestimate the importance of your contribution to the destruction of the totalitarian
to 4 #
(Soviet) regime.” Perhaps less recognized are the diplomatic chess matches in which 
public diplomacy played an integral part. Illustrating the importance of such 
engagements, Lord recalls a struggle for Western European public opinion over the 
deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) in Europe in the 1980’s. Sensing 
some European discomfort over the prospect, the Soviet government channeled its own 
displeasure through disarmament and arms control groups in Europe, and organized 
campaigns by involving journalists, high ranking officials, academics and diplomats to 
denounce the deployment. In response, the U.S. government, through the Department of 
State and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, launched a counter-offensive 
exposing years of alleged Soviet violations of arms agreements, forcing the argument to 
be framed by who Europe could trust more. The historical memory of American 
participants in this contest identifies this effort as pivotal in overcoming the Soviet case 
and enabling the INF plan to proceed.19
Yet another account recalls linkages between the penetration of RFE/RL 
broadcasts into the Soviet bloc and the proliferation of opposition movements to the 
Communist regime from the early 1980’s. Surveys taken by the former Bureau for
17 Wimbush, interview by the author, op. cit.; Andrew Zolotov, Jr., “Radio Liberty Stripped o f Former 
Special Status,” St. Petersburg Times, 8 October 2002.
18 Boris Yeltsin, “On the 40th Anniversary of RFE/RL” (March 1993), http://www.rferl.org/about/impact/ 
yeltsin.asp (accessed on 16 October 2005).
19 Lord, 62-64; George P. Shultz, “Public Diplomacy in the Information Age” (speech given before the U.S. 
Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, Washington, DC, 15 September 1987).
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International Broadcasting (now known as the Broadcasting Board of Governors) in the 
early 1980’s revealed large portions of the Polish population listening to RFE during the
9ftrise of the Solidarity movement, despite jamming efforts. Famously, Lech Walesa was 
reported to have been listening to RFE as his wife accepted the 1983 Nobel Peace Prize
9 1on his behalf since he was not permitted to receive it himself. Former Czech Republic 
President Vaclav Havel found in RFE one of the only media outlets that would broadcast 
the essays he penned as the dissident leader of the Czech human rights group Charter
9977. Finally, one should not neglect the view of prolific East German spy Marcus Wolf, 
who in his memoirs considered Radio Free Europe one of the “most effective” tools for
9*3
mobilizing public opinion against the Communist establishment.
From the famous to the obscure, this is but a small representation of the many 
anecdotes that speak to the impact of U.S. public diplomacy efforts in the Soviet Union 
and neighboring countries. In some cases strong evidence exists that they may have been 
directly responsible for seismic shifts in an era-defining ideological struggle by 
motivating figures who would later become instrumental in the outcome of the Cold War. 
In others it may have acted as a channel of information carrying messages and ideas to 
masses of people. In this sense, the impact of public diplomacy is undeniable, but one 
could also conclude that the public diplomacy programs of the Cold War cultivated much 
of this reputation for success not from their exemplary design and delivery, but from a 
fortuitous turn of events.
20 Lord, 62.
21 “Walesa Hears Speech on Radio Free Europe,” New York Times, 11 December 1983.
22 David Remnick, “Exit Havel: The King Leaves the Castle,” The New Yorker, 17 February 2003.
23 A. Ross Johnson and R. Eugene Parta, “Cold War Broadcasting: Lessons Learned” (paper presented to 
seminar on Communicating with the Islamic World, Annenberg Foundation Trust, Rancho Mirage, CA, 5 
February 2005.)
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In moving forward, two questions of the claim of outright success shall be 
explored. Firstly, does Cold War public diplomacy meet a given definition of success by 
the achievement of its stated objectives? And secondly, by what measure was it 
successful and what evidence points to the conclusion that success was attained?
5.3 Defining “Success”
What exactly is success? Does it bear some sort of objectivity or absolute 
standard in the positivist sense, or would it be more useful to adopt a normative idea of 
the concept, as if  to say that success, to borrow Wendt’s famous title, is ‘what one makes 
of it’?24 In the case of U.S. public diplomacy, a normative approach to defining success 
works well because a brief glimpse into its history reflects constantly changing standards 
of success in relation to social conventions and the accepted conduct of statecraft by way 
of certain practices. For example, some of the earliest iterations of public diplomacy 
institutions that served a significant function during the Cold War in fact trace their roots 
to the Second World War, when short-term information and disinformation campaigns 
were part of an overarching propaganda machine. The Office of Wartime Information, a 
precursor to the USIA, enlisted Hollywood producers to craft films to be used in these
“SC
campaigns. It was during this time, in 1942, that the VO A was launched to compliment 
the effort, and to immediate effect, but it would not be long until the end of the war would 
force a philosophical divide consisting of two camps: the “tough-minded” advocates of a 
propaganda approach characterized by an aggressive, often manipulative style, and
24 Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make o f It: The Social Construction o f Power Politics,” 
International Organization 46 no. 2 (Spring 1992): 391-425.
25 Emily Rosenberg, Spreading the American Dream (New York: Hill & Wang, 1981), 79.
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“tender-minded” proponents who favored a style of persuasion by attraction, and 
incremental attitudinal change over the longer term. Critchlow reports what he viewed 
as a sea change in the public tolerance for propaganda, revealing that during the 1950’s 
that Communist audiences reserved far more suspicion for “anything that smacked of 
propaganda” from foreign media sources resembling in any way their own state-run 
outlets.27
Yet it must also be emphasized that the competing norms that emerged from these 
traditions did not necessarily lead to the survival of one and the elimination of the other. 
In fact, there is strong evidence to suggest that the positive embodiments of what became 
public diplomacy and the negative connotations of propaganda found natural homes 
where they continue to reside; the notion of public diplomacy put forth a well-meaning 
social norm so that its content could maintain the confidence of ‘friends’, while 
propaganda assumed more of an institutional norm, largely within the military sphere,
90
reserved to thwart ‘enemies’. Looking at the relationship in this way helps to show that 
these two sources of state-sponsored indeed coexist, but represent two extremes of the
• onstrategic communications spectrum. In addition, it brings to the foreground the 
perennial debate facing communication strategists of how aggressively public diplomacy 
should be pursued, a paradox that forced important choices to be made in light of the 
ever-changing relationship between the Cold War superpowers.
26 Terry Diebel and Walter Roberts, Culture and Information: Two Foreign Policy Functions (Beverly 
Hills: Sage Publications, 1976), 14-15.
27 Critchlow, 81.
28 R.S. Zahama, “From Propaganda to Public Diplomacy in the Information Age,” in War, Media, and 
Propaganda, ed. Yahya R. Kamalipour and Nancy Snow (Lanham, MD : Rowman & Littlefield, 2004). A 
example o f the latter would psychological operations or “psyops”, a tactical form of information warfare 
used in military operations.
29 See “Get the Message Out,” Washington Post, 28 October 2001. The blurring o f lines separating these 
terms was once demonstrated by Richard Holbrooke, President Clinton’s Ambassador to the United 
Nations, when he wrote in the wake o f the 9/11 attacks, “Call it public diplomacy, or public affairs, or 
psychological warfare, or — if you really want to be blunt — propaganda.”
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With detente approaching in the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the USIA 
entered into a period of stability, and scholarship dealing in the linkage between foreign 
policy and foreign public opinion gained greater visibility within the foreign policy
• indiscourses. It was also becoming more apparent that a pure concept of what comprised
public diplomacy was beginning to take the form of a tripartite set of approaches, which
included, firstly, informing foreign publics of U.S. foreign policy objectives, secondly,
influencing attitudinal and behavioral changes amongst publics for the purpose of
advancing those objectives, and engaging in protracted dialogues with members of
11
foreign publics to build sustainable support of the United States over the long term. In 
practice, however, these aims naturally assume two primary components with information 
and influence on the one hand, as they share common space in the creation and delivery 
of certain messages targeted to foreign audiences through international broadcasting and 
print media, and engagement on the other hand, focused more on time-consuming 
cultivation of interpersonal relations and one-to-one or group dialogue.
Taking cues from these elements one gains a reasonably clear view of what it 
means to employ successful public diplomacy. The means of information, influence and 
engagement underlie strategies that seek to create qualitatively and visibly positive 
changes towards the end of fostering understanding and support for U.S. foreign policy 
initiatives. With some essential contextualizing in place, we return to the initial question 
of whether Cold War efforts undisputedly accomplished these aims.
30 A point perhaps best reinforced by the 1965 opening o f The Murrow Center for Public Diplomacy at the 
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, but also in new studies to emerge in the coming 
years by Arthur Hoffman, John Henderson and Glen Fisher.
31 This is a combination o f two separate definitions. Information and influence components are derived 
from U.S. Department o f State, Dictionary o f  International Relations Terms (Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, 1987), 85; and the engagement component from Christopher Ross, “Public Diplomacy 
Comes o f Age,” The Washington Quarterly 25 (Spring 2002): 75.
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On the matter of information and influence, the discussion would necessarily 
revolve around information (and disinformation) campaigns orchestrated by USIA, which 
peaked first in the early years of the Cold War, and again in the 1980’s under the Reagan 
Administration. The so-called “tools of the trade” for carrying out these activities 
historically involved various forms of media, including the press, publication of 
magazines (up to 14 titles in 16 languages at one point), film, television and later,
• O'}videotaped footage. But the truest test of the impact of these campaigns inexorably lies 
in judging the outcomes produced by broadcast media, chiefly the radio stations of Radio 
Free Europe, Radio Liberty and Voice of America.
The fact that three stations spearheaded the overall information effort owes partly 
to their evolution and partly to the complexity of it targets. VO A evolved from its 
wartime purpose into a resource projecting the American worldview, striving to be 
objective and balanced in the spirit of its first utterance in 1942, “We shall speak to you 
about America and the war,” it was said. “The news may be good or bad. We shall tell 
you the truth.” Whilst VO A functioned as an international shortwave broadcast for a 
global audience, RFE and RL (often regarded as one in the same due to their close 
operational relationship, and later their merging in 1975) were launched in the early 
1950’s funded principally by the CIA and each dedicated to specific localities -  
“surrogate home services” as they came to be called -  with RFE broadcasting in Eastern 
European, and RL in the Soviet Union. But despite the concentration of stations in the 
Communist bloc, with VO A alone reaching an estimated 70 million listeners in those 
countries alone, they nevertheless competed fiercely for the attention of these audiences
32 Allen C. Hansen, USIA: Public Diplomacy in the Computer Age (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984), 
79-100.
33 Kenneth L. Adelman, “Speaking o f America: Public Diplomacy in Our Time,” Foreign Affairs 59, no. 4 
(Spring 1981), 921.
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against formidable Soviet counterparts such as Radio Moscow, once the world’s largest 
international broadcaster, and Radio Peace and Progress. Radio Moscow, at its height, 
alone enjoyed a budget estimated at over 3.5 times that of VOA and RFE/RL combined, 
which afforded superior transmitting equipment and offerings in nearly twice as many 
languages.34 From the West, the United Kingdom operated the influential external 
service of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and West Germany contributed 
newscasts via Deutsche Welle. With several services operating in the area, the ability to 
use these resources to inform and influence was not a question of supply, but of 
accessibility. The Soviet Union employed a complex jamming scheme to thwart Western 
broadcasts for stretches throughout the Cold War. One CIA study in the early 1980’s 
estimated an average of $250 million spent annually by the Soviets on jamming, which, 
as it happened, exceeded the annual cost bom by the United States of supporting its 
stations in the first place. Beginning in 1948 the BBC and VOA were first blocked 
under orders from Josef Stalin, and it was not until June 1963 in the thaw after the Cuban 
Missile Crisis that the jamming ceased temporarily. The strategy reemerged in the wake 
of the Warsaw Pact clampdown on Czechoslovakia in 1968, was shelved again in 1973 
under detente, and appeared once more in 1981, this time brought on by events in Poland. 
It would not be until 1987 when Mikhail Gorbachev would phase out jamming once and 
for all. Jamming of RFE/RL, however, remained continuous from its launch in 1953 until 
November 1988.36
34 Hansen, USIA, 168-9.
35 Ibid., 113.
36 Hoover Institution and the Cold War International History Project of the Woodrow Wilson International 
Center for Scholars, Report from Conference on Cold War Broadcasting Impact (Stanford University, Palo 
Alto, USA, 13-16 October 2004), 15. Dates of jamming vary for Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria and 
Czechoslovakia.
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Exorbitant costs and strength of resistance notwithstanding, this electromagnetic 
defense system was far from airtight, and the vigor with which it was pursued points to 
the certitude that VOA, RFE/RL and other sources successfully informed audiences 
behind the Iron Curtain. A collection of findings to be presented from both American and 
Soviet sources in the next section also offers clear (but somewhat controvertible) 
evidence to support this conclusion. What is less clear is the degree to which some kind 
of influence occurred in the process or aftermath of the information, and this is an 
important question to consider if there is to be some determination, as seems to be the 
case presently, that the influence of these programs was generally positive. However, the 
evidence to support this claim is not forthcoming. It is highly doubtful that any reliable 
statistical data on changes in attitudes toward the West, and the United States in 
particular, could have been collected in the Soviet Union. Alternatively, if forced to rely 
on anecdotal evidence one need not look far to find dissenting opinions about 
broadcasting to offset the accolades.37 Furthermore, as a former head of the BBC Polish 
Service points out, it is important not to presume the influential success of radio 
broadcasting for the fact that in some countries the level of suspicion for RFE nearly 
matched that for state-run media; listeners tended to place the truth somewhere in 
between the two views.
Finally, one can return to the problem that has proved an elusive task for many 
retrospectives on the Cold War, which often wrestle with the question of what truly
37 Central Committee member Georgi Arbatov is quoted as saying in an interview in the late 1980’s: “By 
the way, during a recent vacation I listened to some of the Russian-language broadcasts from abroad. They 
are absolutely counterproductive. They offend a great many Soviet people and appeal to only a very small 
intellectual opposition.” From Stephen F. Cohen and Katrina Vanden Heuvel, Voices o f  Glasnost: 
Interviews with Gorbachev’s Reformers (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1989), 319.
38 Eugeniusz Smolar, former head o f BBC Polish Service, in Report from Conference on Cold War 
Broadcasting Impact, 10.
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contributed to the fall of Communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. As 
explained earlier, there is a continuing debate within IR consisting of rational (realist) and 
ideational (constructivist) positions. Yet, even siding with the constructivist view on this 
question -  that ideas profoundly contributed to the demise of Communism ~  leaves one 
with a riddle of variables to consider. The basis for this lies in the problem of 
multivariation -  a term closely associated with statistics describing a situation where a 
dependent variable (in this case the end of the Cold War) is susceptible to the influence of 
a number of independent variables. The problem here involves identifying which of these 
independent variables (i.e. events, programs, individuals, etc) caused the attitudinal 
changes and behaviors that helped bring about the end of the Cold War, and the extent to 
which they did so. The search for clues arouses such questions as: just where exactly did 
these ideas that generated the ‘new thinking’ originate? Were they a product of thinking 
external to Communist societies, as the merits of international broadcasting would 
suggest? Or did purely domestic sources, such as intelligentsia or political figures, 
generate ‘new thinking’ without interference from abroad, and in turn foster a purely 
organic brand leadership that ultimately led to the collapse of the Soviet Union? And if 
evidence to the latter is strong, would it not be so that U.S. public diplomacy activities 
hastened an already-existing chain of events, instead of creating them from scratch? 
These are the questions that historians and theorists have been grappling with for years, 
and from the sizeable production of analysis it remains to be seen if a definitive 
conclusion to this “hard case” will ever come to pass. Far more can be said about this 
niche of study, but the general point here is to shed light on the questions over the origin
39 The interplay between domestic versus external factors appears in Jeffrey T. Checkel, Ideas and 
International Political Change (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997), 25-27. Rationalist and 
ideational positions and their critiques are nicely presented in Lebow and Risse-Kappen, International 
Relations Theory and the End o f  the Cold War.
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of ideas, or even whether these ideas mattered at all in the final outcome. Such 
suggestions certainly infuse ambiguity into the premise that international broadcasting 
was instrumental to this end, and consequently poses a challenge to the assumption of 
success in influencing masses or elites.
Further complicating this assumption is Risse-Kappen’s insight that “ideas do not 
float freely,” which underscores the interplay of “several, often contradictory” concepts 
ruminating in the minds of decision makers and alludes to a multitude of information 
sources affecting their opinions and actions.40 International broadcasters such as 
RFE/RL, VOA, the BBC and Deutsche Welle did not provide the only channels to 
external ideas; seminal events also participated in the development of international norms. 
One such event worth examining is the impact of the Helsinki Final Act from the 1975 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which marked the occasion when the 
Soviet Union and other members of the Warsaw Pact accepted the inclusion of human 
rights as one of the universal bases for European identity. Thomas treats this event with 
some significance in the sense that it was a catalyst for change in the Soviet social and 
political agenda, ushering in greater acceptance of dissident thinking and a desire for 
peaceful coexistence with the rest of Europe.41 To reinforce this point, there is the 
recollection of Former Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze on how in 1985, on the 
occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act, “by making universal human 
values a priority, we obtained a fresh outlook on the world. In this connection the
40 Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Ideas Do Not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and 
the End o f the Cold War,” in International Relations Theory and the End o f  the Cold War, ed. Richard Ned 
Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 188.
41 Thomas, 117-126.
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philosophy of peaceful coexistence as a universal principle of international relations took 
on different meaning.”42
Multivariation, however, does not inject so much nebulousness into the most 
direct form of public diplomacy practiced by the United States in its engagement strategy. 
The “cultural exchange” or “engagement” side of U.S. public diplomacy that currently 
resides in the U.S. Department of State in the form of the Bureau of Educational and 
Cultural Exchange (ECA), has historically sought to foster “mutual understanding 
between the United States and other countries through international educational and 
training programs.”43 The place from which ECA functions has endured some significant 
changes over the years. In 1978, a restructuring resulted in the merger of ECA with then- 
independent USIA, which for four brief years took the name United States International 
Communication Agency to reflect the union. ECA would return to the Department of 
State along with the USIA in the 1999 consolidation, but despite periods of political 
haggling it has preserved its primary functions throughout. One is the prestigious 
International Visitor Leadership Program (formerly the International Visitor Program), 
which by the mid-1980’s was extending invitations to between 1,500 and 2,000 foreign 
leaders and specialists to visit the United States and exchange views and ideas.44 An 
impressive alumni list includes Margaret Thatcher (1967), Anwar Sadat (1966), Helmut 
Schmidt (1956), Valery Giscard D'Estaing (1956), and Indira Gandhi (1961) 45 Another 
is the Fulbright Program, an academic exchange program named for the U.S. senator who
42 Eduard Shevardnadze, The Future Belongs to Freedom (London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 1991), 61.
43 United States Department o f State Bureau o f Educational and Cultural Affairs, homepage, 
http://exchanges.state.gov/education/(accessed on 15 October 2005).
44 Hansen, 139.
45 International Visitor Leadership Program Fact Sheet, http://www.2005ivpl0usd.smm.lt/ 
about.htm#fact_sheet (accessed 15 October 2005).
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created it in 1946, and since then it has funded over 267,000 exchanges for American and 
foreign students.46
During the Cold War, however, few participants made the journey beyond the Iron 
Curtain under these programs. Instead, a special arrangement between the United States 
and Soviet Union, known as the Lacy-Zarubin Agreement, laid out the terms for 
exchange between the two parties in what evolved into shorthand as the “cultural 
agreement” renewable every two to three years.47 The wide range of activities under the 
agreement, which, in addition to academia, included science and technology and the 
visual and performance arts, created a variety of opportunities to engage with 
counterparts, and this proved highly advantageous for the United States in such instances
A Q
as traveling exhibits within the Soviet Union to promote American life. One of the 
strongest testimonies to the success of engagement public diplomacy can be found in the 
longevity of this agreement. Traditionally regarded as long-range activities, forms of 
engagement were well-suited to sustain periodic fluctuations in the bilateral relationship. 
This bears evidence in the preservation, without any sort of hiatus, of the “cultural 
agreement” until the collapse of the Soviet Union. As a result, even during the most 
tumultuous phases of the Cold War -  the Cuban Missile Crisis and the early 1980’s, for 
example -  the two parties could reliably fall back on this vital connection.
46 United States Department o f State Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Fulbright Program , 
http://exchanges.state.gov/education/fulbright/about.htm (accessed 15 October 2005).
47 Richmond, 15-16.
48 Critchlow, 77.
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5.4 Measuring Success
Imagine a broadcast media outlet delivering programming to an audience whose 
numbers are unknown and listening habits remain a perennial mystery. Or a publisher 
producing massive amounts of literature to a readership without any hope of customer 
feedback or data on reading tastes and habits. An unlikely formula for any business 
hoping to succeed in these industries, indeed, but then again accurate measures of 
performance never came easy to the USIA, RFE/RL, VOA and other U.S. public 
diplomacy programs operating in the Communist bloc. James Critchlow captures this 
frustration based on experiences at RL in the 1960’s, where resignation to the harsh 
realities of the operating environment frequently undermined RL’s objectives: “it would 
be nice to have a neat random sample, but with the KGB on the other side that was a pipe 
dream.”49 In another example, Donald Browne reports from interviews conducted during 
twenty-five years’ research on international radio broadcasting. His findings revealed 
that personnel from audience research units of the BBC, Deutsche Welle and VOA/USIA, 
interviewed between 1967 and 1982, acknowledge “the extreme difficulty of conducting 
such research,” and consistently expressed doubts of accuracy.50
In fact, to this day measuring performance remains a chronic weakness in the 
American public diplomacy apparatus, but for reasons markedly different from similar 
attempts made during the Cold War years. Whereas contemporary problems for mining 
data on performance revolve around inadequate organizational and financial 
commitments inside the U.S. government, Cold War public diplomacy suffered the trials 
of extracting data from “closed” societies, although it cannot be said that countermeasures
49 James Critchlow, Radio Hole-in-the-Head/Radio Liberty: An Insider’s Story o f  Cold War Broadcasting 
(Washington, DC: American University Press, 1995), 109.
50 Donald R. Browne, International Radio Broadcasting: The Limits o f  the Limitless Medium (New York: 
Praeger Publishers, 1982), 155.
181
to this problem lacked vigilance.51 Methodologies employed to gain insights on audience 
response and quality of programming drew on a range of qualitative media industry 
practices, advanced in quantitative analyses, and in some cases covert operations to gather 
and analyze data. In earlier research efforts, VOA, RFE and RL utilized panels 
comprised of locally-situated “experts” who could speak to the level of quality in 
programming through their familiarity with local language and culture. These expert 
panels proved informative for enabling receptiveness of broadcast and well as for keeping 
up with changing tastes and recent developments in language. Faced with no access to 
its principal audiences, RL employed the risky strategy of interviewing so-called 
“average” Soviet citizens by dispatching informant-style proxy interviewers to gather 
response data, which, if found out by Soviet authorities, could have wrought severe 
consequences on all parties involved. In the end, it was a risk worth taking: by 1982 
these interview samples had accumulated to over ten-thousand. Also, both RFE and RL 
took advantage of the increasing number of Central and Eastern Europeans traveling in 
Western Europe for scientific and cultural conferences and prime them for critical 
listenership data. From these citizens, the station was able to collect some 50,000 entries 
between 1972 and 1990, upon which it could shape and enhance its programming.54
Mining these data for clues into listening behavior took a step forward in the mid 
to late 1960’s, most notably from a partnership between RL and the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology (MIT), whose researchers produced a computerized simulation
51 For a critique of contemporary problems with performance measurement, see United States General 
Accounting Office, Report to the Committee on International Relations, House o f  Representatives: U.S. 
Public Diplomacy: State Department Expands Efforts but Faces Significant Challenges (Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, September 2003), 18-24.
52 Browne, 322.
53 Critchlow (1995), 105-111.
54 Browne, 141. Exact figures for interviews o f listeners traveling outside their countries can be found in 
Report from Conference on Cold War Broadcasting Impact, 15.
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methodology to approximate number of listeners, breakdown demographics, and establish 
patterns for a variety of listening habits.55 Results notwithstanding, one could easily raise 
questions of scientific rigor based on compromised not entirely unadulterated data sets to 
carry out this kind work. Data sampling methods appear selective rather than purely 
random, and it is not clear whether the data collection process ensured respondents could 
be candid with their remarks. Furthermore, it can be questioned if Soviets traveling 
outside the country could represent an evenly distributed sample of their society. These 
criticisms aside, it was intriguing (and surely vindicating to researchers) for analysts to 
later discover after the Soviet collapse, when foreign investigators could move about 
freely, that the USSR Academy of Sciences had undertaken its own study of the impact of 
Western radio and that the results of the MIT project actually resembled those of other 
studies.56
What is more, it is with qualified confidence that such metrics can help to verify 
how well U.S. radio broadcasts informed audiences in Communist countries, thus 
addressing one of the chief objectives of U.S. public diplomacy strategy. To put this in 
context, consider the fact that U.S. radio stations concentrated programming around news 
and information, for which VOA and RFE/RL devoting approximately two-thirds of their 
airtime (the rest being devoted to entertainment and education). It follows that when 
audiences did tune in to any of the stations, they were highly likely to discover a report on 
current events; a general inclination toward this kind of programming is reflected in 
listener preferences reported in both MIT and Soviet studies. The MIT study concludes 
listeners were drawn to information, particularly during times of crisis when
55 Ibid., 15-6.
56 Critchlow (1995), 110; Report from Conference on Cold War Broadcasting Impact, 16-18; corroborated 
by remarks from Wimbush, interview by the author, op. cit.
57 Browne, 111 and 140, respectively.
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unadulterated information was unavailable through the Soviet media. One such case 
involves the downing of a Korean Air Lines flight by Soviet fighters on 31 August 1983, 
killing 269 passengers and thrusting a human rights debacle onto the Soviet Union. 
According to the study, more Soviets received their news from Western radio than Soviet 
radio (45 to 44 percent), an outcome likely influenced by VOA’s daily 17-hour coverage
c o
of the event and ongoing commentary. The Soviet study confirms the credibility of 
Western media sources in the minds of Soviet audiences, with 37 percent admitting to 
“somewhat trusting” Western programming as opposed to 32 percent who did not find it 
trustworthy at all. In examining the appeal of Western broadcasts, the Soviet study found 
audiences regarding them as timely information sources, including programs of interest to 
listeners and viewpoints different from those of government officials.59 To put all of this 
in context, the MIT study determined that between 1978 and 1990, VOA’s daily Soviet 
audience commanded the highest proportion of Western broadcast audiences averaging
3.750.000 whilst Radio Liberty -- in spite of jamming ~  reached between 1,250,000 and
2.500.000 on a daily basis.60
Though radio undisputedly served as the cornerstone to information efforts, it is 
important to include collaborating forms of media, the most notable of which are 
publications. Recognized as the most potent of those produced by USIA, Central and 
Eastern Europe publications included titles such as the Life-like and WWII-inspired 
Ameryka magazine, which later changed its name to America Illustrated, and the small-
58 This case study represents the significant role VOA played in some o f the broader public diplomacy 
campaigns targeting the Soviet Union. The Reagan Administration, with coordination from USIA, the 
Department o f State, VOA and the National Security Council’s Special Planning Group on Public 
Diplomacy spearheaded a massive effort to exploit human tragedy aspects and “raise grave doubts about the 
place of the Soviet Union in the community o f civilized nations.” See Laurien Alexandre, The Voice o f  
America: From Detente to the Reagan Doctrine (Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing Corporation, 1988), 115- 
119.
59 Report from Conference on Cold War Broadcasting Impact, 18.
60 Ibid., 15.
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circulation journal Problems o f Communism.6I In particular, it is alleged that in spite of 
carefully controlled circulation in the Soviet Union, copies of America Illustrated often
f%ypassed through the hands of several readers before becoming unreadable.
Thus, for the purposes of information there appear to be compelling indicators to 
support the claim that U.S. public diplomacy achieved reasonable success in the face of 
tight controls and occasions of outright resistance. But to return to the question at hand, 
to what extent did this information campaign succeed? This brings us back to the matter 
of influence which was examined in the prior section, and once again there remains, due 
to multivariation, much uncertainty over whether U.S. public diplomacy verifiably caused 
a change in attitudes or behaviors of ordinary citizens and their leaders. To do so would 
court determinism, if not to accept an overestimation of the many, and admittedly 
redeeming anecdotes offered by figures pivotal in the collapse of Communism in Eastern 
and Central Europe. That said, it is possible there may be some utility in measuring the 
success of public diplomacy programs if not for its direct influence, then perhaps the 
perception that it could have wielded great influence, as seen by Soviet attempts to 
control and thwart Western media over the course of the Cold War. Reframing the 
question in this way suggests an alternative approach to a very puzzling question, which 
would view, for instance, the huge Soviet investment into a complex radio jamming 
infrastructure as a measurable change in state-level behavior (at the expense of $250 
million per annum), brought on by the potential consequences of U.S. radio programming 
penetrating the Soviet populace on a grander scale.
61 Wilson P. Dizard, Jr., Inventing Public Diplomacy: The Story o f  the U.S. Information Agency (Boulder, 
CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), 166.
62 Ibid.
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Moving finally to measuring the success of engagement strategy, the task of 
performance measurement here invites the face-value metric approach of somehow 
quantifying the extent of success, as in our earlier assessment of information strategies. 
At the same time there exists some uncertainty over causation, as typified by the 
aforementioned appraisal of influence. Briefly, one could refer to available data to assess 
engagement strategies by frequency of occurrence, thus high frequency is viewed 
positively due to the assumed increase in the likelihood of positive change in attitudes and 
behaviors. However, it does not follow that the exchange bears a positive outcome for 
the United States due to problems in ascertaining attitudinal or behavioral changes. 
Returning to a previous example, there would be no way to presage the conflicted 
exchange experience of Alexander Yakovlev, one that he explained “pushed me toward 
more conservative attitudes. This was not a matter of intelligence or reason, it was just a
/ ■ i
matter of emotions. It caused negative emotions.’
Yet on the face of things there is at least one strong indicator of successful 
engagement to be found in a correlation between information and engagement forms of 
public diplomacy. Richmond calls attention to an intriguing inverse relationship between 
the information and engagement -  a pattern whereby periods of intensification of 
information activities mirrored period of demise in engagement activities, and vice 
versa.64 That they could not enjoy success at the same time may be intricately linked to 
the prevailing mood of the moment in the bilateral relationship as well as political 
imperative, which could be perceived as both a cause and an effect of the mood. During 
the detente period of the early 1970’s, for example, the “cultural agreement” was seen to
63 Alexander Yakovlev, interview by Harry Kriesler, Conversation with Alexander Yakovlev, Institute of  
International Studies, University o f California, Berkeley, 21 November 1996.
64 Richmond, 20.
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be flourishing from increased cooperation in education, science and technology. 
Meanwhile, information outlets such as VOA were locked into fights for their survival 
against political leaders like Senator J. William Fulbright, who called for the dissolution 
of VOA, RFE and RL by deeming them “relics of the old Cold War.”65 Fortunes were 
reversed in the early 1980’s as tensions mounted over Poland and the Reagan 
Administration injected new life into information campaigns. Budgets were boosted for 
VOA and RFE/RL while those of U.S. government funded exchanges plummeted to a 
fraction of what they had been during the watershed detente years.66
5.5 Debating the Advocacy Tradition o f  U.S. Public Diplomacy
The notion of the Cold War era as a benchmark introduced at the beginning of this 
chapter derives from wistfulness about an international system that was seemingly easier 
to manage. Mearsheimer was among the first to predict that the post-Cold War 
international order would be harder to stabilize, and his predictions of violent outbursts in
f\TEastern Europe were partially realized in the former Yugoslavia during the 1990’s. The 
feeling amongst some Americans that the strength of the United States was both respected 
and revered during the Cold War has assumed new meaning in the post-9/11 era, since it 
appears that reverence has declined considerably in the new age. The public diplomacy 
models and approaches that are believed to have forged that reverence in the past have 
been idealized in light of their associations with the apparent Cold War victory. Advocacy
65 Browne, 142.
66 For figures on early 1980’s decline in budgets for exchanges, see Adelman, “Speaking o f America: 
Public Diplomacy in Our Time,” 926. However, it merits pointing out that there was such a revolt from the 
U.S. Congress and civil groups over this decline that in the end exchanges were also massively expanded 
after 1983-84. I am indebted to Giles Scott-Smith for bringing this fact to my attention.
67 Joihn J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War,” International 
Security 15, no. 1 (Summer 1990): 5-56.
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public diplomacy and the approaches of information and influence dominated those years, 
and they remained unchallenged in the aftermath.
This chapter explored at some length the reasons how this order came to be, and, 
rather than accept historical memory at face value, proceeded to analyze the accuracy of 
the claim that the Cold War tradition of public diplomacy earned its legacy as a success. 
It would seem there is much to be gained from the accomplishments of Cold War-era 
public diplomacy, but in the final analysis, can it be deemed a success to the extent that it 
might serve as a model for future activities? Upon examining public diplomacy by way 
of a methodology dividing its activities into the three constituent approaches of 
information, influence and engagement, it is apparent the answer is not a straightforward 
one, and yet certain compelling aspects come into sharp relief. What they indicate above 
all is that in the philosophical struggle between aggressive and moderate camps, 
American strategic communications (which incorporates the distinct practices of public 
diplomacy and propaganda) was at its best during the Cold War when prizing credibility 
and transparency over subliminal persuasion and manipulation. In the informational 
dimension, it appears public diplomacy enjoyed relative success in reaching a broad 
swath of the Communist bloc. In concentrating three radio stations on this region, the 
United States utilized the ideal technological, yet limited human resources to penetrate 
audiences with customized programming based on content analysis. More importantly, 
the radios demonstrated impressive resilience to Soviet countermeasures and 
resourcefulness in attempting to understand its audience.
On the matter of influence, it is hard to ignore the reasonable doubts that may lead 
to a marginalization or complete disavowal of public diplomacy’s ability to change 
attitudes and behaviors. The problem of multi variation in isolating causal ideational 
variables obscures clear conclusions of just why and how the Cold War ended in the way
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that it did. Furthermore, the overriding tension between rationalist and constructivist 
interpretation of that same event puts at risk any explanations rooted in ideational causes. 
Ultimately, there may be too many compelling anecdotes to suggest that U.S. public 
diplomacy did succeed in influencing its audiences to the effect of changed attitudes and 
behaviors in favor of the United States, but this cannot be confirmed by objective 
qualitative or quantitative evidence existing at present.
Finally, with respect to engagement strategies it is possible that a combination of 
the prior two assessments is instructive here. As with radio programming, some 
compelling evidence for the success of engagement exists in the vast quantity of 
exchanges and exhibits that took place throughout the Cold War period; this rationalizes 
that the high frequency of encounters over a sustained period of time would incrementally 
increase the likelihood of successful exposure to members of the counterpart societies and 
possibly the exchange of ideas. However, in the attempt to measure the quality of 
engagement outcomes there remains the problem, as with measuring influence, of 
confirming success due to the lack of supporting data. In absence of this data, what 
remains is an abundance of anecdotes to speak to the merits of this and other forms of 
public diplomacy. As compelling as they may be, it is important to recognize that 
anecdotes alone are insufficient for the incontrovertible defining and measuring of the 
success of public diplomacy: the facts and judgments which contain the most objective 
determinations of success -- and the Cold War experience has many of these to offer — 
will undoubtedly be most indispensable for plotting future developments that lead to 
future success.
189
CHAPTER 6 : MOVING TOWARDS DIALOGUE?
‘LISTENING’, SOFT POWER, AND THE ‘NEW’ PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
Barring a full dependence on the advocacy public diplomacy that rose to 
prominence during the Cold War, what is the alternative? Another view that has gained 
an increased amount of attention in public diplomacy scholarship has argued for shaping 
strategies and activities not in emulation of the past, but in response to conditions set out 
by the present international system and the forms they will likely take in the future. In an 
attempt to distinguish itself from tradition, this view has come to be known as the ‘new’ 
public diplomacy, and this chapter will describe and assess the validity of this and other 
vanguard ideas currently under consideration.
Of the American grand strategy of containment during the Cold War, John Lewis 
Gaddis has said that it in addition to serving its main purpose of restricting Soviet 
movements, the strategy itself provided a “a kind of ballast” or a “center of gravity” upon 
which successive administrations could base their actions.1 To a lesser degree, the same 
could be said of the American communications approach of that era. The previous chapter 
found that the United States relied on another center of gravity to wage the ideological 
contest of the Cold War. It was an approach founded upon the judicious and concentrated 
use of information as the root principle for the conduct of its public diplomacy. Pursuing 
an approach dominated by the goals of information and influence spurred on the 
proliferation of U.S.-subsidized media operations, including radio broadcasts, 
publications, and later, television. Put together, this constituted a multifaceted advocacy 
machine for transmitting images and messages into closed societies, sometimes more or
1 John Lewis Gaddis, “Strategies of Containment, Past and Future,” Hoover Digest, no. 2 (2001), 
http://www.hoover.org/publications/digest/454811 l.html (accessed on 11 April 2007).
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less aggressively depending on the threat perception felt by the United States at any given 
period. It was believed that in the maintenance of these qualities, the United States 
would stand the greatest chance of influencing general publics behind the Berlin Wall to 
reject communism and ultimately demand of their leaders the adoption of the liberal 
democratic socioeconomic model.
Whether or not this strategy worked is disputable for a number of given reasons, 
many of which are to be found in more recent treatments of U.S. public diplomacy. And 
while the dominant part of recent discourse has been focusing on remarkable changes in 
the milieu of world politics and portents for practicing public diplomacy, the principal 
interpretation of public diplomacy by American practitioners holds that it is chiefly for 
the purveyance of information and for swaying foreign support towards the international 
objectives of the United States. This position bears a striking resemblance to how public 
diplomacy was applied during the Cold War, and proof positive that although the Soviet 
Union is gone, public diplomacy’s tradition of advocacy remains a compelling force well 
into post-9/11 era. The traditional lineage reveals a striking consistency hearkening back 
to the beginning of the modem age of American public diplomacy. Public rhetoric has 
long evoked an image of American ideals in a contest with a competing set laden with 
falsehoods. One can trace this line of rhetoric to President Truman’s ‘Campaign of 
Truth’4 (“ ...to promote the cause of freedom against the propaganda of slavery”), through
2 Allen C. Hansen, USIA: Public Diplomacy in the Computer Age (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984).
3 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Nomination o f Karen Hughes to be to be Under Secretary o f State 
fo r  Public Diplomacy, 109th Cong., 1st sess., 22 July 2005; Carnes Lord, Losing Hearts and Minds? 
(Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006).
4 Kenneth Osgood, Total Cold War: Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad, 
Lawrence, KS: University Press o f Kansas (2006), 43.
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the 1980’s with President Reagan’s ‘Project Truth’5 (to “underline the American 
commitment to peace”), and up to 2005, when Under Secretary of Public Diplomacy and 
Public Affairs Karen Hughes expressed her conviction that “the way to prevail...is 
through the power of our ideals; for they speak to all of us, every people in every land on 
every continent. Given a fair hearing, I am sure they will prevail.”6
This study maintains that the advisory model and engagement approach to public 
diplomacy assumed a subordinate role to the principal modes of information and 
influence. One aspect of the engagement approach discussed in the prior chapter deals 
with the pursuit of exchange programs, seeking not to achieve mutual understanding in 
the reciprocal sense, but rather an outcome where exchange participants could establish a 
level of comfort regarding American international objectives. It was a testament to the 
long-term orientation of these limited engagement activities during the Cold War that the 
United States arguably did achieve a measure of success in maintaining open dialogue 
with Soviet counterparts. Furthermore engagement public diplomacy facilitated the 
development of a cadre of world leaders sympathetic to the position of United States on 
issues pertaining to governance, economic development and security— a benefit that the 
United States continues to enjoy to the present day.
Prior to 9/11, there had been several occasions when ideas expanding beyond the 
dominant interpretations of public diplomacy appeared, although never to any real 
transformational effect. In 1968, Arthur Hoffman assembled a group of journalists, 
anthropologists, psychologists and other social scientists to venture an early forecast of
5 William L. Chaze and Harold Kennedy, “The Great Propaganda War,” U.S. News & World Report, 11 
January 1982, 27.
6 Nomination o f  Karen Hughes, op. cit.
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n‘new diplomacy’. In this volume, several contributors wrote of the rapidly changing 
relationship between governments and foreign publics proposing, among other things, to
o
factor foreign public opinion into the framing of foreign policies. Discussions over the 
increasing sophistication of information and communication technologies (ICTs) 
occupied the minds of high-ranking American officials in 1987, when then-Secretary of 
State George Shultz recognized how they would impact public diplomacy’s future. “The 
need for instantaneous, reliable communications links around the globe is perhaps the 
most obvious and immediate demand we must continue to meet,” he urged.9 It was in 
1994 when Manheim wrote the first integrated analysis on public diplomacy as an 
industry, complete with both public and private actors, multidirectional flows of 
information, and the systematic tools by which foreign public opinion may enter the 
domestic policy discourse.10 In the wake of the equally seminal Nye/Owens Foreign 
Affairs article “America’s Information Edge” in 1996, the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS) subsequently produced a 1998 study on the “reinvention” of 
diplomacy, recommending a “collaborative relationship” with foreign publics that may 
more directly channel their opinions to factor in to policy formulations of American 
decision-makers. Other key ideas to emerge in the report advocated closer interagency 
cooperation on public diplomacy initiatives, upgrading information technology 
capabilities, and drawing more commercial and other non-official interests into the
7 Arthur S. Hoffman, ed., International Communication and the New Diplomacy (Bloomington, IN: 
Indianan University Press, 1968).
8 Lloyd A. Free, “Public Opinion Research,” in International Communication and the New Diplomacy, ed. 
Arthur S. Hoffman (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1968), 61.
9 George P. Shultz, “Public Diplomacy in the Information Age” (speech given before the U.S. Advisory 
Commission on Public Diplomacy, Washington, DC, 15 September 1987).
10 Jarol B. Manheim, Strategic Public Diplomacy and American Foreign Policy: The Evolution o f  Influence 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
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process.11 In 2003, the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy put forth a plan 
for the modernization of communication technologies at U.S. embassies and consulates 
and proposed diversifying information resources to reach a broader audience
1 9worldwide.
The recurring ideas of soliciting views from foreign populations, modernizing 
communication tools with the integration of ICTs and recognizing the potential of non­
state actors to efficiently convey images and messages at last gathered together in a niche 
at the crossroads of International Relations and International Communications. To 
distinguish from traditional ideas about public diplomacy, the new thinking summarily 
became known as the ‘new public diplomacy’, the tenets of which are neatly captured in 
Jan Melissen’s 2005 volume of the same name. Melissen elaborates on three defining 
features of the new public diplomacy as it diverges from traditional interpretations: the 
expansion of actors beyond the state to include supra- and subnational players, complex 
political communication in an age of increased ‘interconnectedness’, and international 
‘dialogue’ as a replacement for more traditional aims of state-sponsored information
13programs. The overarching themes are largely construed as consequences of blurring 
lines between state and non-state actors, domestic and international publics, and, as a 
result, the mobilization of two-way information flows.
In the previous chapter, Nye and Zahama asserted that the international arena after 
9/11 contrasts sharply with that of the Cold War, noting advances and proliferation in
11 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Reinventing Diplomacy in the Information Age 
(Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 9 October 1998), 11-12.
12 United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, “The New Diplomacy: Utilizing Innovative 
Communication Concepts that Recognize Resource Constraints,” A Report o f  the U.S. Advisory 
Commission on Public Diplomacy (July 2003). _
13 Jan Melissen, “The New Public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice,” in The New Public 
Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations, ed. Jan Melissen (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillian, 
2005), 11-14.
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new information technologies, the greatly expanded opportunities for encounters between 
cultures; and the evolving distribution of power occurring amongst states and, with 
increasing relevance, non-state actors at the beginning of the 21st century. Their 
arguments uphold a contesting view that the American proclivity to cling to traditional 
forms of public diplomacy may vastly underestimate the complexity of communicating in 
a political environment laden with instantaneous transmissions of information and a 
growing number of non-state actors involved in foreign policy debates.14 Transformations 
in the way the United States interacts with other entities in world affairs raises the 
possibility that even diplomacy, and public diplomacy in particular, are embarking on this 
‘new’ phase that Melissen and others speak of.15
Despite the increased prevalence of ideas captured under the rubric of the new 
public diplomacy, they have had little impact thus far on refining the purposes, strategies 
and organizations dealing with public diplomacy, most notably in the case of the United 
States. But as the post-9/11 era has heralded the rekindling of scholarly interest in the 
field of public diplomacy and the attention of practitioners observing the U.S. case with 
great intrigue, and new ways of looking at the practice of public diplomacy are a function 
of the future-oriented view of its post-9/11 discourses. Thus, as the previous chapter 
delved into the notion of advocacy as the traditional model of U.S. public diplomacy, this 
chapter weighs an alternate future by exploring vanguard concepts led by considerations 
of how public diplomacy as a form of political communication will adapt to an ever- 
changing international environment. To give an example of the contrast in traditional and
14 Christopher Hill, The Changing Politics o f  Foreign Policy (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 
250-282.
15 Jan Melissen, ed., The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillian, 2005); Shaun Riordan, The New Diplomacy (London: Polity, 2003); Raymond Cohen, 
“Reflections on the New Global Diplomacy”, in Innovation in Diplomatic Practice, ed. Jan Melissen 
(Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999); CSIS, Reinventing Diplomacy in the Information Age.
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new forms of thinking in the United States, one roundtable discussion held by the Aspen 
Institute in 2005 concluded that the new public diplomacy, “however defined, cannot 
simply mimic the approaches of the past... [RJegardless of the form it takes, [it] must 
reflect post-Cold War realities.16 One roundtable participant, an American ambassador, 
developed the following chart to illustrate the necessary changes that he felt were in order 
for public diplomacy to succeed in the present and foreseeable future.
17Table 1: Old versus New Forms o f Public Diplomacy.
Old Forms New Forms
of Public Diplomacy of Public Diplomacy
Monologue Dialogue
Mission-driven Mission-driven, market-savvy
About 4us’ About ‘them’
Bilateral Bi- and multilateral
Managing images Building relationships
Stovepiped Coordinated
Reactive Proactive
From a strategic standpoint, what this proposes is a movement away from a one­
way communication style, a restricted view of the number of stakeholders, primary 
concern for image management and short-term, reaction oriented tactics. Supplanting 
them are a two-way or dialogic communication style, an expanded scope of stakeholders 
to make room for non-state actors and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and a 
long-term, proactive posture emphasizing collaboration with foreign counterparts. 
Contrary to the advisory model favoring engagement, the advocacy model gave priority 
to information and influence during the U.S. public diplomacy campaigns of the Cold 
War. New thinking on public diplomacy, and how to improve U.S. public diplomacy in
16 Aspen Institute, “Soft Power, Hard Issues,” Reports o f  the 2005 Aspen Institute Forum on 
Communications and Society and the Roundtable on Public Diplomacy and the Middle East (Queenstown, 
MD: Aspen Institute, 2006), 4.
17 Ibid.
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particular, eschews modeling solutions upon the past. And if indeed challengers to the 
U.S. revitalization of Cold War approaches are correct in saying it has become an 
anachronism in the face of contemporary challenges, then the logical implication is to 
turn attention to alternatives more befitting of the tasks and conditions presented by the 
international environment. This, they would maintain, is cause for the United States to 
consider engagement public diplomacy and the advisory model as foundations for 
practice in the post-9/11 era.
6.1 Problems of the New Public Diplomacy
But whereas the U.S. case has been proven thus far to possess a substantial history 
and wealth of detail on how strategies of information and influence appear in practice 
given its long-held interpretation of public diplomacy for advocacy purposes (without 
which a case study on American activities during the Cold War would not be possible), it 
is difficult to visualize a viable alternative to take its place. New thinking on public 
diplomacy concentrates on two frequently cited areas: (1) the practicability of dialogic 
communication between governmental and non-governmental parties -  this has come to 
be known informally as ‘listening’, and (2) the soft power thesis. It is the aim of this 
chapter to take adherents of the advisory model and ‘new’ public diplomacy thinkers to 
task on their ideas. In the first instance, this chapter will address the themes of ‘dialogue’ 
and ‘listening’ that recur in the literature advocating an alternative to U.S. public 
diplomacy. When commentators and researchers on the state of American foreign 
relations remark that the United States needs to ‘listen better’, what does that mean? How 
does a nation demonstrate listening, and why is public diplomacy integral to that 
behavior? The same problem of personifying communication techniques to the real
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world hampers the notion of ‘dialogue’ as well -  how does a nation participate in 
dialogue?
In the second, the question must be asked: is new thinking on public diplomacy
anathema to soft power? At first glance, applied soft power appears if anything wholly
consistent with the new public diplomacy, and Nye has argued that improved public
diplomacy practiced by the United States requires “a greater understanding of how our
1 £policies appear to others.” On the other hand, soft power is still a form of power and 
Nye built his thesis on the supposition that the United States, above others, should possess 
sufficient soft power to maintain its pre-eminent position in the world and preserve its 
preferred form of international order.19
The tasks of this chapter will be to elaborate to the strengths and weaknesses of 
these ideas at length. The problematic underlying the forthcoming analysis is one where 
the vanguard segment of scholarship on public diplomacy contains stimulating ideas but 
has yet to mature to the point of making a strong case for a practical alternative to the 
hitherto dominant approach employed by the United States.
6.2 ‘Listening* and Dialogic Communication
In their 2003 report on U.S. public diplomacy, the Council on Foreign Relations 
(CFR) concluded that the United States is viewed by the world as “too seldom ‘listening’
18 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 
2004), 125.
19 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Paradox o f  American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It 
Alone (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).
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to the world while...defining [its] interests and defending them abroad.”20 It is instructive 
that the authors of the report should refer to listening in the figurative sense, recognizing 
that the term personifies a national behavior of responsiveness to opinions expressed from 
the international realm. Others are more precise about who should be doing the listening 
on the American end of the transnational conversation. While some place the burden on
iAmerica public diplomacy officers and administration officials , it is more frequent that 
the demand encompasses Americans as a whole. Nye, for one, contests that in order to 
communicate better overseas, “Americans need to listen.” One member of Business for 
Diplomatic Action, a leading private-sector proponent of engagement public diplomacy, 
commented that “for Americans in general, it is very hard to step back and listen.”23 It 
became evident that the calls for listening rose to the level of public diplomacy strategic 
planning when Secretary Condoleezza Rice, upon the nomination of Karen Hughes to 
oversee public diplomacy activities, remarked that “to be successful we must listen” and 
that this would be central to reforming an ineffective system.24 In keeping with her 
superior’s comments, Hughes first order of business on the job would be to embark on a 
‘listening tour’ of Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey.
But behind the rhetoric some fundamental problems lurk. A brief discourse 
analysis shows that there are various perspectives on what exactly listening as a national 
behavior consists of, and to what end. These questions might not be so important but for 
the fact that listening and the notion of dialogue stand out as an important means to
20 Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force on Public Diplomacy, Finding America's Voice: A 
Strategy fo r Reinvigorating U.S. Public Diplomacy (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2003), 7. 
(hereafter ‘CFR Report’)
21 Ibid; Critchlow, 84.
22 Nye, Soft Power, 25.
23 Clay Risen, “Re-branding America,” Boston Globe, 13 March 2005.
24 Condoleezza Rice, “Announcement o f Karen Hughes as Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy 
and Public Affairs and Dina Powell as Assistant Secretary o f State For Educational and Cultural Affairs,” 
Washington, DC, 14 March 2005.
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applying new thinking on public diplomacy, and more precisely the realization of 
improvement for the U.S. system. One could start by asking a very basic question: how 
do states listen? The responsiveness of leadership in democracies is enabled by a system 
of governance making leaders accountable to their constituents, who wield the power of
9^the vote. In an anarchic international system, responsiveness works differently. The 
CFR report suggests listening can actuated through opinion polling, and the results of 
these polls, in a perfect arrangement, are meant to create substantially more awareness to
96cultural and political realities of targets than would otherwise be possible. However it is 
more likely that states will strive to avoid a scenario in which listening is on order. As a 
result, foreign publics are sometimes inclined to force a reaction by making themselves 
heard, and they do this through the international media, public protests, pressure groups 
and other forms of political expression. Failing these, states will be left to speculate that 
local understanding of foreign objectives is relatively uninformed and shall use proactive 
public diplomacy tools such as information dissemination and cultural centers abroad 
riding the assumption that foreign populations will construct positive associations of
97  • •sponsoring states by these methods. In this way, states attempt to steer foreign opinion 
proactively rather than the converse.
To some, listening is code for clarifying. The National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks upon the United States, known less formally as the 9/11 Commission, devoted 
attention in its final report to the spread of anti-Americanism in the Arab-Muslim world, 
and in response to falling levels of favorability to the United States made available by the 
Pew Global Attitudes Project and others it advocated a strong course of “defining] what
25 Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, “Effect o f Public Opinion on Policy,” The American Political 
Science Review 77, no. 1 (1983): 175-190.
26 CFR Report, 35.
27 Mark Leonard, Public Diplomacy (London: The Foreign Policy Centre, 2002), 46.
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[U.S.] message is, what it stands for.” A host of other studies have followed suit in 
reasoning the sharp decline of the American image as an outcome of poor
* • ♦ • 90communication, and to respond with a more robust information campaign. In an 
example from practice, in her dealings with audiences skeptical of the U.S. role in the 
Israel-Palestine conflict, Under Secretary Karen Hughes has regularly responded to 
charges of American heavy-handedness against Palestinians by stating President Bush’s 
proposal for a two-state solution to bring about its end.
It is of course necessary at times for states to issue clarifications to respond to 
false accusations, but new thinking on public diplomacy argues that this is more often 
done for political expediency and to appear resolved on a policy position.31 What this 
calls for is additional restraint to be shown prior to responding. For example, retired 
American FSO John H. Brown offers the following view to illuminate the point:
Americans should listen more — but then so should the rest o f  the world.
We are not unique in our inability to hear -- and consider — what others 
have to say. More than many other countries, however, the U.S. prefers to 
pretend that it is unaffected with what goes on overseas. This is a 
parochial viewpoint that we can ill afford.32
28 The 9/11 Public Discourse Project. Report on the Status o f 9/11 Commission Recommendations, Part III: 
Foreign Policy, Public Diplomacy, and Nonproliferation, 14 November 2005. http://www.9- 
1 lpdp.org/press/2005-1 l-14_report.pdf (accessed 6 November 2007), 11.
29 See for example, Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, “Changing 
Minds, Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim 
World,” Report o f  the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy fo r  the Arab and Muslim World (Washington, 
DC: Government Printing Office, 2003) (hereafter ‘Djerejian Report’); Stephen Johnson and Helle Dale, 
“How to Reinvigorate Public Diplomacy,” The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder 1645, 23 April 2003; 
Robert Satloff, The Battle o f  Ideas in the War on Terror: Essays on U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Middle 
East (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2004).
30 Karen Hughes, interview by Owen Bennett-Jones, Newshour, BBC World Service, 6 June 2006.
31 Leonard, Public Diplomacy.
32 John H. Brown, e-mail interview by the author, 31 December 2006.
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Here Brown is suggesting two things about the form and function of listening. 
First, in lacking the sufficient capacity or will to listen there is a prohibitive price to pay 
for ignoring foreign public sentiment, and second, that listening is a two-part exercise 
consisting of ‘hearing’ and ‘considering’, the latter of which putatively produces a signal 
to publics abroad that they have been listened to. Generally, these signals reflect 
substantive changes in foreign policy or the implementation of a new policy as a form of 
concession. The problem with this metaphor is that ‘consideration’ as a step in the policy 
formulation or review process intercedes in deliberations usually hidden from view. 
Unlike the Cuban Missile Crisis, where the two superpowers negotiated monumental 
policy shifts over two tense weeks of well-publicized standoff, the path to policy change 
is often protracted and complex, and the notion of consideration may overstate the ease 
with which change happens. The closest that new public diplomacy thinking has come to 
confronting this reality when a meeting of scholars and practitioners generated the idea of 
the ‘feedback loop’, a borrowed business technique in which policymakers consult with 
stakeholders to explain which of their suggestions influenced change and why other ideas 
are rejected. It was reported that the Canadian government has used the Internet in this 
way to open policy debates up for public comment.
In such moments when the international system operates less anarchically in the 
idiom of self-interest and more democratically to the extent that foreign populations 
impact the domestic policy discourse, it is, as would be if the discourse were limited to a 
domestic constituency, politically unwise to base decisions regarding policy based on 
their popularity. That is why new public diplomacy endorses an abstract form of
33 “Public Diplomacy: Key Challenges and Priorities,” Report on Wilton Park Conference WPS06/21, 10-12 
March 2006, 6.
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international negotiation to work out disagreements referred to as ‘two-way’ 
communication, or simply ‘dialogue’.
Like listening, dialogue is also a figurative term used to describe an aspect of 
transnational communication resembling that of an interpersonal conversation. It 
highlights the fact that communication is not terminal after listening and extends further 
to a point where two or more parties are ‘talking’ as well as listening. As Kiehl points 
out, dialogue implies an exchange of views where participants share in the two 
complementary activities.34 In the context of public diplomacy some have opined that the 
process has yet to mature to a point where dialogue is the norm. Practitioners from the 
diplomatic community, including Daryl Copeland of Foreign Affairs Canada and Shaun 
Riordan, formerly of H.M. Diplomatic Service in the United Kingdom, have spoken of a 
necessary shift in political communication flows to depart from the classical emphasis on 
information dissemination and to embrace “two-way” or “dialogue-based” public 
diplomacy. Dialogue is also reinforced by deeds: the Brookings Institute adds that the 
lessons to be learned from such discussions and the resulting policy recommendations 
must somehow feed back into the policymaking process, which underscores an implicit 
tone of compromise.36
The association of dialogue with the new public diplomacy infers the breaking of 
ground in interstate political communication. In fact, the instance of dialogue between 
states by way of public diplomacy is not entirely unprecedented. A classic Cold War-era
34 William P. Kiehl, “Introduction,” in America’s Dialogue with the World, ed. William P. Kiehl 
(Washington, DC: Public Diplomacy Council, 2006), 4.
35 Daryl Copeland, “Response to Sir Malcolm Rifkind” (panel discussion at Silver Jubilee International 
Symposium, University o f Westminster, London, UK, 10 May 2006); Shaun Riordan, “Dialogue-based 
Public Diplomacy: A New Foreign Policy Paradigm?” in The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in 
International Relations, ed. Jan Melissen (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillian, 2005).
36 Hady Amr, “The Need to Communicate: How to Improve U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Islamic World”, 
The Brookings Project on U.S. Policy Towards the Islamic World Analysis Paper 6 (January 2004), 38.
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example of expeditious engagement-style public diplomacy with an emphasis on the 
objective of near-term tension reduction, illustrated in the so-called “Kennedy 
Experiment” conducted over the period of four months in 1963. The dialogue in this 
case consisted of a series of reciprocated acts between the United States and Soviet Union 
that resulted in a short-lived detente until President Kennedy’s death later that year. It 
began with a June 1963 speech delivered by Kennedy titled “A Strategy for Peace”, in 
which it is believed USIA director Edward Murrow gave input. Seeking to improve 
U.S.-Soviet relations after the Cuban Missile Crisis the previous fall, Kennedy initiated a 
conciliatory mood by calling the Soviet Union a “great society” proposing “constructive 
changes” within the Soviet Union to affirm interest in a “genuine peace,” and challenging 
Americans to “re-examine” Cold War perceptions.39 What followed was a volley of 
mostly symbolic yet favorable moves by both parties in areas of trade, the reciprocated 
release of spies, space exploration, and test-bans of nuclear weapons. Each act typified 
the generally symbolic nature of the thaw, the last one, in fact, a rehash of an already 
existing agreement between the two sides to not orbit nuclear weapons in space.40 Such 
agreements may be reminiscent of the traditional kind of diplomacy between states, but 
the evidence suggests otherwise: Kennedy’s June speech appeared in full in Soviet- 
controlled print media and Soviet radio jammers allowed Voice of America to broadcast 
the speech unobstructed. Even in the United States, some worried that popular vigilance 
against Communism would suffer from the unfolding detente41 Indeed, the full
37 Amitai Etzioni, “The Kennedy Experiment,” The Western Political Quarterly 20 (1967): 361-380.
j8 A.M. Sperber, Murrow: His Life and Times (New York: Freundlich Books, 1986), 677.
39 Ibid, 365.
40 Ibid, 367.
41 Ibid.
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participation of political elites engaging the media and public opinion on both sides 
played a vital role in the “experiment.”
The dialogue was innovative to the degree that the rhetoric of each side aimed to 
influence the mood of the other’s constituency when in fact the real substantive exchange 
occurred strictly at the state level. In the purview of the new public diplomacy, dialogue 
occurs on a broader scale than this. The post-9/11 international security paradigm 
demands that states look past co-opting foreign populations to gain leverage in their 
negotiations with foreign ministries. The proliferation of information flows bestows 
formidable bargaining powers upon an ever-growing collection of non-state actors. By 
these estimations, the new public diplomacy assumes changes in the rules of transnational 
dialogue due to transformations in agency: traditional diplomats are ceding ground to a 
‘new’ class of diplomats who are emerging from the ranks of the ‘traditional’ public, for 
example.42 Instead of presuming bilateral or even multilateral dialogues, states must learn 
to converse with NGO’s, suprastate and substate organizations, civil society organizations 
and other non-state actors. This argument corresponds with Nye’s aforementioned 
“paradox of plenty,” and the realization that unprecedented and widespread access to 
information enables a vast number of stakeholders to participate in transnational dialogue 
and do so with considerable effect.43 The covenants of Wilsonian diplomacy thus become 
openly negotiated to the extent that openness is less of an ideal, but more a consequence
42 Brian Hocking, “Rethinking the ‘New’ Public Diplomacy,” in The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in 
International Relations, ed. Jan Melissen (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillian, 2005), 28-43.
43 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Paradox o f  American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It 
Alone (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 67.
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of the diminishing ability of states to control information and manipulate audiences. 
“Who gets attention,” Nye asserts, “depends on credibility.”44
Credibility is a key characteristic in the dialogue of the new public diplomacy 
because it is construed to be a necessary quality in the quest for states to be persuasive. 
On an interpersonal level, it is the amount of trust one can place in another as a source of 
information. As it pertains to states, it is the level of consistency between the claims of a 
state and their accordance with reality. Credibility for states, as with people, is earned by 
developing a reputation for dealing in accurate information 45 This implies that building a 
reputation for being credible is not taken for granted, but it is in fact a time-intensive 
process, and accuracy in information has not only to deal with one state’s reporting on 
events, but also the fulfillment of one’s own promises and deliverance on expectations.46 
Without a long-term timeframe and attention to one’s own reliability, a state is 
undermined in its ability to participate in the dialogue of the new public diplomacy. As 
one German diplomat explained, “public diplomacy can only make a substantial 
difference if it is devised in a long-term manner and if it enjoys credibility.”47 More 
importantly, this brand of dialogue which thrives on credibility extends beyond the realm 
of states into that of non-state agents, who by their own abilities to access accurate 
information, have become credible players in the new political communications
44 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “The Paradox o f American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower 
Can't Go It Alone” (lecture, Carnegie Council, New York, USA, 6 March 2002).
45 Robert Keohane and Joseph S. Nye quoted in David Bollier, “The Rise o f Netpolitik: How the Internet is 
Changing International Politics and Diplomacy,” A Report o f the Eleventh Annual Aspen Institute 
Roundtable on Information Technology (Aspen Institute, 2003), 20.
46 United States Department of Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication, Report o f  
the Defense Science Board on Strategic Communication (Washington, DC: Office o f the Under Secretary of  
Defense, United States Department o f Defense, September 2004), 54.
47 Rainer Schlageter, “German Public Diplomacy” (paper presented at the 2006 Madrid Conference on 
Public Diplomacy, Madrid, Spain, 30 November 2006).
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environment. Yet as states realize their loosened grip on information dissemination and 
gradually turn to non-governmental partners to participate in dialogue, in effect 
structuring public diplomacy processes in a collaborative rather than competitive manner, 
they invariably compromise their own national interest to a degree, ceding not only their 
total power, but soft power as well.
While the soft power capabilities of other actors are increasing, the United States 
has simultaneously undermined its own, and this much to do with credibility as a 
determining factor in the success of U.S. public diplomacy. Such thinking about 
credibility is not new; Socrates once counseled “the way to achieve a good reputation is 
to endeavor to be what you desire to appear.”49 In the early 1960’s then-USIA Director 
Edward R. Murrow famously told a congressional committee, “To be persuasive we must 
be believable; to be believable we must be credible; to be credible we must be truthful.”50 
However it is apparent from recent polls of foreign public opinion that international 
perceptions of foreign policy endeavors of the United States do not match the desired 
portrait pf credibility conveyed by its public diplomacy. Again, ICT’s serve as a force 
multiplier in the foreign vocalizations of discontent towards the United States, and since 
9/11 and more recently the Iraq War, judgments emerging from the American reaction to 
these events, alongside revelations of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo 
have further undercut U.S. efforts at image enhancement. Far more than in the past, U.S. 
public diplomacy in the post-9/11 era faces a number of vulnerabilities in its ability to 
persuade more discerning audiences of the credibility of its messages.
48 Riordan, “Dialogue-based Public Diplomacy”.
49 Socrates, quoted by Simon Anholt, interview by the author, London, 19 October 2006.
50 Remarks o f USLA. Director Edward R. Murrow before the U.S. House o f Representatives Subcommittee 
on International Organization and Movements, 28 March 1963.
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6.3 Soft Power Incompatibility
Arguably no other scholar has done more to make public diplomacy relevant to 
International Relations than Joseph Nye. The trajectory of his discourses on soft power, 
and specifically the contention of information being a source of soft power gathered 
momentum at a time when the general public diplomacy research project had ebbed 
significantly. Nye’s early forays into the persuasive powers of states dealt mainly with 
state resources of ‘co-optive’ power, such as culture, leadership in international regimes, 
or science and technology, and less with state-based mediums for projecting those 
powers.51 By 1996 Nye would narrow his focus to diplomatic resources of channeling 
American soft power, lobbying for an expanded role for the USIA in democracy 
promotion, international broadcasting and exploitation of new information technologies.
It is at this point where Nye turns his attention to public diplomacy, which over time has 
slowly migrated from the periphery of his treatments on soft power towards the center. 
Starting with The Paradox o f  American Power in the post-9/11 era, Nye openly criticized 
the abolition of USIA, saying it had “reduced the effectiveness of one of our 
government’s important instruments of soft power.”53 Such a statement would presage 
the incorporation of public diplomacy into one of the central tenets of 2004’s Soft Power. 
Now tantamount to the act of ‘wielding’ soft power, public diplomacy became renown for 
its association with a widely recognizable IR discourse and gained visibility as a tool for 
winning ‘hearts and minds’ abroad.54 The combination of falling foreign favorability 
towards the United States with its noticeable weak public diplomacy apparatus
51 Nye, Bound to Lead.
52 Nye and Owens, 36.
53 Nye, The Paradox o f  American Power, 143.
54 Carnes Lord, Losing Hearts and Minds:; Blinken, “From Preemption to Engagement,” 47.
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strengthened Nye’s claims of the costs of ignoring soft power, which he argues has placed 
the international standing and national security of the United States at considerable risk.
Prior to this, Nye warned against American unilateral military action to secure the 
peace, and asserted the democratizing (and by extension the peace-inducing) power of 
information.55 It followed that his generalizations of state behavior, while professing to 
be empirical in nature, found their primary catalyst in the United States. From Bound to 
Lead onward, Nye has been mainly occupied with how the United States will maintain its 
primacy as the world’s only superpower, preserving its comparative advantages in 
information technology and military supremacy by applying what he now calls a ‘smart’ 
combination of hard and soft power, and supporting multilateral approaches for dealing 
with transnational issues. In light of this, the principles of the soft power concept in one 
sense accept Realism’s view of the world — that soft power, like any other form of power, 
is distributed unevenly within an anarchic international system and the United States, 
above all, must regard its own cache judiciously to preserve its position.56 It is also an 
ideal. Soft power is an outgrowth of Idealist IR on complex interdependence among 
diverse international actors and it is also portends an increasingly interconnected world 
where the predominant powers must decide what the quality of those connections shall be 
and how they can collectively deal with problems arising in the international 
environment. The futurist prescription for soft power goes that it may “change
perceptions of self-interest” and, in turn, the way international actors use hard power as
55 Joseph S. Nye and William A. Owens, “America’s Information Edge” Foreign Affairs (March/April 
1996).
56 Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make o f It: The Social Construction o f Power Politics,” 
International Organization 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992): 393.
57 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, “Power and Interdependence in the Information Age,” Foreign 
Affairs 77, no. 2 (September/October 1998).
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c o
well. As for how this impacts the future behavior of states, the implication that those 
who embrace soft power to enhance their overall standing among other nations suggests 
that states who ignore soft power do so at their own peril.
Essentially, soft power, for all its nuances and emphasis on cooperation, remains a 
form of power. Mattem points out that while there is a distinction to be made between 
attractive and coercive forms of power, attraction requires the representational, if not 
physical, force to be found in coercion in order to be effective. “In this way,” she 
contends, “soft power is not so soft after all.”59 Because power is both intrinsically 
relative and competitive (i.e. one must have less power in order for one to have more), 
and because of Nye’s preoccupations with the primacy of the United States, it undermines 
a core component of the new public diplomacy in that it professes to be purely 
collaborative. “Even authors like Joseph Nye treat ‘soft power’ as an exercise in winning 
the battle of ideas,” writes Shaun Riordan.60 The notion held by many that the United 
States is indeed engulfed in an ideological battle belies the appearance that soft power is a 
common denominator connecting various aspects of the revived scholarship on U.S. 
public diplomacy. To be sure, Nye’s singling out of public diplomacy as an application 
of soft power serves many purposes that have been undeniably integral to all recent public 
diplomacy discourses. It has shed new light on the need for non-military expressions of 
state behavior, the potency information and its centrality to contemporary international 
relations, and the desirability of states having the capacity to ‘listen’ to other states. 
Without broad agreement that each of these subjects is important, unquestionably far less 
thought would be devoted to public diplomacy. The fact that the new public diplomacy
58 Ibid., 94.
59 Janice Bially Mattem, “Why ‘Soft Power’ Isn’t So Soft: Representational Force and the Sociolinguistic 
Construction of Attraction in World Politics,” Millennium 33, no. 3 (2005): 587.
60 Riordan in Melissen, op. cit., 188.
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discourages competition raises the question of whether this risks drawing general public 
diplomacy scholarship away from its theoretical home. Alternatively, when looking at it 
from the reverse perspective perhaps the new public diplomacy exposes the innate tension 
in the soft power thesis of states having to balance self-interest with the common good.
The feeling that soft power does not accurately represent certain quarters of the 
new thinking on public diplomacy has much to do with the trade-offs of power. In the 
case of the United States, Nye attempts to ameliorate this apparent balance by asserting 
that the American international agenda can strive for objectives that bestow benefits for 
not only the American good, but the common good as well.61 On the other hand, 
Henrikson has referred to public diplomacy and an “equalizer -  even a negator -  of 
power”, which in his view points to an inherent demand for compromise with other and 
often less powerful international actors. But of course there are many cases where 
states, including but not limited to the United States, have and continue to use public 
diplomacy for the paramount purpose of securitizing its power, be it for accumulation or 
preservation. As the new public diplomacy weighs its relationship to state power, soft or 
otherwise, its acceptance as a viable form of statecraft will be decided on its ability to 
conform to state interests.
6,4 ‘Traditional’ and ‘New’ Public Diplomacy: Moving towards Dialogue?
In this section, an effort will be made to synthesize the points of the last two 
chapters while re-examining the question of how the United States might proceed in
61 Nye, The Paradox o f  American Power, 141-7.
62 Alan K. Henrikson, “Niche Diplomacy in the World Public Arena: the Global ‘Comers’ o f Canada and 
Norway,” in The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations, ed. Jan Melissen 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 73-75.
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addressing the problems surrounding its public diplomacy. In one of the first studies 
dealing principally with American public diplomacy, Glen Fisher, an American FSO, 
made an early attempt to characterize it as not only an act, but a process as well, calling it 
“the cause and effect of public attitudes and opinions which influence the formulation and 
execution of foreign policies”. Coming from a behavioral sciences perspective, Fisher’s 
characterization is noteworthy not only in the way it conceives the relationship between 
foreign publics and the domestic policy discourse but also by its suggestion that public 
attitudes and opinions influence policymakers rather than simply the converse. A number 
of studies have been undertaken to explore the questions surrounding a possible causal 
relationship between publics and decisionmakers of foreign policy in the strictly domestic 
content, and their findings, while not irrefutably conclusive, are strongly suggestive of the 
public’s power to steer outcomes of foreign policy formulation.64 However, unlike these 
studies’ concentration on domestic behavior, Fisher casts a large net in his composition of 
the public to include both domestic and foreign constituents, and over time it has proven 
yet more vital for states to seek and act on inputs emerging from the international 
environment. This truism is yet more compelling in the post-9/11 era: public 
participation in the policy discourses surrounding international affairs has increased 
dramatically. According to Hill, contemporary foreign policy must consequently 
demonstrate the flexibility to “cope with not just an increased public interest in external
63 Definition of the Murrow Center for Public Diplomacy, Fletcher School o f Law and Diplomacy, quoted 
in Glen H. Fisher, Public Diplomacy and the Behavioral Sciences. (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University 
Press, 1972), 7.
64 Some examples include Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y, Shapiro, “Effects o f Public Opinion on Policy”, 
The American Political Science Review 77, no. 1 (March 1983): 175-190; Robert Y, Shapiro and Lawrence 
R. Jacobs, “Who Leads and Who Follows?” in Decisionmaking in a Glass House: Mass Media, Public 
Opinion, and American and European Foreign Policy in the 21st Century, ed. Brigitte L. Nacos, Robert Y. 
Shapiro and Pierangelo Isemia (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), 223-245; Thomas Risse- 
Kappen, “Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies,” World Politics 
43, no. 4 (July 1991): 479-512.
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policy but also an increasingly direct participation by citizens in international relations...” 
He explains that world citizenry partakes in international relations
“...fuelled by the knowledge that legitimate ‘domestic’ concerns are to 
some extent dependent on international and transnational contexts. This 
heightens the responsibilities o f  foreign policymakers as well as making 
more complex the technical, managerial tasks they face. ”65
The heightened capability of citizens to migrate from domestic to foreign spheres 
combined with sophisticated means of participating directly in political matters means 
that the critical mass of stakeholders in policy outcomes assumes a form unlike any other 
seen in the history of international affairs. Even the realist perspective of Hans 
Morgenthau had to be refined to account for the intensifying conflict between ‘good 
foreign policy’ and ‘the preferences of public opinion’66 to acknowledge the breaking 
down of barriers separating the domestic concerns from foreign ones67, and not deny the 
dynamism of communications techniques possessed by members of civil society, the 
private sector, and other non-state and sub-state actors.
The new public diplomacy is partially a product of capitalizing on such 
transformations in the ways policymakers and publics domestic and foreign interact with 
each other; however it should also be mentioned the broad agreement that exists in 
recognizing the impact of new media from those who would represent more traditional 
perspectives. The influential 2003 report of the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for 
the Arab and Muslim World considered ICT’s to be the “lifeblood of global 
communications outreach and impact” and “essential to a public diplomacy with
65 Hill, The Changing Politics o f  Foreign Policy, 283-4.
66 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle fo r  Power and Peace, Brief ed. (Boston, MA: 
McGraw Hill, 1993), 164-5.
67 Ibid.
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consistent strategic direction.”68 Ross, in addition to acknowledging these realities, notes 
how the number of actors in public diplomacy has “mushroomed” over many years to 
include representatives from NGO’s, and the higher visibility of supra- and sub-state 
organizations.69 Due to the fact that information technologies have aided in dispersing 
political participation and enabling informed judgments by the general public, 
governments must not only engage with a more complex domestic constituency, but an 
emerging foreign constituency as well. As a point of intersection between recognizing 
both the proliferation of ICT’s and the shrinking distinctions between domestic and 
foreign audiences, some have suggested that U.S. lawmakers repeal the 1948 Smith- 
Mundt Act -  the law that prohibits government-sponsored media from broadcasting to 
domestic audiences -  since its broadcasting outlets are now fully accessible over the 
internet.70 In the political arena, most agree that the dynamism of information resources 
has significantly altered the way publics participate in elections, policy debates, lobbying 
campaigns and decisions involving military interventions, and public diplomacy must 
adapt accordingly.
It is learned from the example of Cold War public diplomacy that for the better 
part of the 20th century, ICT resources of the public and other non-state actors 
qualitatively inferior to those of governments, public diplomacy practitioners in the 
official capacity could presume large segments of the population to be deficient in 
information relative to governments, and it was therefore appropriate for countries like 
the United States, Soviet Union, France, Germany and United Kingdom to pursue
68 Djerejian Report, 40.
69 Ross, op. cit, 76.
70 Johnson and Dale, “How to Reinvigorate Public Diplomacy,” 12-13; Alvin Snyder, “Is It Time to Permit 
Americans to Watch US International Broadcasting?” Worldcasting, USC Center for Public Diplomacy, 8 
March 2005; Mark Helmke, “International Broadcasting: The Public Diplomacy Challenge” (speech given 
at Washington, DC, USA, 16 November 2006).
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information-driven public diplomacy strategies. But the prediction of James Rosenau has 
become a reality: politics everywhere are gradually becoming more related to politics 
everywhere else, and thinking about how public diplomacy may be effective in the 21st
7 1
century is dictated first by highly knowledgeable and informed audiences. The main 
differences in the approaches between traditional and new public diplomacy lies in how 
communications with these audiences will happen. Will they be a monologue or 
dialogue?
If 20th century public diplomacy showed a predilection for ‘push-down’ short-term 
and sometimes propagandist^ tactics befitting information and influence approaches, the 
new public diplomacy of the 21st century envisages multidirectional flows of shared
7 7
information and reciprocated influence within a network atmosphere. The challenge 
then posed to scholars and practitioners of the new public diplomacy is to implement 
strategies that correspond to public behavior and implement them judiciously. As the 
lines that once separated domestic from foreign constituents become less defined and civil 
society asserts more bargaining power in the public interest through its enhanced access 
to information, new public diplomacy conceives a modified view of the ‘public.’
With foreign populations, civil society, NGO’s and the private sector all poised to 
gain significantly in the new public diplomacy process, where does this leave the state? 
All of this creates a scenario where states are confronted with a choice of whether to 
proceed with their public diplomacy activities under the advocacy model or adopt a new 
course under the advisory model. The circumstances surrounding this choice reveal a 
spectrum of issues ranging from relatively minor tactical ones all the way to re-evaluating
71 James N. Rosenau, “Introduction: Political Science in a Shrinking World,” in Linkage Politics, ed. James 
N. Rosenau (New York: Free Press, 1969), 2.
72 Hocking, “Rethinking the ‘New’ Public Diplomacy”, 35-39; R.S. Zahama, The Network Paradigm. 
(forthcoming).
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foreign policy traditions and grand strategy. The post-9/11 era has witnessed the United 
States, with the release of the National Security Strategy of 2002, shifting into a new 
grand strategy to deal in the age of terrorist threats. But it is also clear from the creation 
of the Department of Homeland Security and the recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission that the support structure to complement the new strategy will take time to 
coalesce. This fact extends to U.S. public diplomacy as well, where a largely pre-9/11 
structure supports an advocacy model of diplomacy constructed with Cold War-era 
conditions impacting its development and orienting its goals. If the United States should 
make the decision to redefine its international communications within an advisory model, 
as new public diplomacy architects suggest, the next chapter shall show the degree to 
which the present public diplomacy organization and coordination complicates the 
process.
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CHAPTER 7 : DISORDER FROM ORDER: 
ORGANIZATIONAL OBSTACLES TO DIALOGUE
Up to this point, the study has devoted most of its attention to the strategic 
dimension of U.S. public diplomacy and the question of shifting approaches to allow for 
new ideas in application and analysis. In this chapter, attention turns to the structural by 
exploring the layers underlying strategy to further elaborate on challenges for engaging 
publics abroad. These layers consist of organization and coordination, and it shall be 
discussed here how both are strewn with obstacles that would pose difficulties for the 
United States should it decide to shift emphasis to engagement.
The argument for employing the advisory model and engagement approach as the 
dominant practice of public diplomacy over the information and influence-driven 
programs of the past appears with increased frequency and in various forms. The revived 
research project in public diplomacy, sparked in no small way by 9/11 but attempting to 
be empirical in its implications, calls on states to modify their practices in recognition of a 
rapidly changing global communications environment altering the international system to 
some degree by expanding the number of policy-relevant actors and the communications 
channels that link them together. That is why the ‘new’ public diplomacy represents the 
elevation of responsibilities shared by the non-state actor, privileges peer-to-peer and 
network-based relationships over hierarchical or ‘push-down’ ones, and favors dialogic 
over uni-directional communication. In the American discourse, keen observers flog the 
idea of ‘listening’ and place the burden of proof on policymaking elites to demonstrate 
that the concerns of target populations abroad have been heard. This position suggests 
that policy aims should be pursued with thoughtful consideration about the sorts of 
messages they will ultimately convey. All of this constitutes a significant reorientation
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and re-conceptualization of structural elements underlying strategy, and this chapter shall 
discuss the many barriers to achieving those ends.
The process flow of public diplomacy as practiced in the United States 
traditionally occurred in such as way that messages in fact conformed to policy aims. 
Direction was highly centralized and centripetal in design, with one of the starkest 
examples to be found in the management style of Charles Z. Wick, director of the USIA 
from 1981-89. A Reagan loyalist, Wick synergized the agency to the administration’s 
aggressive stance toward the Soviet Union, and it has been argued that this constituted the 
most successful coordination with the White House in the agency’s history.1 Wick also 
exerted tight control over U.S. Information Service (USIS) posts abroad, visiting them 
more than any previous director. Wick’s reign at the USIA has long since passed, as has 
the USIA itself, but it is worth noting how this instance compares and contrasts with 
contemporary U.S, public diplomacy. Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public 
Affairs Karen Hughes has issued strict guidance for American Foreign Service Officer’s
g -i
(FSOs) who deal with local media. Hughes also initiated in early 2006 the Rapid 
Response Unit the aim of generating and circulating daily talking points and positions to 
the diplomatic and consular corps. While the models set forth by Wick and Hughes may 
reflect a tightly coordinated public relations machine, some wonder if centripetal 
management makes sense in the post-9/11 era. Barry Fulton of the Public Diplomacy 
Institute asserts the need to “map” public diplomacy apparatus to meet present and future 
challenges posed by the international environment. By noting the new balance
1 Wilson P. Dizard, Jr., Inventing Public Diplomacy: The Story o f  the U.S. Information Agency (Boulder, 
CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), 200-1.
2 Ibid., 201.
3 Elizabeth Williamson, “Karen’s Rules on Diplomacy: Talk to the Media -  if You Dare,” Washington Post, 
6 November 2006.
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organizations must strike between distribution and concentration in relation to 
contemporary information sharing capabilities, Fulton argues it is wiser to delegate more 
responsibility away from the center to the periphery, where field units can leverage their 
comparative advantage in possessing local knowledge and respond quickly to new 
developments.4
Strategy is a putative product of coordination and organization, and it thus follows 
that proposals for strategic changes are correlated with concomitant changes in the 
support structure. A Congressional Research Service report extracted the main points 
from the major studies during the previous five years and condensed them into a simple 
matrix comprised of fourteen proposed solutions. One criterium alone dealt with strategy 
(“define overall strategy”); five addressed coordination and the remaining eight covered 
the litany of organizational problems. Of the 117 concrete suggestions made by the sum 
of these reports, 42 were targeted for coordination while organization commanded 65 
recommendations -  nearly half of the sum total.5 The most cited points in the CRS report 
centered on two organizational weaknesses: raising the number of exchanges and libraries 
(both engagement activities), and the adding significantly to the overall public diplomacy 
budget, which has held steady at slightly over $1 billion throughout the Bush presidency.6 
Some authors propose boosting the budget anywhere from four to seven times this level, 
accompanied by large increases in staffing of up to three-times that of 2005.
4 Barry Fulton, “Taking the Pulse of American Public Diplomacy in a Post-9/11 World,” (paper presented at 
the annual convention o f the International Studies Association, Montreal, Canada, 18 March 2004), 7.
5 Susan B. Epstein and Lisa Mages, “Public Diplomacy: A Review o f Past Recommendations,” CRS Report 
fo r  Congress, 2 September 2005. See Appendix B.
6 House Committee on Foreign Affairs, International Relations Budget, 110th Cong., 1st sess., 7 February 
2007. Virtually the entire annual public diplomacy budget is shared by the Broadcasting Board of  
Governors and the Department o f State. For fiscal year 2008, their combine budget requests totaled SI. 154 
billion according to a statement by Secretary Condoleezza Rice.
7 Public Diplomacy Council. A Call fo r Action on Public Diplomacy (Washington, DC: Public Diplomacy 
Council, January 2005).
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Almost invariably such ideas come packaged with a proposed major 
reorganization of public diplomacy institutions, including compelling calls for the 
reconstitution of the USIA or the creation of a new stand-alone agency, and it is widely 
believed that only by virtue of such drastic changes that public diplomacy under one lead 
institution will consolidate its responsibilities, streamline coordination with other U.S. 
government agencies and liaisons abroad, and realize the clear strategic direction it has 
lacked since the end of the Cold War. But consolidation of this sort did not necessarily 
maximize efficiency or effectiveness during the Cold War years, and it is important to 
recognize the numerous instances where ostensible coordination and direction did not 
necessarily constitute a well-oiled machine, but rather caused repeated problems of how 
administrators would best allocate the information, influence and engagement resources 
at their disposal. For all the commotion surrounding the numerous studies accumulated 
since 2001, one must also recognize the roughly 30 government-sanctioned 
reorganization plans occurring throughout a large portion of the Cold War and dealing
o
strictly with information and cultural programs.
From the USIA’s incarnation in 1953, it spearheaded information programs while 
educational and cultural exchange operated from the Bureau of International Cultural 
Relations in the Department of State (hereafter sometimes referred to by the shortened 
moniker “State”). Starting with the Eisenhower administration, each subsequent 
executive would return to the question of how best to organize these institutions.9 In the
8 Lois W. Roth, “Public Diplomacy and the Past: The Search for an American Style Propaganda (1952- 
1977),” The Fletcher Forum (Summer 1984): 353.
9 Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Waging Peace 1956-1961 (New York: Doubleday, 
1965), 138; Thomas Sorensen, The Word War: The Story o f  American Propaganda (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1967), 122; House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on International Organizations and 
Movements, The U.S. Ideological Offensive, 88th Cong., 1st sess., 1968; Edward L. Bemays and Burnet
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1960’s during US involvement in Vietnam, a disproportionate concentration of USIA 
resources in that part of the world deprived activities in other critical areas.10 During the 
1970’s a panel chaired by former CBS executive Frank Stanton prepared one of the most 
anticipated reorganization plans affecting public diplomacy institutions. Informally 
referred to as the Stanton Report, it inspired consolidation of cultural and educational 
exchanges from State into a revamped agency, also integrating information programs and 
international broadcasting and known for a time as the U.S. International 
Communications Agency (USICA). Later, panel members would assert this was not the 
outcome the report had intended: the resulting marriage was regarded by some informed 
observers as “a monster far worse than what [USIA] had before.” 11 It furthermore failed 
to redress certain ‘philosophical’ concerns that would remain years later pieces of a 
puzzle for the would-be architects of the new public diplomacy organization to work out: 
its relationship to policy formulation and execution, balancing the twin aims of advocacy 
and credibility in carrying out international broadcasting, and exploring a gainful 
relationship with the private sector, to name a few.
After the 1999 merger of the USIA into State, long-standing concerns were joined 
by a new set of problems regarding organization and coordination. The merger required 
the reassignment of nearly 7,000 staff into the existing State structure as well as the 
creation of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA) and the International 
Information Programs Office (IIP). A new public diplomacy “cone” was added to the
Hershey, eds. The Case fo r  Reappraisal o f U.S. Overseas Information Policies and Programs (New York: 
Praeger, 1970).
10 Hans N. Tuch, Communicating with the World: U.S. Public Diplomacy Overseas (New York: St, 
Martin’s Press, 1990), 29-30.
11 Remarks o f Richard T. Arndt and Walter R. Roberts in Walter Roberts, “Public Diplomacy: Principles 
and Problems,” in Rhetoric and Public Diplomacy: The Stanton Report Revisited, ed. Kenneth W. 
Thompson (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1987), 48-50.
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Foreign Service and all USIS libraries overseas closed and folded into nearby embassies 
and consulates as Information Resource Centers. But, as Chapter Three explains, the low 
regard for public diplomacy in the State organizational culture meant greater distance 
from policy-relevant discussions, a marginal consideration in the training of FSO’s and an 
overall diluted version of what had previously passed as public diplomacy in the field. 
Adding to this the performance hazards of dealing in a dramatically changed global 
information landscape, visualizing a new class of non-state actors modifying the pursuit 
and execution of American foreign policy, containing the unabated spread of anti- 
Americanism, and countering an acute dearth of institutional knowledge of mission- 
critical areas and populations, then how might U.S. public diplomacy be organized and 
coordinated to confront such challenges? If Sun Tzu is right by saying “disorder coming 
from order is a matter of organization”, then the point of departure for this inquiry should 
begin there.
7.1 The Right Skills?
The definition of public diplomacy used in this study presents a concise 
arrangement of three main activities: information, influence and engagement. This 
closely resembles the Department of State’s own definition, which considers it to be
19“programs intended to inform or influence public opinion in other countries.” The 
Department’s Foreign Service Institute (FSI) offers a specialized curriculum for officers 
assuming information, public affairs and cultural affairs posts, and courses range from 
policy advocacy through media to local outreach. Despite this, there remain some
12 U.S. Department o f State, Dictionary o f  International Relations Terms (Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, 1987), 85.
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contradictions in how these abstract activities translate into practice. One important
problem is that the amount of preparation invested in public diplomacy officers often
belies their ability to conduct public diplomacy with any realistic hope of
accomplishment. Public Diplomacy Officer Dan Sreebny has written that “understanding
the host country helps [officers] effectively carry out their duties in that specific 
1 ^environment.” A survey conducted by the U.S. Government Accountability Office 
found there to be “significant challenges” restricting the ability of public diplomacy 
officers in the field from doing their jobs effectively.14 Based on responses from 118 
heads of public affairs sections in U.S. embassies, consulates and missions to 
international organizations obtained between March and May of 2003, more than 40 
percent reported having devoted an insufficient amount of time to public diplomacy 
activities. Respondents note some of the causes for this to be a function of inefficient 
distribution of resources: more than 50 percent felt the number of staff devoted to public 
diplomacy duties to be insufficient. In addition, those officers making good faith 
attempts to deliver on information or outreach programs found insuperable the 
administrative tasks associated with gaining approval for projects, acquiring supplies and 
planning logistics.15 A further complication hindering dedication of time to public 
diplomacy activities may be related to the institutional practice of assigning FSO’s to 
posts abroad in cycles of two to three years. Defenders of this system maintain its 
necessity in preventing American diplomats from sympathizing too strongly with their
13 Dan Sreebny, “Public Diplomacy: The Field Perspective,” in America’s Dialogue with the World, ed. 
William P. Kiehl (Washington, DC: Public Diplomacy Council, 2006), 99-100.
14 United States General Accounting Office, “U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Expands Efforts 
but Faces Significant Challenges,” Report to the Committee on International Relations, House o f  
Representatives, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, September 2003.(hereafter ‘GAO Report, 
September 2003’).
15 Ibid., 26.
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host country, known informally as “going native.” At the same time the frequent 
recycling of staff, as some respondents reported, inhibited their ability to build 
relationships in such places where they might require a long time to develop.16
Further complications in outreach can be found in the paradox it shares with 
security. Some high-risk postings require of embassy or consular staff, when venturing
1 n
out to make appearances or participate in meetings, to travel in heavily armed convoys. 
Public affairs officials could conceivably work around this problem during the days of 
overseas USIA posts, the USIS libraries, which in the 1990’s numbered at approximately
| Q
200 and spanned over 140 countries. This may have increased the occupational hazards 
of public diplomacy fieldwork, but when the dismantling of the posts relocated libraries 
within embassy compounds, along with it came the numerous security checkpoints, 
escorts and scheduling entanglements that would act as deterrents to many well- 
intentioned local patrons as well as those who might wish harm to U.S. overseas 
missions.
Another explanation for public diplomacy officers’ difficulties functioning in their 
specific locales relates to training. The GAO survey revealed that 58 percent of 
respondents felt their preparation to perform public diplomacy duties was insufficient.19 
Up until mid-2003, the FSI’s public diplomacy training curriculum amounted to a paltry 
three weeks. The FSI subsequently retooled and expanded its course offerings in public 
diplomacy to 19 weeks in tandem with Secretary Colin Powell’s Diplomatic Readiness 
Initiative, which mandated significant staffing increases in the Foreign Service. In so
16 Ibid., 28.
17 Raymond Cohen, interview by the author, Boston, 3 December 2003.
18 “United States Information Agency” (archived) http://statefan.lib.uic.edu/usia/usiahome/factshe.htm 
(accessed 18 March 2007).
19 GAO Report, September 2003, 29.
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doing, the Department of State sought to allow veteran diplomats extra time for training 
by way of using the new hires to fill vacancies that would otherwise keep capable 
personnel away from the training room. But a 2005 report by the U.S. Advisory 
Commission on Public Diplomacy found residual problems in staffing with 15 percent of 
newly-established overseas public diplomacy posts that year remaining vacant. The report 
therefore underscored “the need to fill a post quickly often prevents public diplomacy
9ftofficers from receiving their full training.”
One of the skills intrinsically important to performing public diplomacy yet often 
neglected is foreign language proficiency. Returning to Sreebny, he also stresses the 
importance of public diplomacy specialists to be fluent in foreign languages; “a 
diplomat’s conversations will have a greater impact” by allowing local interlocutors to
•  91speak more honestly and thereby draw diplomats closer to the heart of local concerns. 
Language provides a window into the worldviews of cultural groups. Notable studies on 
the linkages between perception and communication by Benjamin Lee Whorf, Edward 
Sapir, and Edmund Glenn raise convincing arguments to conclude that language is “the
99manifestation of the perceptions, attitudes, values, [and] beliefs... that a group holds.”
But FSO’s arguably suffered for lack of training here more than any other area in 
the public diplomacy curriculum. The 2003 GAO survey reported 21 percent of overseas 
public diplomacy officers possessing insufficient language skills to do their jobs 
effectively; by 2005 this number increased to 24 percent and rises further to 36 percent
20 U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, 2005 Report (Washington, DC: Government Printing 
Office, November 2005), 31
21 Sreebny, “Public Diplomacy: The Field Perspective,” 101.
22 Marshall R. Singer, “The Role o f Culture and Perception in Communication,” in Culture, Communication 
and Conflict, Readings in Intercultural Relations, revised 2nd ed., ed. Gary R. Weaver (Boston, MA: 
Pearson Publishing, 2000), 29.
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• ♦ •  9"}when considenng only those officers posted in Arabic-speaking countnes. Department 
of State officials added that even more members of this latter group feel they do not 
possess the necessary speaking skills to appear on local Arabic-language television 
programs or engage in public debate.24 One career diplomat with extensive experience in 
the Arab world estimated the American Foreign Service in 2003 to have between fifty and 
sixty officers fluent enough to hold casual conversation, but only five fluent enough to
•  9Sintelligently debate on Arab media. In 2004, officers by and large received a total of 
two years of area and language training. By contrast, a Soviet diplomat posted to the 
Arab world in the 60’s and 70’s received six.
In light of evidence that many FSO’s were unprepared or untrained the State 
Department responded with vigor to rectify the problems. In advance of her confirmation 
as Secretary of State in early 2005, Condoleezza Rice renewed calls for a more effective 
public diplomacy embracing of the engagement ideal, stating in her confirmation hearing 
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “If our public diplomacy efforts are to 
succeed, we cannot close ourselves off from the world. And if I am confirmed, public
97diplomacy will be a top priority for me and for the professionals I lead.” In effect, State 
redoubled its efforts in staffing and skill-building. The closure of the Diplomatic 
Readiness Initiative upon Powell’s departure made way for Secretary Rice to implement 
her “transformational diplomacy” restructuring plan, which introduced intentions to
23 GAO Report, September 2003, 27; U.S. Government Accountability Office, “State Department Efforts to 
Engage Muslim Audiences Lack Certain Communication Elements and Face Significant Challenges”, 
Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Science, the Departments o f  State, Justice, and Commerce, and 
Related Agencies, Committee on Appropriations, House o f Representatives, May 2006, 37 (hereafter GAO 
Report, May 2006).
24 GAO Report, May 2006, 37.
25 Harold Pachios, interview by the author, Portland, USA, 19 December 2005.
26 Peter Bechtold, telephone interview by the author, 11 December 2003.
27 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Confirmation Hearing o f  Condoleezza Rice, 109th Cong., 1st sess., 
18 January 2005.
226
reposition the diplomatic corps into “critical emerging areas” over the course of many 
years, and to shift training away from a centralized to localized model so that learning 
could take place in a “hands-on” fashion. In response to language deficiencies, in 
January 2005 the FSI announced the creation of the Language Continuum, “a career-long 
approach to language learning and use” utilizing post language programs, distance-
9Qlearning over the Internet, and immersion training in overseas field schools. As a form 
of incentive, it became a requirement for officers to speak two foreign languages fluently 
in order to be promoted into the Senior Foreign Service.
The cumulative effect of these most recent countermeasures to strengthen public 
diplomacy activities remains unknown at the time of writing. But for the sake of 
argument an important question must be posed: Assuming the transformational diplomacy 
reorganization meets its objectives where “the right people have the right skills in the 
right place at the right time”, and with time American FSO’s acquire the requisite 
language skills to communicate with local populations and media -  does this result in 
optimum public diplomacy? Unless the organization first sets out clear roles and projects 
a defined scope of responsibilities for the conduct of public diplomacy, it casts doubt on 
expectations that coordination and execution of a clear strategy will follow. It is one thing 
to equip officers with the means and requisite skills to perform their duties, but quite 
another to see that they are being applied towards meaningful ends.
Dealing with the curious question of who lays claim to the role of public diplomat 
is at once straightforward and enormously complicated because it juxtaposes a strict
28 Office o f the Spokesman, “Transformational Diplomacy Fact Sheet,” U.S. Department o f State, 18 
January 2006, http://www.state.gOv/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/59339.htm (accessed on 14 April 2007).
29 Steven Alan Honley, “FSI Settles into Arlington Hall,” Foreign Service Journal (July/August 2005): 20.
30 Michael Lemmon, “Meeting the Need for World Languages,” (speech given at States Institute on 
International Education in the Schools, 16 November 2004).
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organizational order against often vague and abstract notions of role ownership. For 
example, within the public diplomacy ‘cone’ at State there are five positions: (1) Public 
Affairs Officer, (2) Cultural Affairs Officer, (3) Information Officer, (4) Information 
Resource Officer, and (5) Regional English Language Officer. In 2006, a total of 1,980 
State staff could consider themselves public diplomacy officers by their responsibility to 
one of these areas. However, the public statements of political leadership suggest that 
public diplomacy is the responsibility of a multitude of figures starting with top 
administration officials through to ambassadors and moving down the chain of 
command. To complicate matters further, there have been an increasing number of 
pronouncements on roles played by non-official parties; Secretary Rice has spoken of 
public diplomacy being “the job of all Americans, not just government specialists.” In 
addition, Hughes presided over a January 2007 summit inviting the prospect of private 
sector “foreign service officers.” In effect, some may visualize the upkeep of the national 
image and management of communication channels to be the province of every citizen, 
public or private, which would be an idealistic perspective if not for the gulf between 
those whose actions indirectly affect the pursuit of American public diplomacy and those 
whose main purpose is to pursue it. In actuality, the current organization is built to 
employ and sustain the very limited numbers of the latter, including State staff listed 
above as well as the approximately 3,200 (2005 estimate) working for media outlets
31 U.S. Department o f State, FY 2008 Performance Summary (Washington, DC: Government Printing 
Office), 114.
32 House Committee on Appropriations, Science, The Departments o f State, Justice, and Commerce, and 
Related Agencies Appropriations, 109th Cong., 1st sess., 9 March 2005; George W. Bush, “President and 
Secretary Honor Ambassador Karen Hughes at Swearing-in Ceremony” Washington, DC, 9 September 
2005, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/52846.htm (accessed on 28 March 2007); Karen Hughes, 
“Transformational Public Diplomacy” (speech given at Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 10 May 
2006).
33 Condoleezza Rice, “Remarks With Under Secretary o f State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs 
Karen Hughes and Public Diplomacy Envoy Michelle Kwan”, Washington, DC, 9 November 2006, 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/75762.htm (accessed 28 March 2007).
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overseen by the Broadcasting Board of Governors. 34 (One may also deem worthy the 
inclusion of the Department of Defense’s new Office of Support Public Diplomacy, or 
any number of periodic and short-lived offices to emerge from the White House). By 
incorporating a myriad other actors from a non-official capacity, then how can a 
centralized structure guarantee the mastery of a select requisite skills or any form of 
institutional learning for proper engagement in the field? How can responsible agencies 
aspire to “coordinate better” while simultaneously expanding the pie of stakeholders? 
And most importantly, how can a strategy maintain its integrity in the face of such diverse 
activities?
These questions are reflective of an organization tom between the desires of 
consolidating some areas of its public diplomacy apparatus while on the other hand 
devolving other responsibilities to non-official parties. Indeed, the suggestions presented 
in several of the post-9/11 studies on U.S. public diplomacy advocate increases in training 
and tightening of standards in areas such as language proficiency, and at the same time 
urge closer partnership with the private sector. “Collaboration between government and 
the considerable benefit of private sector thinking and skills should be encouraged,” 
asserts a 2004 report of the Defense Science Board on Strategic Communication. 
Meanwhile, the report cautions against relinquishing government oversight: “appropriate 
controls and risk assessment will be needed...private organizations represent particular 
interests.” Echoing the often dualistic characterizations of public diplomacy (as 
discussed in Chapter Two), the American organization, according to Nicholas Cull, must
34 Broadcasting Board o f Governors, 2005 Annual Report (Washington, DC: Government Printing’Office, 
2005).
35 United States Department o f Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication, Report o f  
the Defense Science Board on Strategic Communication (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense, United States Department o f Defense, September 2004), 31. (hereafter ‘DSB Report’)
36 Ibid., 32
229
balance the ‘specialist pursuit’ with being ‘everyone’s business.’ By this estimation, it 
is possible American public diplomacy institutions are in the process of migrating to the 
engagement approach, finding a way, as it were, to integrate non-official actors into a 
traditionally centralized system.
Expanding the number of stakeholders poses immediate challenges to 
coordination and strategy, which shall be discussed momentarily. Before doing so, 
however, it is important to discuss to some degree the present tension in the 
responsibilities of public diplomacy officers to foreign policy makers. This tension, one 
of the most persistent and complicated obstacles to engagement public diplomacy, holds 
implications for the arrangement of relevant organizations as well as coordination 
mechanisms. Those dealing with organization shall be discussed first.
7.2 Public Diplomacy Organizations and Proximity to Policy
As it has been discussed in Chapter Three, the post-9/11 era of U.S. public 
diplomacy draws into sharp relief the ongoing conflict over determining an appropriate 
relationship with foreign policymaking and proximity to its inner workings. Because 
public diplomacy is multi-faceted by nature, it is too simplistic to suggest a categorical 
solution for this. Advocates for cultural and educational exchange prefer considerable 
distance from policymakers to ward off charges of political tampering. International 
broadcasters demand independence to protect their journalistic integrity. By contrast, the 
Bureau of International Information Programs, which crafts and articulates policy 
advocacy messages for foreign audiences, is ideally situated close to the policymaking
37 Nicholas J. Cull, “Seven Lessons from the Past o f U.S. Public Diplomacy” (paper presented at the 48th 
annual convention of the International Studies Association, Chicago, USA, 3 March 2007), 9-10.
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process in order to reconcile messages with policy intentions. In fact, such were the 
principal suggestions of the Stanton Report, which sought to move exchanges to the 
USIA, spin off the Voice of America (VOA) under an independent, quasi-govemmental 
board of directors, and relocate information and advisory programs within the Department
•30
of State. These suggestions were never fully implemented and moreover became moot 
in the aftermath of the merger between the USIA and State, which was motivated in large 
part by a perceived need to integrate public diplomacy into basic policymaking
3 0institutions.
But the subsequent trials stemming from the 1999 merger indicate that it did not 
settle the debate over public diplomacy’s proximity to policy continues. Several recent 
studies on the subject have proposed creating a new independent agency to oversee public 
diplomacy activities in an attempt to increase its influence, and raise its profile at the 
White House via presidential directive.40 Meanwhile, international broadcasters both 
present and past now grapple with the question of credibility exhibited in U.S. 
government-sponsored outlets, constantly revisiting how strongly it should advocate 
views favorable to the Bush administration.41 The tenure of Charlotte Beers as Under 
Secretary of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs from 2001 to 2003 reinforces the
38 Panel on International Information, Education and Cultural Relations, “International Information, 
Education and Cultural Relations: Recommendations for the Future,” CSIS Special Report Number Fifteen 
(Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1975).
j9 U.S. Congress, Congressional Record, 106th Cong., 1st sess., 31 July 1995, S10933; Advisory Group on 
Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, “Changing Minds, Winning Peace: A New Strategic 
Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World,” Report o f  the Advisory Group on 
Public Diplomacy fo r the Arab and Muslim World (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2003), 
61. (hereafter ‘Djerejian Report’)
40 See Appendix B. Of the ten reports proposing a Presidential Directive or reorganization o f public 
diplomacy at the White House, seven also propose a new independent agency.
41 Sanford J. Ungar, “Pitch Imperfect?” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 3 (May/June 2005); David S. Jackson, 
Kenneth Y. Tomlinson, Richard Richter and Philomena Jurey, “His Master’s Voice?” Foreign Affairs 84, 
no. 4 (July/August 2005).
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functional tension between policy advisory and policy advocacy roles that public 
diplomats are urged to provide.
The question of what is the appropriate proximity to policymaking unearths a 
history of a rather nuanced and qualified arrangement that seldom achieves unanimous 
satisfaction amongst its participants. In fact, the debate is a long-running one stretching 
back to the earliest days of the USIA, when the executive branch added public diplomats 
to its lengthening list of advisors. The Eisenhower administration, like the Truman 
administration before, exhibited a keen interest in psychological warfare stemming from 
the president’s experience in effectively using propaganda to achieve political and 
military goals during the Second World War.42 The ‘P factor’, as Eisenhower called it, 
represented the need for a close-knit relationship between public opinion and foreign 
policy, and the extensive propaganda campaigns carried out abroad and domestically in 
cooperation with the Departments of State and Defense as well as the CIA reinforced this 
view 43 But the demonstrated embrace of propaganda by using overt and covert 
information programs did not necessarily extend to all public diplomacy activities and 
despite the administration’s oversight of the launch of the USIA in 1953, its influence 
was kept at a distance from policymaking. The first director of the agency did not have a 
personal relationship with Eisenhower and their correspondence was limited to monthly 
progress reports. 44 Anti-communist investigations led by Senator Joseph McCarthy 
expanded to charges of subversion by USIS libraries overseas, and though 
unsubstantiated the stigma reverberated into USIA’s relationship with the fledgling 
National Security Council (NSC). One NSC official, upon being asked to share classified
42 Dizard, Inventing Public Diplomacy, 66.
43 Kenneth Osgood, Total Cold War: Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad 
(Lawrence, KS: University Press o f Kansas, 2006).
44 Walter Roberts, interview by the author, Washington, 14 December 2006.
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reports with the agency, replied he did not trust USIA officials.45 Successive 
administrations would establish their own arrangement on whether, and if so, how the 
USIA would liaise with NSC, but the relationship never normalized during the agency’s 
lifetime, and this constantly called into question its policy relevance.
When the Kennedy administration tapped Edward R. Murrow, the legendary 
American broadcaster, to be USIA director in early 1961, with it came encouragement 
from the president for Murrow to participate in policy discussions “when appropriate.”46 
This included providing Murrow a seat on the NSC and access to all its meetings, thereby 
giving the USIA unprecedented access to policymaking. According to Walter Roberts, 
former associate director of the USIA, Edward Murrow was the only director in the 
history of the agency “to try to change foreign policy from an information point of view.”
“Murrow dispatched now and then little memoranda to John F. Kennedy 
on little foreign policy matters...None o f the [directors o f  the USIA], to the 
best o f my knowledge ever suggested to the President o f  the United States, 
whoever he was, that certain foreign policy actions might or might not be 
taken. ,A1
But by April of that year, and in the wake of the failed gambit at the Bay of Pigs -  
a maneuver that had taken place unbeknownst to Murrow -  the recurrence of isolation 
from policymaking was captured by his famous retort: “If they want me in on the crash 
landings, I’d better damn well be in on the take-offs.” By the end of his involvement 
with the USIA in late 1963, Murrow had arrived at the conclusion that he had “never 
made it into the inner circles of the administration, for all the committees and task forces
45 Dizard, 67.
46 A.M. Sperber, Murrow: His Life and Times (New York: Freundlich Books, 1986), 677.
47 Roberts, interview with the author, op. cit.
48 Interview with Henry Loomis, 4 April 1985 in A.M. Sperber, Murrow: His Life and Times (New York: 
Freundlich Books, 1986): 624.
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or his own seat on the NSC; it wasn’t the NSC where Kennedy’s policies were 
formulated...Above all the crash landings were outnumbering the takeoffs.”49 Although 
the Kennedy administration originates the idea of using public diplomacy powers to 
advocate as well as advise on policy matters, implementation of that aspect would 
continue to plague the USIA for successive administrations.50
By contrast, in the late 1960’s President Nixon and his powerful National Security 
Advisor Henry Kissinger would concentrate all foreign policymaking power into a newly 
reinvigorated NSC system and limit meeting participants to a highly selective group. 
Incidentally, the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information, then the chief oversight 
mechanism for the USIA, produced annual reports during that time in which it posed 
questions such as, “Should [the USIA] be more than an arm of foreign policy?” and 
“Should it play a role in the influence of policy as well as in its execution?”51 In February 
1969, the Commission sent a letter to President Nixon requesting that the USIA Director 
Frank Shakespeare be invited to attend all NSC meetings. The request was denied, with 
the exception of meetings in which “matters of particular concern to USIA [were] under 
discussion.” Eventually, Shakespeare was granted his wish to attend all Cabinet and 
NSC meetings as part of a deal to assuage his threats to resign. However, the terms of the 
deal reflect a resistance on the part of the White House to normalize the USIA-NSC 
relationship, not to mention to impact of personalities on the regard for public diplomacy 
at the highest level of policymaking: the invitation would not extend to future directors.
49 Sperber, Murrow, 677.
50 Gifford D. Malone, Political Advocacy and Cultural Communication: Organizing the Nation’s Public 
Diplomacy (Lanham, MD: University Press o f  America, 1988), 20.
51 United States Advisory Commission on Information. Twenty-third Report (Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, 1968.)
52 Organization and Management o f  U.S. Foreign Policy, 1969-72, vol. 2 o f Foreign Relations o f  the 
United States, 1969-1976 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006), 36.
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Outside of the NSC, the Department of State offered a viable route to policy 
relevance for public diplomats who sought to take their policy-related concerns through 
the Office of the Secretary in order to reach the cabinet level of the administration. The 
existence of an independent agency dealing in information of programs had long been 
scrutinized up until this time, and to many it appeared that State remained best suited to 
the task of overseeing all aspects of foreign affairs, including information. The creation 
of the USIA itself depended on a significant diversion of State resources, including the 
redeployment of over 40 percent of its personnel and the semi-autonomous U.S. 
International Information Administration, formerly State’s lead office on overseas policy
•  •  •  oinformation strategies. A number of concurrent studies preceding the launch of the 
USIA wrestled with the notion of separating policy information programs from State.54 
Perhaps the most influential of this series of reports was that of a committee led by former 
CIA deputy director William H. Jackson, which favored a plan to keep information 
activities within State if not for the lack of enthusiasm then-Secretary of State John Foster 
Dulles.55 In acquiescence with Dulles’ wishes, information programs resided in the new 
USIA and for the next two decades proceeded to ward off several attempts at being 
returned to State.56
53 Roth, Public Diplomacy and the Past, 365.
54 U.S. Congress, Report o f  the Subcommittee on Overseas Information Programs, Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, 1953 (Fulbright/Hickenlooper Committee); U.S. President’s Advisory Committee on 
Government- Organization, Foreign Affairs Organization, Memorandum 14, Washington, 1953. 
(Rockefeller Committee); U.S. President’s Committee on International Information Activities, International 
Information Activities, Washington, 1953. (Jackson Committee).
55 Malone, 16; Roth, 362.
56 Roth cites several attempts by the Senate in 1955 and 1956 to move USIA back into the State 
Department. At the end o f the Eisenhower administration, the Brookings Institution by invitation o f the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee and industrialist Mansfield Sprague at the behest o f the president 
argued for consolidation o f all foreign affairs activities within State. Another committee headed by Graham 
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The Stanton Report constituted a mediated solution between the two sometimes 
indistinguishable information programs of political information and cultural information, 
and it proposed restoring the former to State and appropriating the latter from State to 
operate in the still-independent USIA. Most relevant to questions at hand, the logic of the 
Stanton Report asserted the need to “link policy formulation to articulation...ensuring 
that foreign public opinion was taken into account as policy was developed.”57 But in the 
final outcome the more things changed, the more they stayed the same. The new Carter 
administration issued a reorganization plan (#2, 1978) creating an entirely new agency, 
USICA, comprised of both political and information programs, administration of 
educational and cultural exchanges, and directorship of international broadcasting. With 
respect to the agency’s policy advisory function, the USICA director would continue to 
filter guidance through the Secretary of State as before.
The arrival of the Reagan administration opened yet another chapter in the 
application of public diplomacy for policy objectives. A far more aggressive stance on 
the communist threat, sparked by unfolding events in Eastern Europe and Central 
America, fuelled an equally more aggressive use of relevant agencies, and by 1982 the 
USICA was once again reformed into the USIA, only this time much more concentrated 
on the singular task of enhancing the profile of the President and promoting American 
foreign policy overseas. All but forgotten were the stipulations laid out in the Carter 
administration’s reorganization of the old USIA, notably the language calling for the new 
USICA “to help insure that our government adequately understands foreign public
c o
opimon and culture for policy-making purposes.” In its place, the Reagan
57 Malone, 37.
58 Jimmy Carter, Memorandum for the Director o f  the International Communication Agency, 13 March 
1978.
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administration conceived its public diplomacy strictly as “those actions of the U.S. 
Government designed to generate support for our national security objectives.”59 While 
the promises of USICA never lived up to their billing, the USIA of the 1980’s aroused no 
expectations beyond carrying out the expressed will of the administration. The USIA 
director of that time, Charles Z. Wick, came to his post through a personal relationship 
with Reagan and threw his now-legendary zeal behind building a modernized 
broadcasting component of global proportions, with which the agency could “tell 
America’s story to the world.”60 The full commitment to policy advocacy under the aegis 
of undermining communism, in addition to his personal connection, afforded Wick the 
ability to sharply increase the agency’s budget, which doubled over the course of his 
eight-year directorship.61 But with all resources pouring into broadcasting, other 
functions suffered: educational and cultural exchanges waned until into Reagan’s second 
term. Meanwhile, policy advisory functions remained diminished and largely beyond 
Reagan’s public diplomacy purview. One former ambassador remarked in 1984 that “the 
public aspects of policy are usually an afterthought.” The 1986 annual report of the 
U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy found the agency “still not asked to 
advise routinely on the public diplomacy impact of proposed policy options and new 
policies as they are being developed.” It was also revealed by the Commission’s 
chairman that in the year leading up to July 1986, the director of the USIA had attended
59 Ronald Reagan, National Security Decision Directive 77: Management o f  Public Diplomacy Relative to 
National Security, 14 January 1983.
60 Malone, 64.
61 Dizard, op. cit., 200.
62 William H. Sullivan, “The Transformation o f Diplomacy,” The Fletcher Forum (Summer 1984): 293.
63 U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, 1986 Report.
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only two NSC meetings.64 For his part, Wick had neither the interest nor the expertise to 
weigh in on policy matters (which may have facilitated his absences from NSC 
meetings).65
Without a true connection by which to carry out the policy advisory role, public 
diplomacy through the 1970’s and 1980’s vacillated between emphasizing the qualities of 
an engagement approach in the former period and an information approach stressing 
policy advocacy in the latter. In both cases, one approach emerged at the relative 
discounting of the other, and the problem of allowing foreign opinion to somehow impact 
policy at the formulation stage continued without resolution. The end of the Cold War 
ushered in a period of re-evaluating the role of foreign policy institutions, coupled with a 
sharp drop in funding that was emblematic of the increased indifference felt by American 
lawmakers regarding international affairs early in the post-Soviet era. By way of a 
motion first put before Congress in January 1995 by the Clinton administration’s first 
Secretary of State Warren Christopher, the very realistic option of merging USIA with the 
Department of State re-entered the picture after more than three decades, and it gained 
further momentum under the watchful eye of Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
chairman Jesse Helms. Unlike previous attempts, advocates for the new plan raised two 
reasons -  cost and function -  as sound responses to changes in the international 
environment since the end of the Cold War. There should be no mistaking that cost came 
before function; Clinton’s March 1993 announcement of its ambitious National 
Performance Review proposed vast reductions in various U.S. government agencies, in 
turn making good on a campaign promise to cut the costs of running the federal
64 House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on International Operations, Oversight, 99th Cong., 
2nd sess., 16 July 1986.
65 Roberts, interview by the author, op. cit.
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f i f igovernment. But Secretary Christopher’s reorganization plan seized a moment in which
( \ 7he could make a strong case for all foreign affairs agencies to streamline operations. 
Legislation introduced in the months and years to follow agreed that the leadership of the 
Secretary of State should be strengthened through the consolidation of foreign affairs 
agencies and closing ranks in the hierarchy by assigning former directors of those 
agencies the title of Under Secretary. However, the changes that ultimately culminated 
into the 1999 merger and subsequent transition demonstrated that public diplomacy had 
become no more effective than before. In fact, in the U.S. Advisory Commission on 
Public Diplomacy’s 2000 report on the status of the merger found that the transferred 
responsibilities were “not seen as integral to the Department [of State], rather,
co
peripheral.’ Quite apart from the substantive work of advising to or advocating on 
behalf of policymakers, the first Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs 
attended primarily to the purely administrative matter of facilitating the transfer into the 
State structure.
The administration of George W. Bush would be the latest to view public 
diplomacy strategy in zero-sum terms, and it proceeded to shape new and existing 
organizations around an information approach reminiscent of the Wick USIA in that 
strong messages defending the administration’s policies and expansive broadcasting 
schemes, such as the new Arabic-language satellite television channel al-Hurra, played 
important roles. The brief but eventful tenure of Charlotte Beers demonstrated how the
66 William J. Clinton, “Announcing the Initiative to Streamline Government” (speech given at Washington, 
DC, 3 March 1993.)
67 White House, Office o f the Press Secretary, “Gore Announces Initial Restructuring o f Foreign Affairs 
Agencies: Review Calls for International Affairs Community to Change for Demands o f 21st Century,” 27 
January 1995.
68 U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, Consolidation o f the USIA Into the State Department: 
An Assessment After One Year (Washington, DC: Department o f State, October 2000), 8.
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office of Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs had consequently 
accepted isolation from substantive policy discussions and did so at Beers’ staunch 
defense -- a gesture of complicity with the new modus operandi.69 That her information- 
driven approach to conducting public diplomacy failed mightily not only fuelled criticism 
of her unusual qualifications to rise to the challenge, but also re-opened investigations on 
the purposes and roles of public diplomacy, questioning the wisdom of using it as a 
means for public relations elevated to an international scale and rethinking an 
organizational structure bent on communications instead of weighing in on the substance 
of those communications.
7.3 Coordination Challenges
Despite the consolidation of most foreign affairs agencies within the Department 
of State it is a well-established fact that the conduct of U.S. foreign affairs extends to 
other agency-level actors within its government, such as the Department of Defense, 
NSC, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and on a separate track such quasi­
independent organizations as the National Endowment for Democracy and the 
Broadcasting Board of Governors. In the post-9/11 era, U.S. public diplomacy is an 
interagency activity, and although not all lay claim to its professional niche as does State, 
their primary concerns with public diplomacy involve interfacing with publics and the 
systematic transmission of certain images and messages internationally. It has therefore 
been the challenge of administrations to ensure that the disparate actions and messages of
69 Charlotte L. Beers, interview by Aaron Brown, NewsNight with Aaron Brown, CNN, 16 January 2003; 
Beers, Speech at the National Press Club, Washington, DC, 18 December 2002.
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various agencies do not conflict with one another, as such conflicts can undermine overall 
foreign policy objectives. Some administrations have exercised more vigilance than 
others, usually motivated by wartime circumstances and the need for a firmly ‘proactive’ 
posture in swaying foreign public opinion. In one example from the Vietnam era, the 
Johnson administration instituted the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) to 
replace USIS Vietnam from 1965 to 1972. Above the usual activities of a USIS branch, 
JUSPAO incorporated USIA, the Department of Defense and the Department of State 
representatives to conduct a domestic public affairs campaign within Vietnam and public 
diplomacy to brandish the image of the United States..
In another example consider President Reagan’s National Security Decision 
Directive 77 (NSDD 77), which came into effect in January 1983 and aimed to coordinate
7ft“various aspects of public diplomacy...relative to national security.” The directive 
convened an interagency “special planning group” as the bedrock for the new 
arrangement; members included secretaries from the State and Defense Departments as 
well as directors from USIA and USAID. In addition, it created four interagency standing 
committees focused on public affairs, international information, international politics and 
international broadcasting. This format remained in place, albeit dormant for many years 
from the mid-1980’s, until April 1999 when President Clinton replaced NSDD 77 with 
Presidential Decision Directive 68 (PDD 68), also recognized by its subtitle International 
Public Information (IPI), “to synchronize the informational objectives, themes and 
messages that will be projected overseas . . . and to influence foreign audiences in ways
71favorable to the achievement of U.S. foreign policy objectives” Membership in the IPI
70 NSDD 77, op. cit.
71 William J. Clinton, Presidential Decision Directive 68, 30 April 1999.
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Core Group included secretaries from the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, 
Commerce, Treasury, as well as the directors of the CIA and FBI. It is not clear how well 
this directive was implemented or if the Core Group ever convened, but the succeeding 
administration demonstrated little interest in holding over the new structure, and in early 
2001 the NSC terminated PDD 68 and relegated the public diplomacy component to a
79policy coordinating committee within its organization where it gained little notice.
Coordination efforts for public diplomacy lagged until they assumed a higher 
priority in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. The Bush administration launched two 
separate entities in the Office of Global Communications (OGC) and the Strategic 
Communications Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) in 2002. While the latter set out 
to establish a clear direction for public diplomacy, the OGC’s primary objective rested in 
the integration of the messaging capabilities of the various agencies involved in the 
promotion of American interests abroad. In order to achieve this, the OGC would 
collaborate with the policy and communications offices of agencies, sometimes 
assembling temporary interagency teams on topical matters, to ensure the overall 
consistency and efficacy of communications abroad. Final clearances for 
communications would pass through high-level officials at the Departments of State and 
Defense as well as the National Security Advisor.
But these attempts at coordination again proved fleeting as expectations of 
strategic clarity succumbed to underachievement. The GAO reported that the OGC 
focused too much on tactical level activities, such as the daily “Global Messenger” one- 
page brief containing talking points and other short-term solutions, when a
72 DSB Report, 24.
73 Executive Order no. 13283, Code o f  Federal Regulations, title 3, p. 159-161, 21 January 2003.
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comprehensive strategy remained elusive to practitioners.74 For its part, the PCC fell far 
short of crafting this important piece and after less than a year in existence the group 
dissolved when co-chair Charlotte Beers resigned from her post as the Department of 
State’s lead figure on public diplomacy. However, this would not spell the complete end 
of coordination committees. In 2004, the NSC created the Muslim World Outreach 
Policy Coordinating Committee to draft an outreach strategy for posts abroad to forge ties 
with moderate Muslims whilst marginalizing extremists. The strategy was submitted to 
the NSC in early 2005 as planned, but ultimately was not released for posts. Meanwhile, 
in April 2006 the Bush administration launched a new version of the PCC, which would 
again be charged with the task of establishing an interagency strategy, and this time under 
the direction of Under Secretary Karen Hughes.75
It is challenging to identify patterned reasons explaining why coordination efforts 
within the U.S. government repeatedly lack for staying power. In some cases it may 
appear as if limits to purpose or changes in American foreign policy render some of them 
obsolete, as with the diminishing American involvement in Vietnam. The issuance of 
NSDD 77 was closely associated with increased attention devoted to communist 
maneuvering in Central America and the calculated American-led propaganda campaign
n r
organized to defend against it. In other cases, it may be attributed to inevitable changes 
in administrations and concomitant shifts in policy positions as in the 2001 transition 
between the Clinton and Bush presidencies, or more precisely a rotation of individuals
74 U.S, Government Accountability Office, “U.S Public Diplomacy: Interagency Coordination Efforts 
Hampered by the Lack o f a National Communication Strategy,” Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on 
Science, the Departments o f  State, Justice, and Commerce, and Related Agencies, Committee on 
Appropriations, House o f  Representatives (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, April 2005), 10- 
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75 Karen Hughes, “Transformational Public Diplomacy,” 10 May 2006.
76 Robert Parry and Peter Kombluh, “Iran-Contra’s Untold Story,” Foreign Affairs 72 (Autumn 1988): 3-30.
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who serve as de facto  champions for their own coordination teams. What is clear is that 
the lack of coordination contributes to the creation of a strategic straw man where myriad 
agencies continually fail to galvanize disparate information and communication 
approaches into clear direction. As a result, post-9/11 observations spotting this trend, 
such as the 2003 Djerejian Report, logically argue for a systematized interagency process 
with a strategy that stresses accountability and measurement, and possesses the ability to
77address short and long -term interests.
However, the soundness of this solution may be undermined in two ways. First, 
should one accept the notion that public diplomacy can be pursued over short and long 
timeframes, as the Djerejian Report and others imply, then the stability of a coordination 
mechanism becomes crucial for bridging immediate needs with broader goals, not to 
mention establishing consistency of process. The mercurial history of efforts coordinating 
the varied public diplomacy programs of the U.S. government illustrates the post-9/11 
institutional incapacity to develop and sustain a coordinated information and 
communication strategy with any success. While it is no less important to improve on 
this by enlisting political will from the highest levels and close participation from relevant 
agencies, most observers fail to recognize the unresolved issue of how to maintain these 
efforts for the longer term. Second, it is often overlooked how the public domain of U.S. 
public diplomacy should function in tandem with the cooperative involvement of the 
private sector. On the one hand, official collaboration with the private sector is 
encouraged by virtue of the latter’s abilities to innovate, operate with fewer constraints 
than government, and develop and share best practices. Alternatively, there is an 
overriding risk to government in devolving some control of information and
77 Djerejian Report, 58.
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communications to non-official entities, be they private firms or civil society groups, in 
that such collaboration may pose threats to message consistency, and systems of 
accountability and measurement. For example, a dissenting view of a 2003 Council on 
Foreign Relations study points out that in spite of their comparative advantages, private 
organizations also remain beholden to their own interests, which may conflict with those
n o
of their public counterparts.
One compromising solution would protect the interests of the public sector by 
allowing it to assert leadership over the public diplomacy process whilst at the same time
• 70embodying an ‘open culture’ where public-private collaborations can flourish. Whereas 
this imagery offers room for adjustment, it is apparent that the public sector has grown 
irretrievably weak in another coordination aspect: the international information programs 
and broadcasting components of the U.S. government tend to compete directly with 
private American media outlets with international reach.80 The latter also must respond to 
own interests and, as the DSB report asserts, cannot be relied upon to faithfully and
o  -a
accurately communicate foreign policy. National values and national security, therefore, 
become at odds with one another as private media espouse plurality, which often breeds 
criticism of policy, and government-sponsored media are urged to communicate in 
unanimous defense of policy. Leaders of public diplomacy coordination efforts continue 
to wrestle with the balance of somehow maximizing the benefits of private participation
78 Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force on Public Diplomacy, Finding America's Voice: A 
Strategy for Reinvigorating U.S. Public Diplomacy (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2003), 49. 
(hereafter ‘CFR report’)
79 Shaun Riordan, “Dialogue-based Public Diplomacy: A New Foreign Policy Paradigm?” in The New 
Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations, ed. Jan Melissen (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2005), 192.
80 For example, in 2005 the BBG reported the total number o f  employees o f the its seven broadcasting 
outlets numbers around 3,200, CNN alone boasts nearly 4,000.
81 DSB Report, 94.
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89without the drawbacks of relinquishing control over tactical and strategic outputs. In 
January 2007, Under Secretary Hughes held a summit inviting key representatives from 
the private sector and public relations to discuss ways in which they can better support 
U.S. public diplomacy initiatives. In effect, it was an attempt by the Department of 
State to somehow integrate the best practices of the private sector, but doing so in a 
controlled way.
The fact that the aforementioned challenges have remained so significant is a 
testament to the unsettled nature of coordination in the interagency process. Each 
administration confronts the question of its willingness to engage this process and some 
have proven more effective than others. However it is also clear that regardless of the 
strengths or weaknesses present in any of the various coordination efforts, none have 
established themselves in a sustained manner and this is reflected in the constant 
reinvention of the process.
7.4 Effects upon Strategy
Looking back again at the brief existence of USICA, Malone notes that its 
downfall represented a case where the underlying structure did not suit the more balanced 
public diplomacy strategy that the Carter administration intended to pursue. Although 
promising an elevated advisory function in addition to the traditional advocacy role more 
associated with past public diplomacy strategies, it eschewed some of the most critical
82 Djerejian Report; CFR Report; United States Department o f State and the PR Coalition, Private Sector 
Summit on Public Diplomacy: Models fo r  Action, 2007.
83 Neil King, Jr., “Karen Hughes Gets Cozy with Corporate PR,” Wall Street Journal, 9 January 2007.
84 Malone, Political Advocacy and Cultural Communication, 56-7.
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• ocproposals contained within the Stanton Report that were focused on this very outcome. 
Merging cultural and information programs in fact blurred the line between the dual 
functions Carter sought to balance, failed to support the overriding strategy he endorsed, 
and both the organization and strategy were shortly thereafter exposed for their flaws and 
overhauled immediately upon the arrival of the next administration.
Such an example simply reinforces the pivotal role that organization can play in 
the realization of a particular strategy and the importance of establishing consonance 
between the two. While this lesson is certainly not exclusive to public diplomacy or even 
the workings of government, it remains no less evident in this case that organizational and 
coordinating deficiencies have given rise to strategic stasis. Some have suggested the 
U.S. government lacks a clear strategy when it comes to public diplomacy and must do a 
better job integrating relevant players and clarifying goals. This is correct insofar as the 
quality of the strategy remains clouded by serious questions as to its roles and purposes, 
and is moreover challenged by the development of a firm plan to deal with circumstances 
of the post-9/11 environment. But it is wholly incorrect to suggest a lack of strategy 
altogether. If the stated mission of U.S. public diplomacy vis-a-vis the Department of 
State is to influence, inform and engage, the strategic imperative has always rested with 
information. Not long before her departure, Beers confirmed this to be true when she
85 Roth, Public Diplomacy and the Past, 378-9.
86 GAO Report, September 2003; Christopher Marquis, “Effort to Promote U.S. Falls Short, Critics Say,” 
New York Times, 29 December 2003; The 9/11 Commission. Final Report o f  the National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2004); Ariel 
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said before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: “Our job is to both inform and 
engage. But I must tell you, inform is really the first job.”
With information serving as the basis for action, the underlying organizational 
dynamics forecast some of the ways in which planning takes place and tactics are 
pursued. When the White House exerts tighter control over the public diplomacy process, 
information tends to be more propagandist^ and influence tactics more aggressive and 
concentrated. Greater executive control also parallels with wartime scenarios, as with the 
Johnson administration’s JUSPAO in Vietnam and the Reagan administration’s NSDD 77 
“special planning group”. Reagan’s public diplomacy apparatus arguably constituted the 
most focused of any administration with a forceful USIA director in Charles Wick, an 
active public diplomacy office under the NSC, and covert propaganda program known as
on
Project Democracy buried deep within the bureaucracy of the Department of State. 
Alternatively, looser executive control does allow for greater transparency to occur. 
Broadcasters incur less political pressure to tilt the news more favorably toward the 
policies of the incumbent administration.89 The more pervasive effect, however, is that 
loosened control of an information-dominated strategy indicates poor coordination, 
deficient executive oversight of public diplomacy agencies, and information programs 
operating at cross-purposes.
Critics of post-9/11 US public diplomacy often evoke these precedents and their 
outcomes to explain the causes for more recent failures. The attempt to retain the core 
components of an information-dominant approach, motivated largely by the Cold War
87 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, America and the Islamic World, 108th Cong., 1st sess., 27 February 
2003.
88 Parry and Kombluh, op. cit.
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tradition, has been challenged in recent years by a loose and inconsistent support 
structure, as evidenced by short-lived coordination efforts, a lack of mission-critical 
training and skills hampering public diplomacy officials’ ability to inform, and fluctuating 
levels of commitment and interest from the White House. In searching for the root causes 
of failings in organization and coordination structures, these instrumental weaknesses rest 
upon two deep-seated tendencies still at the core of strategic planning efforts. One is the 
noted anachronism of having held over outmoded public diplomacy tactics from the Cold 
War, and it has been suggested this is symptomatic of a broader legacy not only found in 
strategic communications, but also reflected in the government-wide ability to respond to 
security challenges.90 The mainstays of this legacy include the ‘push-down’, centripetal 
technique to problem-solving, which correctly characterizes the principle of policy 
advocacy at the heart of contemporary public diplomacy strategy.91 Foresight is largely 
limited to the short-term in the way information efforts are designed to address immediate 
needs (e.g. Under Secretary Hughes’ new Rapid Response Unit) and the culture of 
measurement demands instant results.
It follows, then, there is a second tendency undermining post-9/11 strategy, and 
that is keeping focus on short-term problems leading to a myopic view of long-term 
trends. Gregory notes this as instrumental to unstable and ineffective coordination efforts, 
evidence of which is borne out in earlier examples. The resulting ‘stove-pipe’
90 Leon Fuerth, “Strategic Myopia: The Case for Forward Engagement,” The National Interest (Spring 
2006): 57-62; Bert B. Tussing and Kent Hughes Butts, “Aligning the Interagency Process for the War on 
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Council, National Security Strategy o f  the United States (Washington, DC: White House, 2006), 45.
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coordination model that has persisted since the Cold War period undermines the 
interagency process, otherwise engaged periodically as political pressures dictate. 
Strategic communications planners and outside observes therefore continue in the 
repetitive practice of proposing and launching new coordination efforts, but doing so 
without a plan to sustain such efforts over time.
7.5 Catalysts fo r  Change
What this chapter has attempted to show is that an engagement approach to public 
diplomacy, or any approach for that matter, is more than simply a strategic orientation; 
beneath the strategy there must be an enabling support structure to help realize its 
ultimate objectives. The ensuing analysis responded to calls for the general approach to 
shift towards engagement by illustrating the barriers to that shift, and institutionally these 
are traceable to characteristics revealed at the organization and coordination levels. Some 
of the many studies conducted on US public diplomacy in recent years give the 
impression these obstacles are easier to overcome than they might realistically be. A 2003 
Heritage Foundation study proposed that policymaking elites “recognize that public 
diplomacy is a strategic, long-term effort that requires constant application.” Contrast 
this with those forces aimed at keeping public diplomacy a primarily a tactical short-term 
pursuit -  advocacy of contemporaneous policy matters, a focus on immediate responses 
to current events, pressures by the culture of measurement to deliver immediate results, 
and sporadic oversight and coordination. Given this tension, existing literature has
“whether [post-9/11 political leaders] will create flexible, adaptive [public diplomacy coordination] 
structure grounded in legislation that will last over tim e...” (30)
93 Stephen Johnson and Helle Dale, “How to Reinvigorate Public Diplomacy,” The Heritage Foundation 
Backgrounder 1645, 23 April 2003, 10.
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actively worked toward a resolution by discussing possibilities for improving aspects of 
public diplomacy organization and coordination in ways that may enable engagement. 
Two examples -  the creation of a new organization and enhancing opinion polling 
capabilities -  appear with regularity.
Eight studies included in the 2006 CRS overview, along with a number of USIA 
alumni and public diplomacy scholars, have recommended that U.S. public diplomacy 
would be best served by a new organization devoted strictly to oversight and operations 
aspects. Many have lamented the decision to dismantle the USIA and consequently 
argued for another autonomous agency to take its place.94 The summary of this argument 
is that merging public diplomacy into the Department of State did not result in its 
integration into the policymaking process as hoped and became more diluted over the 
Department’s many bureaus. An autonomous agency, therefore, would be more agile and 
cohesive in its strategic planning, respond more quickly to changing needs and dynamics 
abroad, and yet remain closely involved in policy matters. Others have suggested the less 
radical option of reshuffling public diplomacy offices to remain in the Department, but 
with broader powers and stronger central coordination.95 This view aspires to extract 
certain functions regarded as effective within the former USIA, such as media and public 
opinion analysis, foreign press offices and regional bureaus, and provide direction that is 
almost semi-autonomous in nature. Broadcasting should remains independent, but 
information programs and exchanges should operate in close proximity to policy.
94 Philip Taylor, interview by the author, Leeds, UK, 18 October 2006; CFR Report, 37-29; The Public 
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Proponents of engagement effectively point out the anachronisms present in post- 
9/11 public diplomacy and stress changes that may lead to a more dialogic 
communications approach.96 However, there are some tools that have never been used to 
their potential -  opinion polling is a prime example in this regard. As early as the late 
1960’s it was already being expressed that the US government was not doing enough to
07systematically use public opinion data in the framing of foreign policies. The issue 
remained salient in the 2003 GAO report in which it was revealed that the Department of 
State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the US government office responsible for
QO
opinion polling overseas, was devoting approximately $3.5 million annually to the task.
When the large portion of researchers and observers suggests ways in which a
government can ‘listen’ better, opinion polling is the universal method of choice. Yet it is
clear that opinion polling programs are both vastly underfunded and, based on what
limited data is available, also underused.99 This is hugely surprising given the fact that
opinion polling remains one of the few reliable forms of evaluating the success of public
diplomacy programs; it explains why the establishment of baseline standards to measure
results constitutes a critical challenge for public diplomacy organizations to tout 
100successes.
Although there are strong cases to make in raising the profile of public diplomacy 
through reorganization and empowering its listening capacity through enhanced opinion 
polling, less has been said about resolving the inconsistency of coordination efforts.
96 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 
2004), 99-125; CFR Report; Cynthia P. Schneider, “Culture Communicates: US Diplomacy That Works,” 
in The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations, ed. Jan Melissen (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 147-168.
97 Lloyd A. Free, “Public Opinion Research,” in International Communication and the New Diplomacy, ed. 
Arthur S. Hoffman (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1968), 61.
98 GAO Report, September 2003,21-23.
99 Ibid.
100 Joe Johnson, “How Does Public Diplomacy Measure Up?” Foreign Service Journal (October 2006): 51.
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Fortunately, the Department of State contains one model of coordination among public 
diplomacy activities in the form of the Interagency Working Group on US Government- 
Sponsored International Exchanges and Training (IAWG). IAWG resides within the 
ECA and can claim the membership of over 25 departments and agencies; in 2005 its 
members oversaw 239 exchange programs with 900,000 participants at a total US 
government expenditure of $1.2 billion. It has been noted the value IAWG provides for 
all agencies involved in exchanges since it takes an annual inventory of programs and 
performs the task of assessing whether any of them duplicate another existing 
programme.101 Its uniform approach to dealing with all exchange programs means that 
government resources can be channelled in the most efficient way possible. It is the 
primary office responsible for the collection and analysis of performance data for 
exchanges as well as a clearinghouse for sharing regional reports and facilitations 
between the public and private sectors. Most noteworthy is that IAWG was launched in 
1997 by an executive order from President Clinton, and although its mandate has changed 
over time it remains a compelling case of what can be achieved with a sustained 
coordination effort.
These examples demonstrate that avenues do indeed exist for the increased 
efficiency of organizing and coordinating public diplomacy at the government level. 
There remain opportunities, such as the augmentation of official opinion polling 
programs, to enhance ‘listening’ capabilities and thereby allowing engagement, in some 
small way, to offer a more viable resource for soliciting views from abroad. Yet there is 
much more to be done to elevate engagement to the strategic level. An historical
101 Sherry Lee Mueller, “Professional Exchanges, Citizen Diplomacy, and Credibility,” in America’s 
Dialogue with the World, ed. William P. Kiehl (Washington, DC: Public Diplomacy Council, 2006), 61.
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perspective of public diplomacy organizations reveals an uneasy tension between 
advocacy and advisory roles accorded to public diplomacy officers. The long legacy and 
dominance of the information approach, moving through the virtual entirety of the Cold 
War and beyond, has supported the pre-eminence of the advocacy role and the preference 
of successive administrations to keep public diplomacy considerations off the policy 
formulation agenda. Coordination efforts have historically shown to be sporadic and 
short-lived, and as these patterns continue well into the post-9/11 era strategic planning, 
measurement and policy relevance are further undermined. Strategy, as a result, has 
suffered from stasis and perpetual near-term foresight.
And so, even at the official level realizing the engagement approach to public 
diplomacy must overcome significant obstacles. However, this is not the only obvious 
constraint; American political culture and other domestic forces beyond government pose 
serious threats to any changes that may be desired, and the final chapter opens with these 
considerations in mind.
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CONCLUSION:
THE LIMITS AND LIMITATIONS OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
As this study nears its end, this chapter shall attempt to synthesize the points 
raised in the preceding pages in order to address the research questions set out at the start. 
Above all others, there is the question of why U.S. public diplomacy has failed in the 
post-9/11 era. There is hardly any doubt amongst observers and even American political 
leaders that the claim of failure is a legitimate one, and so it must be that such an 
assumption, which forms the basis of the preceding analysis, is not a new contribution to 
public diplomacy scholarship. However, where there is ample room for interpretation is 
in debating the many possible causes for failure. Commentators have used this space to 
the fullest, and among the leading explanations is the view that operations have been ill- 
prepared strategically, organizationally and financially to meet the demands of the post- 
9711 environment the United States now faces. Not long after the attacks, the 2003 
Council on Foreign Relations report found that “the promise of America’s public 
diplomacy has not been realized due a lack of political will, the absence of an overall 
strategy, a deficit of trained professionals, cultural constraints, structural shortcomings 
and a scarcity of resources.”1
The massive post-9/11 outpouring of studies on the failings of U.S. public 
diplomacy might leave one with the false impression that these problems emerged rather 
suddenly. Often overlooked is the fact that U.S. public diplomacy embarked on its 
declining path long before 9/11. It is crucial to understanding the present situation by
1 Peter G. Peterson, “Public Diplomacy: A Strategy for Reform” (symposium, Council on Foreign 
Relations, New York, USA, 30 July 2002) http://www.cfr.org/publication/4697/public_diplomacy.html 
(accessed on 26 May 2007).
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looking, as this study has done, at events dating from the immediate aftermath of the Cold 
War. It was during this time that the pursuit of foreign affairs by the United States 
underwent a dramatic transformation that resulted, among other things, in the 
downgrading of public diplomacy from an independent agency to a far less consequential 
cog in the American foreign affairs machinery. By 2001, its organization scarcely 
resembled that of its Cold War precursor and it was the acute rise in negativity towards 
the United States after 9/11 that exposed the full extent of its weaknesses for all to 
behold. But even if the complete apparatus that existed throughout the Cold War, which 
is widely considered the period of U.S. public diplomacy’s greatest success, had remained 
intact up to the present time would the image and reputation, and furthermore the foreign 
policy of the United States be better off? The organizational and strategic histories 
presented here cast doubt on the likelihood of this happening. From an organizational 
point of view, the suggestion that U.S. public diplomacy maintained a higher level of 
stability and consistency in its operations and displayed greater efficiency in its 
coordination during the Cold War is questionable at best. The USIA fought for survival 
from the very beginning of its existence, endured countless attempts at reorganization that 
never resulted in a stable and ideal structure. One is hard-pressed to cite a public 
diplomacy coordination effort that did not succumb to political apathy, purposeful 
exclusion, or shortsightedness in its aims. This history in particular seems largely 
forgotten amidst virtually all new proposals for coordination. All are forceful on 
inclusiveness and interagency cooperation, but as yet none have examined the problem of 
how to make such efforts sustainable over time.
2 Walter Roberts, “Public Diplomacy: Principles and Problems,” in Rhetoric and Public Diplomacy: The 
Stanton Report Revisited, ed. Kenneth W. Thompson (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1987), 
48-50.
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Substantively, the programs of the Cold War era established what has become the 
‘tradition’ of U.S. public diplomacy, and this continues to the present day. Evolving in 
the wake of the robust propaganda displayed by warring powers during World War II, the 
USIA and state-sponsored broadcasting outlets were built to use information to America’s 
benefit. Zahama has said of this period, “American public diplomacy rightly defined its 
strategic goals as promoting American interests, increasing volume, segmenting 
audiences, and controlling information.” It was also during this period, as Malone has 
discussed, that the United States established its dominant approaches to public diplomacy, 
opting for information and influence over the far less visible ‘advisory function’ that 
made a brief and unsuccessful run to change the status quo in the late 1970’s during the 
short existence of the USICA. It is therefore ironic that in the post-9/11 era, clarion calls 
for bringing back the halcyon days of U.S. public diplomacy suggest the benchmarking of 
the Cold War archetype, buttressed by the belief that the best practices of the past were 
lost. With the elimination of the USIA in 1999, the American public diplomacy 
architecture has indeed changed considerably, but the dominant model of advocacy and 
leading approaches of information and influence remain firmly in place long after the 
Cold War’s end.
The structural and substantive problems with U.S. public diplomacy would not be 
so great if events following on the 9/11 attacks had not illuminated their effects and 
imbued them with a sense of urgency in their rectification. That is, the post-Cold War 
history shows the problems to be not necessarily new. The post-9/11 concentration on 
public diplomacy by scholars, practitioners and political elites in the United States owes
3 House Committee on Government Reform, The 9-11 Commission Recommendations on Public 
Diplomacy: Defending Ideals and Defining the Message, 108th Cong., 2nd sess., 23 August 2004.
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less to domestic forces than changes imposed by the world outside. It took undeniable 
expressions of resistance to American foreign policy to demonstrate how the lack of 
international confidence in America’s role in the world could obstruct those policies from 
success. It took an enormous increase in anti-Americanism in various parts of the world 
to provoke a national discussion as to whether or not it was important for America’s 
standing to be viewed in a more positive light. Finally, it took the globalization of 
information communication technologies to show that the credibility of the United States 
could be tested as never before.
The amount of commentary lamenting those factors that may have caused U.S. 
public diplomacy to fail is exceeded only by the amount that deals with fixing them. It 
was not one of the intentions of this study to add to an already exhaustive list of possible 
remedies accumulating since shortly after 9/11, but to make sense of the underlying 
assumptions about what public diplomacy is and the overall messages about what the 
United States should do about its own ongoing problems. Along these lines, this study 
finds there to be two competing points of view in the forms of the advocacy model and 
the advisory model. Those who argue in favor of advocacy invoke the information and 
influence-driven traditions that were regarded as effective in the past. The bulk of the 
history of U.S. public diplomacy, even up to the present day, overwhelmingly finds this 
model favorable to the ‘advisory function’ that Malone spoke of. But advisory model 
supporters submit that public diplomacy used primarily for advocacy purposes has been 
not only ineffective but also damaging to the United States. They claim that advocacy 
public diplomacy in the post-9/11 era has fuelled international opinion that the United 
States is not only not credible, but unapologetically indignant as well. ‘New’ public 
diplomacy thinkers, who comprise the most outspoken and articulate supporters of the 
advisory model, view the future of public diplomacy as engagement-driven -- a mode for
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processing feedback solicited from publics abroad and harmonizing policy goals with 
local opinion.
At the heart of this debate on the merits of advocacy and advisory models is a 
contrast in views over public diplomacy’s place in the making of U.S. foreign policy. In 
other words, the two sides fundamentally disagree over the proper time at which public 
diplomacy should enter the foreign policy process. Proponents of the advocacy model 
perceive the import of public diplomacy only after policy has been determined, while 
those of the advisory model see a place in the policy formulation stage. This too is a 
tension that long preceded the present state of affairs, but one must wonder, as this study 
does, whether the American public diplomacy tradition of pursuing monologues with 
foreign counterparts is more susceptible than ever to a move to dialogue. The reader may 
arrive at the conclusion that two of the main rationales for this research -  acute anti- 
Americanism since 9/11 and the widely perceived failure of key post-9/11 U.S. foreign 
policies -  set up an inquiry pointing to better public diplomacy as a grand solution, 
otherwise referred to derisively as the ‘magic bullet’.4 This echoes the lofty expectation 
that effective public diplomacy, by itself, can transform the way the world views the 
United States. It would be correct to say this study agrees with the idea that public 
diplomacy, when backed by credible and transparent messages and a long-term 
commitment, may improve image and reputation to a certain degree. To distill the image 
woes of the United States into the serviceable problem of public diplomacy makes way 
for a “technical fix” that leaves underlying influences unscathed.5 But it is important to
4 Kim Andrew Elliott, Public Diplomacy is Not the Magic Bullet, Radio Netherlands, 24 August 2004.
5 David M. Edelstein and Ronald R. Krebs, “Washington’s Troubling Obsession with Public Diplomacy,” 
Survival 47, no. 1 (2005): 99.
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see that public diplomacy, even at its most effective, is not a wholesale solution. It does 
have limits, and two variables lead the long list of why this may be so.
The first constraints to be considered are those created by policy. In the U.S. case, 
many have argued that discussion about improving public diplomacy, although 
worthwhile, does not address more fundamental problems the United States faces in 
elevating its image internationally. “Better image management alone, however, will not 
allow the United States to exercise its power without provoking opposition abroad,” write 
Edelstein and Krebs. “It is substance that is at issue, not style: lasting change in image 
will come only with meaningful and difficult changes in the way that the United States 
conducts itself.”6 The substance they refer to is foreign policy, and the fact that foreign 
populations since 9/11 have been so outspoken in their opposition to it presents both a 
policy problem and a public diplomacy problem. It is a problem of policy to the extent 
that public opposition undermines the international cooperation needed for policies to 
succeed. Several foreign opinion polls, including those of the Pew Global Attitudes 
Project, Zogby International and German Marshall Fund, consistently report declining 
foreign favorability towards the United States. Some would excuse the inadequacies of 
U.S public diplomacy officials with the claim that they are mere messengers delivering 
policy communications they themselves did not create, or even more apologetically, that 
they have been restrained by a set of tools too limited and antiquated to “tell America’s 
story” in a far-reaching and compelling manner.7 For whatever reason, such excuses
6 Ibid, 91-92.
7 United States General Accounting Office, “U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Expands Efforts but 
Faces Significant Challenges,” Report to the Committee on International Relations, House o f  
Representatives (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, September 2003); United States 
Government Accountability Office, “U.S Public Diplomacy: Interagency Coordination Efforts Hampered 
by the Lack o f a National Communication Strategy,” Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Science, the 
Departments o f  State, Justice, and Commerce, and Related Agencies, Committee on Appropriations, House
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sidestep the constraining effect the United States has caused for itself by pursuing a post- 
9711 policy agenda deeply unpopular in many areas of the world. The damage, of course, 
is most perilous in the Middle East, of which Peter van Ham has written, “the proof of the 
pudding is in the eating, and for many Arabs U.S. foreign policy just does not taste
o
good.” With almost uncritical support for Israel and the occupation of Iraq heading the 
list of grievances, many on the “Arab street” treat with suspicion American efforts at 
democratic reform in the region, ridicule its bickering with Iran, Syria, Hizbollah and 
Hamas, and still seethe over images of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib. A 2005 Pew 
survey of the U.S. image abroad revealed that even a majority of those living in moderate 
Middle Eastern nations worried that the United States would take military action against 
them in the future.9 Also worrisome are negative impressions about the United States by 
European nations. Results from a Eurobarometer poll published in the June 2006 
recognized the United States as largely detrimental to peace in the world and negatively 
contributing to the war on terror -  a harsh indictment from countries traditionally 
regarded as friendlier than most to the American foreign policy agenda.10 As of yet, the 
ongoing debate within the United States over what is wrong with its public diplomacy 
apparatus has not produced any official response serious enough to tackle the foreign
o f  Representatives (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, April 2005); “State Department Efforts 
to Engage Muslim Audiences Lack Certain Communication Elements and Face Significant Challenges,” 
Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Science, the Departments o f  State, Justice, and Commerce, and 
Related Agencies, Committee on Appropriations, House o f  Representatives (Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, May 2006); Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, 
“Changing Minds, Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab and 
Muslim World,” Report o f  the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy fo r  the Arab and Muslim World 
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2003). (hereafter ‘Djerejian Report’)
8 Peter van Ham, “Power, Public Diplomacy, and the Pax Americana,” in The New Public Diplomacy: Soft 
Power in International Relations, ed. Jan Melissen (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillian, 2005), 61.
9 Pew Global Attitudes Project, American Character Gets Mixed Reviews: U.S. Image Up Slightly, But Still 
Negative, The Pew Global Attitudes Project (2005), 31. Figures include Turkey (65%), Jordan (67%) and 
Lebanon (59%).
10 European Commission, Eurobarometer 64: Public Opinion in the European Union, (June 2006), 101-2.
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policy dilemma. It then becomes a public diplomacy problem of addressing the 
grievances of those publics, leaving policymakers with the choice of selecting an 
approach that stands the greatest chance of resolving such conflicts.
But the American tradition of public diplomacy has generally eschewed 
reconciliation through substantive policy change. The image that the advocacy model 
conjures in practice has been described here as a ‘push-down’ movement or ‘one-way’ 
flow of information, and this assumption underlies two common recourses used by 
American foreign policy elites to avert calls for policy change. It has been seen that when 
opposition to foreign policy forms, American policymakers’ first recourse is to refine 
messages. Motives used to justify this course of action in recent times include the 
correcting of what is seen to be flawed message distribution, and the determination that 
not enough information channels are being exploited to articulate and defend policy 
positions.11 This justification is attuned to the complex realities of global news cycles 
and the contemporary information technology paradigm, and assumes that higher 
saturation of media with preferred messages will lead to greater understanding and, 
therefore, compliance. But while quantity underlies the management of this problem, 
there are also quality concerns. For example, another motive arises from the general sense 
of American policymakers that messages supportive of their policies are being 
misinterpreted or distorted (usually by international media), or wrongfully contradicted, 
and this adversely impacts foreign public opinion. This solution presumes that better 
articulation of positions will lead to greater understanding and compliance, and American 
officials have effectively sanctioned this tactic within the ‘battle for hearts and minds’.
11 Djerejian Report.
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“This struggle of ideas will span generations,” Karen Hughes has said. “But I am
i ' j
confident our ideals will prevail.”
Alternatively, the second known recourse or tradition to deal with international
opposition to American foreign policy is policy adjustment. But as the brief chronicle in
Chapter Seven revealed, the making of foreign policy in the U.S. tradition tends to occur
virtually exclusive of any involvement by public diplomacy officials. The separation has
ensured that policy debates have always remained beyond the scope of public diplomacy,
save for the occasional expansion of its powers in the event foreign public opinion poses
a significant enough threat to the successful implementation of policies, as with Vietnam
in the 1960’s and Europe and Central America in the 1980’s. During the Cold War,
foreign disenchantment with American foreign policy could be offset by reminding
populations of the Soviet alternative, as the United States did with Western Europe over
11the INF debate in the early 1980’s. The salience of public diplomacy also increases 
when American actions in the international realm encounter a crisis or failure scenario, 
one of which -  the Bay of Pigs fiasco in 1961 -  fostered Edward Murrow’s ‘take off’s 
and crash landings’ phrase. Historically, public diplomacy has entered the fray only after 
substantive policy discussions have taken place.
In the post-9/11 era, there is a question of how much longer these traditions will 
remain practical ones for makers of American foreign policy. On the surface level of the 
debate, one must decide if it is policy that is actually sabotaging public diplomacy rather 
than the reverse. Those who answer affirmatively would side with soft power adherents 
and nation-branding experts who warn, as Simon Anholt has, that the problem of
12 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Confirmation o f  Karen Hughes, 109th Cong., 1st sess., 22 July 2005.
13 Carnes Lord, “The Past and Future o f Public Diplomacy,” Orbis (Winter 1998): 62-64. See Chapter Five 
for more detail on INF.
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international hostility is attributed not so much to “the pervasiveness of the message as 
the credibility of the messenger.”14 The task therefore becomes one of conforming 
substance to message, as it would seem that policy substance belies the messages 
communicated through public diplomacy. Foreign public opinion polls, such as the ones 
presented in the beginning of this study, reinforce this conclusion by suggesting a strong 
relationship between levels of international favorability expressed about the United States 
and the direction of American foreign policy. But is policy chiefly to blame? Keohane, 
Katzenstein and others have recently concluded from an extensive study that the reasons 
for increased international hostility towards the United States are varied and, moreover, 
difficult to measure. Among the areas of ambiguity is the connection between anti- 
American sentiments in response to unpopular foreign policy.15 They find that although 
some regions of the world, such as the Arab Middle East, may demonstrate strong 
opposition to the policy aims of the United States in that part of the world, other 
dimensions of the American image, such as those linked to business and tourism do not 
suffer in this way, and may in fact be viewed positively.16 This appears to contradict a 
basic assumption of soft power adherents concerned about the standing of the United 
States, as well as the extrapolations of foreign opinion pollsters, who make the case that 
American actions in the post-9/11 era share a positive relationship with its international 
image troubles.
14 Simon Anholt and Jeremy Hildreth, Brand America: The Mother o f  All Brands (London: Cyan Books, 
2004): 141.
15 Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds., Anti-Americanisms in World Politics (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2007).
16 Ibid., 273-277.
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8.1 Cultural Constraints
Another factor that may be imposing limits on public diplomacy is culture. In an 
attempt to generalize what is already a convoluted and vastly representational term, 
‘culture’ in this case refers mainly to political culture, although the prevalence of certain 
cultural norms and cross-cutting aspects of American identity also are at play. American 
public diplomacy, as Adelman rightfully pointed out nearly three decades ago, holds no 
domestic constituency “in part because it conjures up Orwellian images of a ‘Ministry of
17Truth’”. This speaks to the postwar American cultural norm of shunning all forms of 
propaganda, especially those generated by the U.S. government. In accord with the 
changed mood, the 1948 Smith-Mundt Act prohibited government sponsored overseas 
information programs and international broadcasting from domestic consumption. 
Because most Americans do not experience the products of public diplomacy programs 
first-hand, it has been difficult for lawmakers to sustain the political will and adequate 
financing needed for such programs to stand any chance of being effective. Chapter 
Three explains how this was never more acute than during the foreign affairs 
restructuring years of the 1990’s -  a prime example of how political culture can 
determine the fate of public diplomacy. In particular, the trials of the Voice of America 
(VOA) over several decades reflect the ebb and flow of the permissiveness with which it 
may advocate American positions to the wider world. Dismissed as a “relic” in the early 
1970’s, VOA re-established itself as a bulwark of American advocacy during the Reagan 
administration, only to once again be fighting for its survival by the mid-1990’s.
17 Kenneth L. Adelman, “Speaking o f America: Public Diplomacy in Our Time,” Foreign Affairs 59, no. 4 
(Spring 1981): 914.
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In the post 9/11-era, the question is not whether to have VO A but how to best 
allocate its resources, which is evident in the scaling back of English-language services in 
favor of local language services.18 The fact that aspects of VO A are again fighting for 
their survival at this time demonstrates one important caveat about the American 
tolerance for public diplomacy, and especially the propagandistic kind. As Bruce 
Gregory points out, Americans are apt to “discover” public diplomacy in times of war.19 
In effect, it has been reintroduced during this time both as a potent tool of statecraft and 
subject of intrigue in the public discourse, both domestically and internationally. (This is 
not to say that international scholarship was entirely inconsequential prior to 9/11, but the 
event-driven reawakening of interest in public diplomacy in the United States has 
unquestionably stimulated not only new thinking on the subject but also new ideas for 
conducting it.) As much as renewed interest in public diplomacy can be attributed to 
9/11, the wartime scenario that emerged thereafter effectively casts public diplomacy as a 
means for victory in the ‘battle for hearts and minds’, and so it becomes tolerable to 
Americans to advocate policies, with what Muravchik has called “unapologetic 
directness”, in a way that most would frown upon during peacetime.
The United States is certainly not the first state to turn to a propagandistic style of 
public diplomacy during wartime. Sharp increases in nationalism are common, fuelling a 
widespread sense of righteousness in support of the cause. Yet there is something 
distinctive about American preponderance of power that lends itself to advocacy model, 
and consequently also diminishes prospects for transparent, relationship-oriented and
18 “Budget Proposal Cuts English-Language Broadcasts,” All Things Considered, NPR, 13 February 2006.
19 Bruce Gregory, “Public Diplomacy as Strategic Communication.” in Strategic and Tactical 
Considerations, vol. 1 o f Countering Terrorism in the 21st Century, ed. James J. Forest (Westport, CT: 
Praeger Security International, forthcoming), 2.
20 Joshua Muravchik, “Hearts, Minds, and the War against Terror,” A E l Online (1 June 2002), 
http://www.aei.org/include/pub_print.asp?pubID= 14896 (accessed 28 February 2006).
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engagement-style public diplomacy approaches. A probable reason for this may be found 
in American exceptionalism. According to Lipset, exceptionalism refers to a perceived 
uniqueness of values and ideals, and strength in conviction, so much so that it is not only
91“qualitatively different” from other cultures, but believed to be of a higher quality. 
Micklethwait and Wooldridge posit that American exceptionalism permeates foreign
99policy through the elements of power, population and patriotism. The messianic current 
of American foreign policy traces back at least before the days of Woodrow Wilson to the 
Spanish-American War, and beneath it a strong undercurrent of patriotism that conceives 
of the United States as a redeemer nation. As for the influence of American population 
on the expression of its nation’s power, Holsti and others argue that the American 
public’s impact on foreign policy is limited, but there is also growing evidence that the 
‘attentive’ public, which is typically well informed or even politically connected, exerts 
significant influence.23 Dean Acheson once remarked that Americans are given to a 
“Narcissus psychosis”, where they stare “like Narcissus at [their] image in the pool of 
what [they] believe to be world opinion.24 Ethnocentrism, then, feeds off this form of 
self-aggrandizement, because being exceptional in the international sense justifies 
behavior ranging from propagandist to hypocritical.
21 Seymour Martin Lipset, American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword (New York, NY: W.W. 
Norton, 1996), 18.
22 John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, The Right Nation: Why America is Different (London: Allen 
Lane, 2004), 297.
23 Ole R. Holsti, Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy (Ann Arbor, MI: University o f Michigan 
Press, 2004), 99-102; Richard Sobel, The Impact o f  Public Opinion on US Policy since Vietnam: 
Constraining the Colossus (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 23-24.
24 “The American Image Will Take Care o f Itself,” New York Times Magazine, 28 February 1965.
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8.2 Revisiting Foreign Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy
The limits imposed on public diplomacy by the American policymaking process 
and certain aspects of American culture are well established, and have been so for most of 
the last sixty years. By calling them limits the implication is that there are external forces 
imposing constraints on acts of public diplomacy, and therefore limiting their potential to 
be effective. These forces came to life with the exploration of the tension between public 
diplomacy and policymaking in Chapter Seven. Moreover, Chapter Three delved into the 
shifting tides in American political culture after the end of the Cold War, and Chapter 
Five the fickleness of American attitudes toward aspects of public diplomacy, such as 
propaganda. However, there are limits and then there are limitations, and the general 
practice of public diplomacy also bears its share of the latter. Relationship building is a 
time intensive pursuit for which political leaders and the public may not have the 
patience, and this has been historically viewed as a limitation of the engagement 
approach. In light of this, the relatively faster returns of information and influence 
approaches garnered more appeal in the eyes of policy-relevant figures. Lawmakers, 
public diplomacy officials, and scholars also have probed endlessly for ways to measure 
the effects of public diplomacy. But there has been little progress in the establishment of 
performance indicators and benchmarks, and this remains an obstacle to cultivating public 
support and political will, not to mention the virtually perennial requests for budget 
increases. As an institution, U.S. public diplomacy perpetuates some of its own 
limitations by dispatching officers into the field without sufficient local knowledge or 
language skills.
25 Joe Johnson, “How Does Public Diplomacy Measure Up?” Foreign Service Journal (October 2006), 44- 
52; U.S. General Accounting Office, “U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Expands Efforts but Faces 
Significant Challenges,” 20-21.
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As many recent critical reports suggest, there lies hope in knowing that there is 
much the United States can do to deal with internally-placed limits and limitations. But if 
there is anything to be gained from examining the limits as well as the limitations of U.S. 
public diplomacy, it is in the way they have expanded from the domestic to the 
international realm. As ‘new’ public diplomacy thinkers argue, the world around United 
States has changed, and this should significantly alter the way it thinks about and pursues 
public diplomacy in the post-9/11 era. There are four external factors raised throughout 
the study that might help explain the limits of U.S. public diplomacy. First, foreign 
populations have unprecedented access to information and a broad selection of sources 
from which they can gather content. The old public diplomacy conundrum of tunneling 
information to deprived populations is fast becoming an anachronism. In turn, the new 
public diplomacy conundrum is how to capture the attention of populations inundated by 
competing sources. Because information proliferation makes it easier for audiences to 
distinguish fact from fiction, it behooves government-sponsored information providers to 
eschew propaganda in favor of transparency, and place a priority on credibility. As 
Steven Livingston has advised diplomats:
“The world may be awash in data, but credible information and certainly 
wisdom will remain in short supply. This offers the professional diplomat 
a clear opportunity and an equally clear challenge. The diplomat has the 
opportunity to become -  to remain -  a trusted source o f  clarity in a world 
too given to producing overwhelming complexities. ”
Second, foreign populations are showing an increased capability to use that 
information to affect policy discourses and outcomes. The factors that may affect the
26 Steven Livingston, “The New Media and Transparency: What are the Consequences for Diplomacy?” in 
Cyber-Diplomacy: Managing Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century, ed. Evan H. Potter (Montreal & 
Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002), 121.
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course of a policy have until now remained confined to the domestic realm. With the 
globalization of ICT’s, it is far easier for individuals to educate themselves on the policy- 
related discourses of other countries, organize political action, or enter the news cycle by 
broadcasting views and opinions. Third, public empowerment in determining the course 
of foreign policy means that civilians are undertaking roles that were once exclusive to 
diplomats. Non-state actors have exhibited the ability to steer agendas, communicate on a 
worldwide scale, and draw segments of societies to their causes. Both nations and firms 
are employing public relations techniques borrowed from the private sector to build
onrepresentational ‘brands’ to positively project image and reputation. Fourth, the 
changing nature of the way foreign publics interface with governments means that, by 
definition, public diplomacy is being transformed. Preceding conventional wisdom about 
public diplomacy held that the flow of communications would travel from state officials 
to foreign populations and do so terminally, primarily for the tasks of informing and 
influencing them to think and behave in ways consistent with the aims of the protagonist 
government. As the actors involved in public diplomacy expand to incorporate a greater 
number of empowered counterparts bearing a non-official status, the flow of 
communication becomes more symmetrical. As the information disparity narrows, it 
becomes more advantageous for parties to cooperate rather than compete, as Lord 
Triesman recently concluded in the aftermath of an extensive study on British public 
diplomacy:
“The new public diplomacy relies as much on alliances and cooperation 
as classic diplomacy. But these alliances are not just with Governments 
but with pressure groups, charities, business, human rights organisations, 
community and religious groups, the media and countless others who want
27 Anholt and Hildreth, Brand America.
270
JRto achieve the same thing as us. ”
8.3 Future Directions and Future Scholarship
With the years of the Cold War gradually fading into the distance, American 
public diplomacy institutions are undoubtedly situated at a crossroads. Hanging in the 
balance are decisions that will shape and guide the purpose of those institutions for the 
years ahead, and given the complexity of the vastly changed and complex environment in 
which they must operate it is no surprise the debate over the future of public diplomacy is 
fraught with a cacophony of ideas, but no clear consensus over how to proceed. Some 
of the more forward-thinking propositions to enter the fray genuinely reflect the dynamics 
of a new geopolitical environment. These consist of proposals for new approaches to 
public diplomacy in accordance one or more of the following schools of thought: first, the 
greatly accelerated flow of information due to advances in international communications 
technologies; second, the increasing relevance of culture over ideology as a basis for 
transmitting messages among foreign populations; and third, a starkly different position 
of power held by the United States in the post-Cold War era than before. In the first 
instance, we see a reaction to changes in the way people obtain and share information, 
heralded by the arrival of the “information age” and such extant developments in the form 
of the Internet and the “CNN factor” of global and instantly accessible newscasts. With 
so many information channels available to average people on a regular basis, this 
explosion in technological innovation has resulted in what Joseph Nye calls a “paradox of
28 Lord Triesman, “Public Diplomacy: Steps to the Future” (lecture, London School o f Economics, 23 April 
2007).
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9Q •plenty”. No longer subject to controls of limited time and limited access, which has 
abetted the United States in the ability to contain and manage information, the future 
success of public diplomacy rests in part on an ability to keep pace. “Patience,” says 
former U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry wistfully, “was the last lesson of the 
Cold War.”30
The second characteristic posits a general statement about dynamics in the 
international arena -  cultural differences, rather than nationalism, more frequently
♦ 91account for miscommunications between peoples. This dimension goes so far to say 
that past struggles over nationality and ideology have given way to struggles of identity, 
in effect somewhat paralyzing the comparative simplicity of targeting public diplomacy 
to a sovereign state with a distinct polity and hierarchy of leadership. Consequently, 
without a base of cultural knowledge from which initiatives can be developed, tailoring 
content to suit tastes and habits becomes for more complex than during the Cold War. 
The third characteristic involves yet another Nye paradox, not of ‘plenty’ but of ‘power’, 
which draws attention to changes in global distribution of power from a bipolar to 
unipolar one, and thereby implying a parallel adjustment in the exercise of public 
diplomacy -  an adjustment that aid in the preservation of U.S. dominance through the use
99of soft power.
What kind of paths these ideas will open for future public diplomacy activities 
remains uncertain, and it is probable that another plethora of reports may generate yet
29 Joseph S. Nye Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004.)
J° David Bollier, “The Rise o f Netpolitik: How the Internet is Changing International Politics and 
Diplomacy,” A Report o f the Eleventh Annual Aspen Institute Roundtable on Information Technology 
(2003), 6.
31 House Committee on Government Reform, The 9-11 Commission Recommendations on Public 
Diplomacy: Defending Ideals and Defining the Message, 108th Cong., 2nd sess., 23 August 2004.
32 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Paradox o f  American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It 
Alone (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.)
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more ideas for agents of change to ruminate over. Until that time, how well can the 
‘broken’ apparatus of U.S. public diplomacy sustain itself? Some, such as Bruce Gregory 
at George Washington University’s Public Diplomacy Institute, lament the imbalance 
between far-reaching reporting efforts and the underwhelming evidence that new ideas 
are being implemented into new approaches to public diplomacy. At the very least, it is 
undeniable that all points are searching for responses to world dramatically changed since 
the Cold War. For public diplomacy to move forward, as such forward-thinking 
approaches suggest, it must respond to changes in the international system by developing 
practices most suited to the dynamics in which they must operate rather than rely too 
heavily on “relics” of the past.
One thing that can be said for the post-9/11 period is that the state of scholarship 
on public diplomacy, both on the U.S. and in general, appears more robust than during the 
prior decade, and perhaps more diversified than ever before.34 In 2006, Melissen 
proclaimed public diplomacy to be “beyond any doubt one of the hottest topics under 
discussion in the world’s diplomatic services.” Meanwhile, Gregory submits the attack of 
9/11 turned the preceding “analytical trickle” of public diplomacy research into “a fire 
hose of reports, articles, and opinion columns.” The greater attention concentrated on the 
U.S. case also has paralleled a surge of interest in the way other nations go about 
conducting public diplomacy. Canada and Norway are two frequently cited cases of
33 Bruce Gregory, “Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication: Cultures, Firewalls, and Imported 
Norms” (paper presented at the American Political Science Association Conference on International 
Communication and Conflict, Washington, DC, 31 August 2005.)
34 Jan Melissen, “Public Diplomacy Between Theory and Practice” (paper presented at the Madrid 
Conference on Public Diplomacy, Madrid, Spain, 30 November 2006.); Bruce Gregory, “Public Diplomacy 
as Strategic Communication”.
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• • •states investing more heavily in their own public diplomacy capabilities. Western
powers such as Germany, France and the United Kingdom are looking at new ways of 
expanding existing programs, while an emerging China now includes a public diplomacy 
component within its foreign affairs agenda. As scholars collect and analyze the 
experiences of states with their public diplomacy programs, more is learned about the 
breadth and depth of public diplomacy activities, which adds an empirical dimension to a 
hitherto understudied and highly specialized state behavior. To a significant degree, U.S. 
public diplomacy engenders facets of agency, structure and behavior that are common to 
other international actors. One of the goals of this study has been to establish a global 
context for public diplomacy practice, if only to demonstrate that the American emphasis 
on a particular hierarchy of approaches and primary reliance on one model is but one 
interpretation of a broader notion of public diplomacy activities.
But this should not obscure the fact that United States does face unique challenges 
in repairing its public diplomacy. The United States is now confronted with how to 
gamer more domestic support for a dimension of foreign policy implementation 
traditionally hidden from public view. It suffers from dysfunction in its organization and 
short-lived coordination efforts. It has yet to adapt its practices from the Cold War 
assumption that foreign audiences are information-poor to a new information paradigm 
where publics are deficient in attention, information-rich, and, in concurrence with Nye, 
more powerful as a result. It is the conclusion of this thesis that future research should
35 Jozef Batora, “Public Diplomacy in Small and Medium Sized States: Norway and Canada,” Discussion 
Papers in Diplomacy (Netherlands Institute o f International Relations (Clingendael), March 2005); Alan K. 
Henrikson, “Niche Diplomacy in the World Public Arena: the Global ‘Comers’ o f Canada and Norway,” in 
The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations, ed. Jan Melissen (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2005), 67-87; On Norway, see Mark Leonard, Public Diplomacy (London: The Foreign Policy 
Centre, 2002), 169-75.
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concentrate on resolving these areas if U.S. public diplomacy is 
effectiveness.
to increase its
275
APPENDIX A: LIST OF ACRONYMS
ACDA Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
BBG Broadcasting Board of Governors
CIC Coalition Information Center
CWC Chemical Weapons Convention
EC A Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs
FSO American Foreign Service Officer
GAO Government Accountability Office
(General Accounting Office until July 2004)
IIP International Information Programs
JUSPAO Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement
NED National Endowment for Democracy
NIS Newly Independent States
NPR National Performance Review
PAO Public Affairs Officer (American Foreign Service)
RFE Radio Free Europe
RL Radio Liberty
RRU Rapid Response Unit
SMI Strategic Management Initiative
VO A Voice of America
USAID U.S. Agency for International Development
USIA U.S. Information Agency
USICA U.S. International Communication Agency
USIS U.S. Information Service
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APPENDIX B: SUMMARY RECOMMENDATIONS OF CRS REPORTS, 1999-2005
Source: Susan B. Epstein and Lisa M ages, “Public D iplom acy: A Review o f  Past Recommendations,” CRS R eport fo r  C ongress, 2 September 2005.
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Challenges Remain. GAO-04-106IT. 23 August 2004; (911) National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. The 9/11 Commission Report. 22 July 2004; (NSFR) Walter R. Roberts and 
Barry Fulton. “Rebuilding Public Diplomacy.” National Strategy Forum Review. Spring 2004; (PDC3) Public Diplomacy Council. “Engaging the Arab/Islamic World -  Next Steps for U.S. Public Diplomacy.” 
Summary of Public Diplomacy Forum. 27 February 2004; (RAND) Charles Wolf, Jr. and Brian Rosen. Public Diplomacy - How To Think About and Improve It. RAND Corporation. 2004; (FPA) Jerrold 
Keilson. “Public Diplomacy and U.S. Foreign Policy.” Great Decisions 2004. Foreign Policy Association; (KIE) William Kiehl. “Can Humpty Dumpty be Saved?” American Diplomacy. 13 November 2003; 
(DJEI) Peter G. Peterson and Edward Djerejian. A New Strategic Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab & Muslim World. T ranscript. Council on Foreign Relations. 7 October 2003; (DJE2) 
Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World.Changing Minds, Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World. 1 October 2003.
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(US IPI) Richard Solomon and Shery 1J. Brown. Creating a Common Communications Culture: Interoperability' in Crisis Management. United States Institute of Peace. 12 September 2003; (G A 02) U.S. 
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APPENDIX C: U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY BUDGET 1991-2001
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